$6.50

WINTER 1982

A Journal of World Affairs

ORBIS

797
E
USBE

RECEIVED
PERIODICALS
MAR 29 1982
DREW UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

Foreign Policy Research Institute

in Association with the Graduate Program in International Relations
University of Pennsylvania

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS: A Journal of World Affairs **(ISSN 0030-4387)**

Published by the
Foreign Policy Research Institute
in Association with the
Graduate Program in International Relations
University of Pennsylvania

EDITORIAL BOARD

RICHARD K. BETTS
The Brookings Institution

HENRY S. BIENEN
Princeton University

ADDA B. BOZEMAN
Sarah Lawrence College, Emeritus

INIS L. CLAUDE
University of Virginia

RICHARD V. L. COOPER
Coopers & Lybrand

DAVID DEESE
Boston College

CHARLES F. DORAN
The Johns Hopkins University

MARK FALCOFF
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

STEPHEN P. GIBERT
Georgetown University

COLIN S. GRAY
National Institute for Public Policy

WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

MICHAEL C. HUDSON
Georgetown University

J. C. HUREWITZ
Columbia University

MORTON A. KAPLAN
University of Chicago

CHARLES W. KEGLEY, JR.
University of South Carolina

CATHERINE KELLEHER
National Defense University

LAWRENCE B. KRAUSE
The Brookings Institution

CHONG-SIK LEE
University of Pennsylvania

DEREK LEEBAERT
Harvard University

THOMAS NAFF
University of Pennsylvania

STEPHANIE G. NEUMAN
Columbia University

COVEY T. OLIVER
University of Pennsylvania

NORMAN ORNSTEIN
Catholic University

NORMAN D. PALMER
University of Pennsylvania

ANDREW J. PIERRE
Council on Foreign Relations

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

R. J. RUMMEL
University of Hawaii–Manoa

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO
University of California–Berkeley

PAUL SEABURY
University of California–Berkeley

DONALD E. SMITH
University of Pennsylvania

W. SCOTT THOMPSON
The Center for Strategic and International Studies

FRANK N. TRAGER
New York University, Emeritus

WILLIAM R. VAN CLEAVE
University of Southern California

IVAN VOLGYES
University of Nebraska–Lincoln

ALLEN S. WHITING
University of Michigan

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS

Editor
ALAN NED SABROSKY

Managing Editor
NILS H. WESSELL

Manuscript Editor
NORA E. POMERANTZ

Book Review Editor
CHARLES B. PURRENHAGE

Circulation Manager
JULIE JOHNSON

Editorial Assistant
KENNETH C. WARNER

Graphics
BELINDA QUAN

Contributing Editors
RICHARD E. BISSELL
GREGORY D. FOSTER

Editors Emeriti: WILLIAM R. KINTNER, ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ

The opinions expressed in articles and reviews in this journal are those of the contributors and should not be construed as representing those of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the University of Pennsylvania, or the Editors of ORBIS.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Copyright © 1981 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a Delaware nonprofit corporation. Reproduction of contents without permission is forbidden. The Foreign Policy Research Institute is a publicly supported, nonprofit, tax-exempt corporation as described in Section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) of the Internal Revenue Code. All contributions to the Institute are tax-deductible.

ORBIS (ISSN 0030-4387) is published four times a year by the Foreign Policy Research Institute. **Editorial and business offices:** 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104. **Subscription rates,** per year: $15.00 for individuals, $25.00 for institutions. Special student rate, $10.00. (Outside U.S.A., add $2.00 per year.) Single copy, $6.50. Second-class postage paid at Philadelphia, PA, and at additional mailing offices. **Postmaster:** Send address changes to ORBIS, 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104.

Books and other publications for review should be sent to the Book Review Editor. Address correspondence relating to **subscriptions and bulk orders** to the Circulation Manager (please include ZIP).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS
A Journal of World Affairs

VOLUME 25
NUMBER 4
WINTER 1982

Editors' Note 852

Forum: U.S. Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa

The Pursuit of Coherence	Richard E. Bissell	853
On Safari – Again	Helen Kitchen	855
Nigeria and the United States	Ali Mazrui	858
The Dimensions of U.S. Policy Toward South Africa	Alan Pifer	864
Has Constructive Engagement Died?	John Seiler	867
A Rapprochement with Racism?	Stephen J. Solarz	873

Bridging the Black-White Gulf in Africa	Newell M. Stultz	881
African Flashpoints: Prospects for Armed International Conflict	Raymond W. Copson	903
Things Fall Apart?	Dennis Austin	925
Military Rule and Military Order in Africa	Henry S. Bienen	949
Ideology, Parties, and Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa	Michael Radu	967
Africa and Foreign Aid: Using Scarce Resources Wisely	Frederick W. Stokeld	993
U.S. Policy Toward Africa: At America's Service?	W. Scott Thompson	1011
Issues of African Diplomacy in the 1980s	I. William Zartman	1025

Review Essays

Winning the War for Zimbabwe	Robert I. Rotberg	1045
Soviet Diplomacy in Africa	Crawford Young	1053

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EDITORS' NOTE

The ORBIS Special Issue on Africa was conceptualized more than a year ago in recognition of the need to focus greater attention on Africa's role in the world from both policymaking and academic perspectives. At a time when U.S. policies toward Africa are undergoing re-evaluation, the Special Issue provides an opportunity to assess the changing dynamics of African domestic policies and international relations.

The journal is pleased to acknowledge the generous grant from the Howard Heinz Endowment in support of the Special Issue on Africa.

THE EDITORS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

forum

U.S. POLICY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

In this special issue on Africa, the "ORBIS Forum" examines U.S. foreign policy toward sub-Saharan Africa and focuses on providing some guidelines for the present administration in Washington. The six contributors in this issue are: **RICHARD E. BISSELL,** *Research Associate at the Foreign Policy Research Institute;* **HELEN KITCHEN,** *Director of African Studies at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies;* **ALI MAZRUI,** *Professor of Political Science at University of Michigan's Center for Afroamerican and African Studies;* **ALAN PIFER,** *President of the Carnegie Corporation of New York;* **JOHN SEILER,** *Editor of* The Seiler Report *and a political scientist; and* **STEPHEN J. SOLARZ** (D-NY), *former Chairman, and now a member, of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa.*

The Pursuit of Coherence

It would be impossible to count the times the question "What should be the shape of an American policy in Africa?" has elicited the response "There is no such thing as an Africa policy in the singular—the continent is too diverse and dynamic to be encompassed by a single strategy." The Reagan administration came into office with perhaps the lowest expectations in twenty years for a simple, straightforward policy in Africa, the American policymakers readily recognizing the complications of the 1980s: major Soviet/ Cuban inroads, growing gaps in African income levels, continuing domestic political instability, and an absence of regional harmony. Yet in the course of its first year, the Reagan administration demonstrated striking coherence—whether intended or not—in its approaches to African issues.

The focus of American diplomacy clearly shifted from domestic problems of African states to the international conflicts racking the continent. Every corner of Africa faces major armed conflicts that, if not eliminated or at least dampened, represent permanent drains of funds otherwise available for development. The wars in Namibia, Angola, Western Sahara, Chad, and the Horn of Africa are each dangerously subversive of stability in an African subregion. U.S. activism in Africa in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1981 was clearly directed at dealing with those conflicts. Given the limited political capital available in Washington for African issues, that choice has been instrumental in focusing high-level attention on African interstate relations rather than domestic economic or political problems.

Attention appears to have diverted to domestic issues, primarily where the character of regimes has been judged so dangerous as to endanger regional stability; the case of Colonel Qaddafi is most notable in this regard. Rumors of initiative in Washington to unseat the Libyan leader probably had some basis in fact, particularly after he appeared to threaten U.S. peacemaking plans in both the Middle East and Africa.

In general, however, the focus on African international issues has led to exercises in "bridge-building" between states and warring parties not otherwise engaged in negotiation. The American role has been particularly promiment in Namibia, where the United States decided to introduce some changes into the old process based on UN Security Council Resolution 435. Not only did the wide range of involved states accept the changes, but also the gradual process of reaching a settlement was still on a positive track at the end of 1981. The negotiating process itself became an object almost as valuable as the end result of independence for Namibia; after all, a range of issues must eventually be faced involving South Africa and the rest of the continent, and Namibia may be the place to begin building some mutual trust. In some conflict environments, Washington has had little room to maneuver into a "good offices" role. The role of mediator was then taken by other states, as in Chad.

An interesting common denominator of all recent U.S. activity in Africa, however, has been its low visibility. The Reagan administration is evidently not interested in keeping African issues before the public. This may be the result of the unpopularity of diplomatic bridge-building among U.S. constituencies actively involved in African affairs. The polarized nature of Africa lobbies in the United States, whether clustered around Jesse Helms or Randall Robinson, has ensured a deep reservoir of hostility or skepticism about an American administration trying to work both sides of the fence in Africa.

The scope of this American diplomatic tack is limited by the availability of non–zero-sum solutions to these African problems. Thus far, the Namibian negotiations appear to hold out gains for both sides—even if only the absence of war. The cases of the Western Sahara and the Somali-Ethiopian wars are far more difficult: either you have the territory or you don't. The pain involved in both conflicts, escalating as more soldiers are killed and refugees created, may become an incentive for the settlement of the conflicts. The more difficult search for a non–zero-sum solution occurs in the post-Namibia confrontation between South Africa and its northern neighbors. An early clue to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shape of that confrontation could be seen in the creation of the Southern African Development and Coordination Council (SADCC), mobilized by Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe to knit together the economies of the states on South Africa's northern border. The United States supported the SADCC generously with financial aid from its inception, but warning flags went up in 1981 over the emerging confrontational language used by SADCC leaders against South Africa. It became evident that the administration or the Congress might make support of the SADCC contingent on it not becoming a "bridge-burning" operation at a time when the United States is attempting to build bridges. To be successful in that effort, though, the United States would need to find allies among the other Western aid donors, and some of those donors, particularly the Scandinavians, give support particularly to antiapartheid institutions.

It would be unfair, having acknowledged some coherence of behavior in U.S. foreign policy in 1981, to then ask if it will be adequate or appropriate for the rest of the 1980s. After all, that coherence may have been unintended and liable to change at any time. At the same time, one should note the fact that Africa is truly entering a new era. It should be evident that while decolonization preoccupied Africa over the past twenty to thirty years, the continent is now in the postdecolonization era. Of great symbolic importance was the departure of Leopold Segar Senghor from Senegal's presidency in 1981. A new generation of leadership is almost fully emerged, having arrived at political power in most cases by domestic mechanisms rather than having been endowed by a colonial power. We can assume that they expect and deserve a different sort of respect from non-African powers than was given their predecessors. They are likely to be more secure in their domestic bases of power and less certain of dealing with the international environment. If the United States, in fact, is engaged in a shift of priorities to the interstate milieu, it will be valuable to see the African response to such American policies. Thus far, the African view seems to be so reserved as to express approval through an absence of condemnation.

RICHARD E. BISSELL

On Safari—Again

The gusto with which the Reagan administration has entered into or initiated a series of high-stakes poker games on the African continent during its first year in office derives from yet another adjustment to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lenses through which the executive branch of the United States government views political developments and personalities in Africa and the Third World generally.

The Reagan administration is more categorical than its predecessor in linking aid to Africa to the U.S. national interest. Moreover, calculations of the U.S. national interest in Africa place heavier emphasis on countering Soviet influence in the here and now than on the concept of helping Africa construct the building blocks of economic and political self-reliance.

In the 1982 budget presentation sent by the president to Congress early in 1981, the amount specified for foreign military sales credits for sub-Saharan Africa was up 178 per cent from 1981 to a requested total of $203 million. An increase of 60 per cent was proposed for the sub-Saharan Africa portion of the Economic Support Fund, which funnels aid funds through governments and is traditionally influenced heavily by political and security considerations. Development project aid administered by the Agency for International Development was up 29 per cent, but distributed in new ways. Food assistance was projected to decline.

Selected countries are being favored in all categories of aid because of security considerations or a desire to encourage the Western orientation of governments. The Sudan is in high favor because President Jafar al-Numeri remained aligned with Egypt during the crucial period after Camp David, has offered the United States access to Sudanese facilities in the event of a regional crisis and for military exercises, and has been portrayed as facing a destabilization threat from Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi, who is viewed as a prime U.S. enemy. Indeed, excluding Egypt, Sudan is now scheduled to receive the largest share of U.S. aid to the African continent, at a proposed base level of $206.6 million. Kenya and Somalia, which are supporting the growing U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean by providing access to port and other facilities, rank second and third. Morocco and Tunisia, both neighbors of Libya, are also receiving new attention. Liberia and Zimbabwe are perceived as needing special attention to ensure that they remain either pro-Western or genuinely nonaligned, although there are growing pressures from right-wing Senate Republicans against major support for Zimbabwe.

In undertaking to pick up where the Carter administration left off in orchestrating the UN-based search for a solution to the Namibia problem (specifically, to revive the stalemated process of getting all the internal and external actors to agree to and carry through a sequence of steps by which the long-disputed territory would become an independent state in such a way that its independent status would be recognized by all members of the international community), the Reagan administration

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

made a major tactical shift in relation to South Africa. The resulting policy of "constructive engagement" is a high-risk gambit. Washington's strongest card is the threat implicit in the reality that South Africa will never get a better deal on Namibia than one negotiated under the Reagan administration's aegis.

Nevertheless, some architects and well-wishers of constructive engagement are wary that South Africa may be operating yet again on a two-track policy—gobbling up Washington's carrots appreciatively and cooperating in all of the early steps pointing toward elections, while retaining the ability to shift to another track if a later assessment determines that the domestic political costs of a Namibian settlement would be too high. The most unsettling evidence supporting the two-track thesis is the South African military's continuing policy of pre-emptive strikes across its (or Namibia's) borders against forces, armaments, or installations perceived to be threatening.

Thus, an unresolved contradiction exists between the optimistic readings that we are getting from all quarters on the diplomatic strides toward a Namibian settlement achieved through constructive engagement and the intensity with which the South African military is dedicating itself to wiping out the political movement viewed by most observers to be the voters' likely choice of government in a freely conducted Namibian election. The low-keyed, convoluted U.S. response to this contradiction seems to reflect some ambivalence on the part of the administration about the logical outcome of present negotiations—another self-declared Marxist government in southern Africa.

The subtleties of U.S. policymaking in southern Africa have been flung aside in dealing with North Africa and the adjacent sub-Saharan region. As early as March 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig was characterized by the *Washington Post* as "slightly obsessed with knocking Libya's Colonel Muammar Qaddafi from power" and as viewing the Libyan leader "as an agent of an international Soviet-backed terrorist conspiracy." In late June, the State Department's press spokesman publicly chastised the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for choosing "a most inappropriate spokesman" (Qaddafi) as its 1982 chairman. Throughout this area of the continent, U.S. policy has divided leaders into camps of "good guys" and "bad guys."

The administration appears to have been rescued from a potentially catastrophic military involvement in northern Africa by a masterful exercise of French diplomacy working through the OAU to effect a peaceful removal of Libyan troops from Chad and to establish that both Chad and the Western Sahara are regional rather than East-West problems, and thus better handled (with Western technical and logistical

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

help) through African channels. French Minister of Cooperation and Development Jean-Pierre Cot helped set the scene during a visit to Washington in late September 1981: "Qaddafi has an enormous capacity for bluff . . . [he] can develop his influence not so much through terrorism or true strength, but by using an extraordinary tactical intelligence and understanding of the governments around him. . . . [The United States should not] play funny games with him. . . . Don't elevate him to martyrdom."

This sampling of current U.S. policy toward Africa illustrates an almost reflexive inclination to fit every personality, every country, every issue, every crisis into squares on an East-West chessboard. But the sampling also suggests that this administration, like others before it, is in the process of learning that ideological linkages are still means rather than ends in most African situations, and that political and economic bargaining and brokerage are more effective than arms in resolving African conflict situations.

The learning process is inevitably slow. While Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester A. Crocker is more intensively trained in the intricacies of African politics than any preceding political appointee in that key State Department post, not one official in the entire Reagan administration above the assistant secretary level came to office with a working knowledge of Africa's political history. One very senior official did not know that blacks are not allowed to vote in South African elections. Compare this with French President François Mitterrand's and External Affairs Minister Claude Cheysson's intimate ties with Africa over the decades, or the years of experience that enabled British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington to play so brilliantly the role of midwife for Zimbabwe.

With patience, however, and some timely behind-the-scenes mediation by European allies, Africa may yet survive the trauma of the current eposide of America's quadrennial "safari syndrome."

HELEN KITCHEN

Nigeria and the United States:
The Need for Civility, The Dangers of Intimacy

I have made several trips to Nigeria since the military went back to the barracks and the new civilian republic came into being in 1979. I am about to leave for Nigeria once again. One of the most impressive trends in the country is the new growth of international awareness. Nigerians are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

beginning to recognize the simple fact that their country is—in size and to some extent in resources—black Africa's natural leader.

Even if we took the bicontinental unit of Eurafrica (encompassing both Europe and Africa), Nigeria is the largest country after the Soviet Union. Within Africa, the country's population is certainly a qualification for primacy: one out of every four Africans is a Nigerian.

What should U.S. foreign policy toward Nigeria be? I believe it should be based, first, on a recognition that Nigeria is indeed evolving into a great power. Second, U.S. policy should recognize the growing interdependence between the two countries. And third, the United States should not permit that interdependence to become too close an embrace, for this would compromise Nigeria's credentials for leadership in Africa and the Third World.

For the time being, the interdependence between Nigeria and the United States is taking a fascinating form, without becoming an embrace of intimacy. Indeed, the giant of Africa, Nigeria, and the giant of the West, the United States, have entered into a strange social contract without fully realizing it. Something from Nigeria is needed for the economic health of the United States. Something from the United States seems to be needed for the political health of Nigeria. What the American economy keeps importing from Nigeria is oil. What the Nigerian political system has imported from the United States is federalism. "New fuel for old federalism"—this seems to be the clarion call of the new Aladdin.

The president of Nigeria, Al-Haji Shagari, visited the United States in 1980 and addressed the General Assembly of the UN. The visit was Shagari's first major bid for international visibility after he was elected to head the first civilian government in Nigeria since the military coup of January 1966.

In the era of Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford, relations between Nigeria and the United States betrayed a deep contradiction. On the one hand, the economic relations between the two countries were deepening. Nigeria was already becoming the second-largest foreign source of oil for the United States—second only to Saudi Arabia.

On the other hand, though, the political relations between Lagos and Washington were rather cool. This was partly because neither Nixon nor Kissinger took Africa seriously. Nixon virtually snubbed General Yokubu Gowon, then Nigeria's head of state, when Gowon visited the United States during Nixon's administration. Partly in retaliation, Nigeria snubbed Henry Kissinger by discouraging him from visiting Lagos during his shuttle diplomacy to solve the Rhodesian crisis. Relations between the two countries remained politically cool until Andrew Young, U.S. ambassador to the UN, began to mend America's fences with Africa on behalf of the Carter administration.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Throughout that whole period of political coolness, however, America's economic dependence on Nigeria was increasing. Had Nigeria decided to join the Arab oil embargo of 1973, the consequences for the United States would have been severe.

Moreover, the trade deficit between the two countries was already decidedly in Nigeria's favor. In that period the deficit was moving toward the $5 billion mark. It has now exceeded $10 billion. The United States sells far less to Nigeria than it buys. And what the United States buys is much more fundamental to the U.S. economy than what Nigeria buys is fundamental to Nigeria's economic well-being.

But Nigeria, like much of the rest of Africa, is groping for viable political institutions. The constitutional legacy that the British bequeathed on Nigeria's independence in 1960 collapsed in a military coup in 1966. The soldiers remained in power for thirteen years. When the soldiers were at last ready to return to the barracks under pressure from popular forces, and their country then had to work out a new constitution, the most influential model was neither British nor African. It was in fact American. The new Nigerian constitution—though by no means identical to the United States'—owes more to the American constitutional paradigm than to any other.

This is the strange compact between Africa's giant and the colossus of North America. As I mentioned, one out of every four Africans is Nigerian. One out of every three hemispheric Americans is a citizen of the United States. Nigerian fuel helps to keep the economy of the United States ticking; American federalism helps to keep this large African polity institutionally alive. The two societies are caught up in a remarkable interplay between energy and innovation, between the oil pump and the eternal polity.

But, as I intimated earlier, interdependence between the United States and Nigeria should not evolve into too close an embrace. in the early 1970s carried its own momentum. It was part of the wider Sadat's decision to cultivate a new level of interdependence with the West from the early 1970s carried its own momentum. It was part of the wider background to Sadat's dramatic trip to Jerusalem in 1977—to the applause of the Western world.

In this regard, it is worth comparing Nigeria and Egypt as pivotal powers in their respective regions of the world.

Egypt is of course the largest country in the Arab world; Nigeria is the largest in the African continent. By a strange coincidence two events occurred in the year 1970 that profoundly affected the fortunes of the two countries. President Gamal Abdel Nasser died in Egypt, and the Nigerian civil war over Biafra came to an end in West Africa.

The death of Nasser was probably an important stage in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

decline of Egypt as leader of the Arab world. The end of the Biafran war was an important stage in the gradual rise of Nigeria as an African superstar.

The rise of Arab oil power outside Egypt confirmed Cairo's decline as the pivot of Arab initiative. Power shifted to the oil producers, especially Saudi Arabia. The rise of oil power within Nigeria confirmed Lagos's rise as the pivot of Pan-Africanism.

And then came Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the subsequent Camp David accords, and Egypt's separate peace treaty with Israel. This contrasted with the increasing radicalization of Nigeria's policy toward southern Africa, its readiness to use the oil weapon against Margaret Thatcher's administration to gain concessions on Zimbabwe in 1979, and the new threats by President Shagari's administration that Nigeria could not remain indifferent if the Republic of South Africa became a nuclear power—a fair warning about nuclear proliferation in the African continent.

What emerges from this is that since Nasser's death Egypt's foreign policy has deradicalized in spite of the brief glory of the October War against Israel in 1973. On the other hand, since the end of the Nigerian civil war, Nigeria's foreign policy has become increasingly anti-imperialist.

Egypt got out of step with the mainstream of opinion in the Arab world. Nigeria has decided to be fully in the mainstream of opinion in the African world. The secret of leadership is to be neither too far ahead of the followers' opinion nor too far behind. The touch of genius lies in using popular opinion as the foundation of a new breakthrough. Sadat's Egypt did not demonstrate that touch of genius—it went too far ahead of Arab opinion. Nigeria has not yet found the secret of political genius either—but at least Nigeria has so far avoided the mistake of ignoring the basic foundations of African sensibilities.

In the Western world Egypt has never been more popular than since it signed a separate peace treaty with Israel, despite previous vows never to do so. In the Arab world Egypt has never been more ostracized than since that same rapprochement.

The standing of Nigeria is, however, solid in both Africa and the West. In the course of one week there could be a report about a high-powered delegation from the OAU visiting Nigeria to discuss the situation in Chad in the aftermath of Libya's withdrawal from Chad.

Also in the course of the same week there could be reports of Nigeria's involvement as an observer at a meeting of the front-line states of southern Africa taking place in Zambia. The agenda could be mainly on the future of Namibia or South Africa's military incursions into those neighboring countries that harbor South Africa's liberation fighters.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nigeria is located far from southern Africa, but the readiness of the front-line states to keep Nigeria informed about their own strategies for southern Africa is an important measure of Nigeria's emerging status in Pan-African affairs.

Such news items in a single week — Libya's eagerness to explain its policy on Chad to Nigeria while ignoring Egypt, and the eagerness of southern African black states to keep Nigeria fully briefed on security in southern Africa — have raised the question of whether the world is witnessing the birth of a doctrine of *Pax Nigeriana*. Is this remarkable West African state about to become the mediator of the African continent? Is this happening with Egypt's political decline, despite Sadat's desire to see Egypt succeed the shah as policeman of the Middle East?

The answers are complex. On the Nigerian side, however, one question that persists is why it has taken some twenty years since Nigeria's independence to make Nigeria's credentials for leadership explicit.

When I was in Nigeria early in 1981, I was the guest of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, which is the approximate equivalent of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York or, more closely, Chatham House in London.

I found Nigerian intellectuals engaged in lively debates about the role that the country should play in Africa and on the world stage. Nigerians have a new self-confidence, a greater awareness of their significance.

I suggested to some that Nigerians were perhaps in the process of forging for themselves a myth of mission. Every society in the world tends to have two myths: the myth of ancestry and the myth of mission. The myth of ancestry idealizes the society's history, reveres its founding fathers, and puts a premium on certain traditions and certain continuities.

The myth of mission, on the other hand, concerns the society's ultimate collective purpose in life, the perceived reason for its existence, the idealization of its role and what it has to offer others.

France under Charles de Gaulle dramatically fused its myth of ancestry with its myth of mission. He mobilized the glories of the past to lend authenticity to contemporary French purposes. The will to grandeur became the basis of foreign policy.

Is Nigeria involved in a more formative stage of the same process? Is it seeking to fuse its myth of African ancestry with a new concept of global purpose?

Because Nigeria is a large country, with 80-100 million people, its myth of mission is likely to become relatively complex. Small countries do not have much room for credible missions, so they compensate by idealizing their heritage. Past ancestry prevails over future

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mission. Larger countries like France and Nigeria—let alone the United States and the Soviet Union—evolve more complicated notions of global purpose.

I am not sure that Nigerians are anywhere near consensus about their collective political mission in life. They are not even at the level of patriotic goal-definition that Americans engaged in when they started talking about their country's "manifest destiny" in the nineteenth century. But the preliminary debates have indeed started in Nigeria.

But, again, why has it taken twenty years since Nigeria's independence for the country's leadership credentials to have become so compelling? Why is it only recently that most Western initiatives concerning continental African policy have included either consultation with Lagos, or consideration of Lagos's likely response?

Some of the reasons for the delayed recognition of Nigeria's stature are concerned with historical accidents. It was Ghana rather than Nigeria that set the grand precedent of black decolonization, becoming the first African country south of the Sahara to win independence from European rule. This made Ghana highly visible for nearly a decade—1957 to 1966. Ghana's visibility was reinforced by the flamboyance and political dynamism of its first president, Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumah's Ghana—though a fraction of Nigeria's size—convincingly overshadowed the colossus of West Africa.

Then came the army coups of 1966 in both Nigeria and Ghana. The Ghanaian coup—by removing Nkrumah—made room for less visible successors. But the coup in Nigeria did not help Nigeria either and in fact set the stage for the Biafran civil war. So the first decade of Nigeria's independence was one of relative political ineffectuality and obscurity.

The 1970s saw the end of the civil war and the rise of Nigeria's oil power in the context of the rise of OPEC. In addition, a new census after the civil war revealed that the population of Nigeria was larger than the previous methods of counting had indicated.

Perhaps in its new mission for peace Egypt has forgotten the older myth of its ancestry as an Arab country. Nigeria, on the other hand, has struck a more even balance between the imperative of mission and the mystique of ancestry.

Underlying it all is the simple fact that Nigeria in recent years has avoided the sin it committed in its first five years of independence: the sin of too close an embrace with the West. Such an embrace carried the danger of too close a responsiveness to Western goals and values.

Let us hope Washington now will recognize its own interdependence with Nigeria and affirm the potential stature of Nigeria as a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

great power—without attempting to seduce Nigeria to the bosom of Uncle Sam.

ALI MAZRUI

The Dimensions of U.S. Policy Toward South Africa

Prior to World War II, most Americans, it is probably fair to say, were scarcely cognizant of South Africa. The American people in those days were immensely ignorant of the rest of the world and largely uninterested in it. Even through the decade of the 1950s, Americans gave little real attention to events there. Deeply absorbed in their own affairs, such concern as Americans had for international matters was almost wholly directed toward their continuing confrontation with the Soviet Union and its communist allies in Europe and Asia.

In the 1960s, however, interest in South Africa began to rise. These were the years when the United States was making major advances toward racial equality at home, which automatically called attention to South Africa's growing racial tension. It was also a period when newly independent nations, especially those in Africa, began to raise their voices in the UN and elsewhere, complaining about apartheid. The official attitude of the U.S. government toward the South African government became distinctly cool.

From 1968 to 1976, the years of the Nixon and Ford administrations, official U.S. attitudes toward South Africa warmed somewhat, to the degree that the National party government in South Africa believed that it had U.S. support for the invasion of Angola in 1975, only to be let down sharply as Congress became alarmed and reacted negatively.

With the advent of the Carter administration in 1976, official United States–South African relations reached their lowest ebb ever, in part because of the growing opposition to South Africa's racial policies in nongovernmental circles and the appointment of representatives from these nongovernmental groups to powerful positions in the administration.

The Reagan administration has used the phrase "constructive engagement" to characterize its South African policy, as opposed to the frosty aloofness of the Carter years. What this term really means it is too early to say. It could mean making a serious effort through quiet diplomacy to influence the South African government to modify its racial policies, or it could signify a decision, in effect, to ignore apartheid while

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seeking pragmatic working relationships with Pretoria in such areas as defense, technology transfer, and the supply of strategic materials.

This cursory sketch of American attitudes toward South Africa seems to suggest that these have lacked consistency and, at least on the official side, will continue to vary according to the political and geopolitical outlook of whichever administration happens to be in power. A more meaningful view, however, is that American attitudes, and hence basic policy toward South Africa, have been and will continue to be determined not by such superficial considerations but by the United States' own national experience concerning the realization of racial equality and human rights.

Admittedly, there is considerable white backlash against blacks today, for a variety of complex reasons. But this does not, in this writer's view, signify a weakening of our basic national commitment to racial equality. Quite the contrary. The achievements in this area over the past three decades were the product of broad and powerful economic and social forces in the nation that were not to be denied and were the culmination of more than 130 years of struggle. The trauma and bloodshed that marked the American road to equal justice for all are too deeply etched into the soul of the nation for the vast majority of Americans ever to be willing to abandon their commitment to racial equality.

The American idea of human rights goes back to the nation's origins, although policy in this regard has been marked by a good deal of inconsistency as the result of the inevitable interplay of pragmatism and idealism in specific situations. In the post–World War II years, the American interest in human rights became identified almost exclusively with anticommunism. Becoming so virulent at times that it threatened civil liberties at home and caused us to support right-wing dictatorships in various parts of the world, red-baiting became a grotesque perversion of our historic concern for human rights. By the early 1970s, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the notion of foreign intervention to protect human rights in nations thought to be menaced by communist encroachment was thoroughly discredited.

President Carter took office determined to rescue human rights from the anticommunist cul-de-sac and make it the cornerstone of a new American foreign policy. This implied that the United States would be as critical of human rights violations by right-wing authoritarian regimes as it was of human rights violations by communist states. Implementing the policy led to all sorts of practical problems, however, and by the end of the Carter administration, the human rights policy was in considerable disarray.

The Reagan administration maintains that it supports human rights as strongly as any of its predecessors but says that it will promote

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

these rights through quiet diplomacy rather than the kind of public scolding that it believes has proved ineffective in the past. Whether the approach will be effective or is instead a smokescreen for doing nothing, only time and the evidence will tell, but what is interesting is that the administration has felt obliged to declare its intentions in regard to this sensitive area publicly—in effect to put itself on notice to the world, something that quite possibly would not have happened but for the attention given to the subject by the Carter administration and the extensive concern expressed in Congress and among religious and humanitarian groups.

From here on, it seems clear, it will be difficult for any administration to pursue a human rights policy identified solely with anticommunism. If the moral case against human rights atrocities of the left is to be credible to the American people and the world, it will have to be balanced by an equally firm stand against atrocities of the right. The logic of this linkage is inescapable.

More broadly, the United States is locked in a long-term struggle with the Soviet Union that will last at least the rest of this century and probably longer, a struggle that the belief in freedom makes inevitable for Americans. That contest is taking place not on American shores but in the hearts and minds of other peoples, particularly in the Third World countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The contest will never be won by arms alone (although their use may be necessary at times); rather, it can be won only by convincing the world that the ideals of human equality and freedom of the individual are superior to the statist tenets of communism. This is why governments that deny equality and suppress liberty, however anticommunist they may claim to be, are, over the long term, more of a liability than an asset to the United States.

With this history, it should become understandable why Americans feel that they have a right to criticize South Africa's internal policies. First, South Africa practices official racial discrimination, in contrast to the nondiscriminatory goal the United States has set for itself at home and uses, rightly or wrongly, as a standard for the behavior of others. Second, South Africa claims to be part of the Western democratic community and yet systematically denies to the majority of its citizens the essential human rights that define the Western tradition.

South Africa, in short, touches two of the deepest and most sensitive nerve centers in America's very being: commitment to racial equality and commitment to human rights, which, of course, are intimately related. Although U.S. performance regarding these commitments has at times been marked by failure, backsliding, and hypocrisy, and no doubt will be so in the future, the record nonetheless is one of persistent long-term progress that has brought us a tremendous distance, much too

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

far ever to return and much too far to allow substantial numbers of Americans ever again to be anything but critical of regimes that deny racial equality and suppress human rights. That reality will both set the bounds of American policy toward South Africa and make American opposition unrelenting to the racial and human rights policies that South Africa is now pursuing.

ALAN PIFER

Has Constructive Engagement Died?

The Reagan administration's southern African policy—"constructive engagement"—is perilously near an irreversible collapse, with serious immediate consequences for regional stability and disturbing longer-term implications for U.S. relations with black Africa. How did this happen? Was it a failure of principle, of working assumptions, of implementation, or somehow the result of pressure from ideologically bound right-wing Republicans? More to the point, can the policy be salvaged? Is it worth making the attempt to do so?

The Kennedy, Nixon, and Carter administrations focused on African policy enough to suggest that their approach was somehow altogether distinct from their predecessors'. For Kennedy, Africa presented a moral opportunity to aid new democracies, but in practice African policy was impelled primarily by efforts to counter or forestall Soviet initiatives. The Nixon administration insisted it would be more realistic about Africa and, in the 1969 regional policy review—NSSM 39—opted for "communication" with the three white regimes then dominant in southern Africa, although Kissinger himself moved regional policy back toward a "straddle" posture in which contact with black nationalists continued. Although "communication" was intended originally to encourage regional change, for want of White House leadership it lapsed into de facto acquiescence to the white regimes until mid 1976, when in a flurry of belated involvement Kissinger sought overall regional stabilization utilizing South Africa as an active partner. It was South African prime minister John Vorster who pressed Ian Smith to publicly accept the six principles for Rhodesian political transition to black rule, while the U.S. offered South Africa substantial economic aid to ensure a stable transition toward a Western-oriented independent Namibia. At first, the Carter administration tried to break this regional policy dependency on South Africa with its tacit acquiescence in South African domestic policies, but by early 1980 it acknowledged publicly that South African regional interests had

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to be accounted for and that the United States had only limited leverage to apply to encourage change within the republic.

Now we have constructive engagement. In what ways is this policy a departure from previous ones? Despite official insistence, a hard look at its stated principles and actions taken suggests far more continuity than change. An overriding preoccupation with a potential Soviet challenge to U.S. regional interests remains central to policy. The strategic significance of the region remains marginal, with the interest in land facilities for military and space communications, which was once a factor, now replaced by a growing concern for secure access to strategic minerals. U.S. business was never forcefully discouraged from regional investment during previous administrations (with the important exception of Rhodesian sanctions), but now it is offered a central role, especially in Zimbabwe, in large measure because U.S. governmental aid to the region is so small. In addition, this administration is the first one to spell out unequivocally the constructive role business can play in supporting peaceful change within South Africa. Again, as in 1976, South Africa's regional economic and military preponderance gets public acknowledgment in order to woo Pretoria's adherence to the Namibian transition plan. At the same time, the limits of U.S. leverage on the region and the republic are being stressed. Finally, attention is being given to a relatively novel principle: criticism of racism in South Africa must be balanced by an appreciation of the difficulties involved in building stable democratic institutions in that multiethnic society and by public appreciation when measurable progress is achieved.

None of these aspects of constructive engagement is offensive and the final one, in particular, offers some promise for a productive relationship with South Africa. I would like to see the policy work, but its implementation since January 1981 has been marked by mistakes that jeopardize its potential success.

In its simplest terms, Reagan policy toward southern Africa has ignored useful aspects of continuity with Carter's regional policy; it has unnecessarily offended black African governments, Western contact-group partners, UN officials involved with Namibia, and the media; it has given Pretoria too many incentives too soon with no apparent indication of any political cost, thus giving at least tacit encouragement to preemptive raids and economic destabilization against black regional states; and it has failed to build a constituency in Congress, major corporations, and the media in support of its policy premises and goals.

The Reagan administration should have signaled its general continuity with previous policy by taking an observer role at the January Geneva conference on Namibia or at least by sending a message to that conference. In the following months, it would have been better advised

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not to have stressed the absolute failure of previous contact-group negotiations over Namibia.

Washington's cavalier attitude toward black African governments and the UN has not changed very much since January. It is best captured in Chester Crocker's oft-repeated phrase about the U.S.-led negotiations — "this is the only game in town." A crude and unnecessary reminder of a power imbalance long recognized in Africa and at the UN, the phrase also amplifies the cowboy image of Reagan held by many foreign governments — a man, and an administration, inclined to see international disputes in Manichean terms and to seek resolution by resorting to force.

The administration's approach to USUN (U.S. Delegation to the UN) appointments and to briefings has exacerbated this negative impression. Neither Jeane Kirkpatrick nor Kenneth Adelman were known for tact in their academic careers. To the contrary, both are prickly, if often perceptive, individuals. Both have made various harmful, if usually unintended, attacks on African and Secretariat sensibilities, which were not necessary concomitants to their intended criticism of traditional UN approaches to U.S. interests. Civility, not overweening and uncritical attention, is required from USUN. It is not too late to hope for its flowering. No briefings were given to African delegations or to the Secretariat until after the September 24 foreign ministers' meeting on Namibia. In the long interim, former participants in the Carter-style negotiation process fed off one another's gossip and tried to make sense of pirated copies of the two press briefings given by Crocker.

As a result, it is not surprising that most Africans and Secretariat officials remain profoundly distrustful of the tightly held Reagan-style negotiations. Even the contact group is skeptical, after its participation in the November visit to Namibia, South Africa, and various black African capitals, because from spring to November 1981 its members were kept on the periphery of U.S.-South African bilateral discussions. Great Britain, in particular, recalls its own unsuccessful attempt to woo Pretoria toward the end of 1980 and expects Washington to fail in its present similar effort. Although these governments and UN officials do not want the negotiations to collapse, during 1982 when contentious points will demand their active participation to ensure South African and SWAPO commitment, they are unlikely to become fully involved.

Assessing this administration's approach to South Africa is made difficult by the possibility of private exchanges or agreements between the two governments. Nonetheless, public material and leaked reports suggest strongly that Washington has gravely miscalculated the character of South African response to diplomatic incentives. One close observer of Pretoria politics — the distinguished South African journalist,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

John D'Oliveira — argues that the nonrational factor of U.S. appreciation should not be slighted. For him, the modest incentives already given South Africa, plus the shift toward a more understanding public rhetoric, and even the symbolic reward of an official visit to Washington by Botha, add up to an incremental improvement in South African readiness to meet U.S. policy requirements. If the U.S. will give Botha another eighteen months, D'Oliveira argues, South Africa will accede to a SWAPO-governed Namibia, having first ensured that no traumatic domestic political reaction will occur.

This persuasive analysis is outweighed by a pessimistic one from Allister Sparks and Benjamin Pogrund (also distinguished South African journalists), which is corroborated by my own research in South Africa. Without altogether dismissing the utility of appreciation as a factor, Sparks and Pogrund put primary weight on South African distrust of U.S. motives. That distrust is long accumulated, of course. It exhibited cycles corresponding to changes in presidential administrations until late 1975–early 1976, when the collapse of tacit U.S. support for the South African military intervention in Angola persuaded Pretoria that the U.S. government was institutionally incapable — even with a Republican president — of trustworthy support for South African regional policy. During the Carter administration, Pretoria feared it faced a "salami" approach: any single concession, rather than being appreciated on its own terms, would lead inexorably to a U.S. demand for more concessions. This profound distrust remains even now. It might be allayed by a Republican sweep of the House of Representatives in November 1982, but Pretoria is not persuaded that even this administration is free of a "salami" instinct toward change within South Africa.

Added to this abiding distrust are some candid calculations about South Africa's regional military and economic preponderance. What could Washington offer Pretoria that it might really need in the foreseeable future? It faces no conceivable conventional military challenge that it could not meet. Its stock of arms and equipment is complete, except for naval reconnaissance planes and possibly more sophisticated fighter bombers and tanks. It needs no economic aid. Even U.S. consent for South African uranium to be enriched in this country, without full adherence to the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) and U.S. law, under negotiation in late 1981, may not be a decisive lever, now that South Africa has obtained enough enriched uranium (apparently from the People's Republic of China) for the Koeberg power plant's fuel rods, and since France agreed to assemble the rods without U.S. prior approval.

Without significant incentives, and with Crocker's repeated insistences that sanctions will not be utilized and that stalemated negotiations over Namibia would bring U.S. withdrawal from the entire process

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

without cost to South Africa, with the only apparent quid pro quo for the incentives already given by Washington (what Robert Rotberg cleverly calls a "treacle-down" approach) to be South African assent to constitutional principles that they had earlier pressed for, all the remaining factors argue against South African adherence to politically demanding Namibian terms. The South African government broods over a white political backlash, first in Namibia and then exacerbated by the National party's right wing in the republic. Pretoria would not like South African blacks to perceive a SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization) electoral victory as a prototype for South Africa, although it believes it has effective control of internal security. The government worries that SWAPO might let the ANC use an independent Namibia as a base for raids on South Africa. And more positively, however ingenuously, it believes its policies and administration in Namibia have built a basis for multiethnic stability and progress that it will not lightly sacrifice. In this sense, Zimbabwe is not a model, because the South African government has long believed that Mugabe's victory was due more to Rhodesia not adopting some form of separate development than to an overwhelming black reaction to white racism.

Where do the Namibian negotiations stand? Even as phase one ended in November 1981 with the contact group's discussions in Africa, signs of prospective difficulty in phase two emerged in Windhoek, where internal parties raised questions about guarantees for postindependence security. No members of the contact group could promise governmental pledges to this basic point. Whatever agreement may be reached on other contentious points in phase-two negotiations during the first half of 1982—the composition and clothing of UNTAG (UN Transition Assistance Group), the constraining of SADF (South Africa Defence Force) and SWAPO forces, the functions of UNTAG and the DTA (Democratic Turnhalle Alliance) administration in the pre-election period, and the resolution of the UN "partiality" issue—the unresolvable question of postindependence political security will remain.

One other focus for argument must be considered—the precise nature of the constituent assembly elections. The constitutional principles accepted by all parties in October did *not* spell out a specific electoral system. To the contrary, they were consciously ambiguous: "The electoral system will ensure fair representation in the legislature to different political groups representing the people of Namibia, for example, by proportional representation or by appropriate determination of constituencies or by a combination of both." Subsequently, in mid December, the contact group proposed an electoral procedure by which half of the assembly would be elected by a proportional representation from national states and the other half from single-member constituencies of roughly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

equal population, but not drawn on an ethnic basis. Nonetheless, since Pretoria remains genuinely intent on protecting white interests in Namibia, it is unlikely that the government will give way easily at this point in negotiations. This proposed electoral system will probably not be resolved until late in phase two, sometime toward the middle of 1982.

In any case, phase two almost certainly will not be completed in time for Namibian independence on January 1, 1983, a date often mentioned during 1981 discussions. If Pretoria runs true to previous form, it will not remove itself from the negotiations, but will continue to raise difficult questions of interpretation and implementation, anticipating that Washington has neither incentive nor deterrence at hand to shift it from this course.

As long as this Namibian quandary remains, there can be no prospect for constructive engagement in South Africa itself. Crocker has argued that black education and training should get first attention for U.S. aid, and plans have been made to use Agency for International Development funds appropriated for southern African regional security purposes to this end. But given the widespread conviction of black South Africans that this administration has "tilted" toward Pretoria, such a program would be treated with profound suspicion. This attitude would also rub off on the privately funded South African Education Program, which now has the significant imprimatur of Bishop Tutu, Dr. Motlana, and other members of the Soweto Committee of Ten, and make the expansion or possibly even the continued existence of this useful program unlikely.

I regret especially this probable impasse, because I taught for nearly five years in South Africa and recognize the massive problems confronting black education and training. In addition, I believe that constructive engagement vis-à-vis black education and training, trade unions, job advancement, social services and amenities, in the facilitation of effective black local government (now legally permissible, but hamstrung by public investment shortfalls and the need for trained black administrators and councilors), and in the encouragement of nonracial regional administration (like that proposed by the KwaZulu Commission at the end of 1981), taken together can have a substantial impact in this next decade.

But such constructive engagement will not survive even 1982 unless the Reagan administration takes one immediate decisive step. It must make unambiguously clear to Pretoria that there is an unequivocal price to be paid for U.S. acknowledgment of South African regional interests and for U.S. appreciation of constructive developments within the republic. South Africa must promptly and publicly disown preemptive raids and economic destabilization of its regional neighbors, and it must pledge itself to irrevocable acceptance of Namibian negotiations in time to bring independence by early 1983.

Without this South African commitment, the continuation of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

present U.S. policy would result relatively soon in an ambiguous but essentially irreversible commitment to Pretoria in its regional and domestic actions that are recognizably increasing the risk of wider regional war. If no South African commitment is forthcoming, then the United States must step back from constructive engagement as an unconstructive failure and give serious attention to the exercise of graduated sanctions against South Africa intended to secure early Namibian independence.

JOHN SEILER

A Rapprochement with Racism?

Perhaps because Africa does not have quite the same strategic and economic significance to the United States as Western Europe, the Middle East, or Asia, it has frequently been neglected by American policymakers, to the detriment of our interests on the continent. In the case of the Reagan administration, our approach to the strategic, economic, and political problems the United States confronts in Africa is marred by much more than a lack of appropriate diplomatic attention. The central weakness of the Reagan administration's approach to Africa is a South Africa policy that serves neither the interests nor the ideals of the United States. Our present policy, about which Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker has said, "it is not our task to choose between black and white" in South Africa, is a sure formula for forfeiting the demonstrable political and diplomatic advances we achieved through our support of an internationally acceptable transition to genuine majority rule in Zimbabwe. It also constitutes a repudiation of the principles upon which our own nation was founded and a rejection of an American role in upholding individual freedom and human dignity through the conduct of our foreign affairs.

The collapse of the Portuguese empire and the establishment of majority rule in Zimbabwe have left Namibia as the only white-controlled buffer state insulating South Africa from the vicissitudes of racial and political change. With indigenous black majorities having broken the chains of colonial oppression throughout the continent, blacks in South Africa can be expected to demand with increasing urgency that they be given their freedom as well. How the United States responds to the movement to eliminate apartheid will have a significant impact upon our relations not only with South Africa, but also with other nations on the African continent and around the world. While the immediate prospects for meaningful peaceful change and power sharing in South Africa are bleak, the United States has no alternative, consistent with our own demo-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cratic ideals, but to advance the cause of multiracial democracy in South Africa.

A widespread consensus exists in the United States that apartheid is morally untenable and must be replaced. A few unreconstructed racists here may challenge that fundamental belief, but by and large the South African debate in our country centers on the question of how best to eliminate apartheid. In that debate, the Reagan administration and others who argue for a policy of what can best be termed gentle persuasion carry a particularly heavy burden of proof. For thirty-three years, since the National party came to power in South Africa, America has rarely strayed from the path of quiet diplomacy — and the situation inside South Africa has not significantly improved. To be sure, some manifestations of petty apartheid have been terminated and a small wedge has been driven through the previously implacable opposition to black trade unions. For the most part, however, the vast majority of South Africa's black population rightly regards the reforms undertaken with great fanfare in recent years as cosmetic at best and stillborn at worst. At the same time, in the process of muting our opposition to South Africa, the United States has conveyed the impression that we are not at all displeased with the apartheid system and feel no urgency about eliminating it.

Recognizing that gentle persuasion is an ineffective and inappropriate American response to the situation in South Africa, we can begin to implement initiatives that will unmistakably register our opposition to a system of legally enshrined racism while also advancing the prospects for peaceful change. In undertaking these steps, we should harbor no illusions that a more assertive American policy will sound the death knell for white supremacy in South Africa. While the prospects for substantial change in South Africa can be enhanced through external pressures on Pretoria that are designed to make it clear that the only real hope for an improvement in relations between South Africa and the United States lies in significant progress toward the elimination of apartheid, the primary thrust for multiracial power sharing must come from within the country. But an appreciation of the fact that America's role in eliminating apartheid is necessarily limited must not blind us to the need for new initiatives on our part expressing our unbending opposition to that system.

The Reagan administration contends that peaceful change will come to South Africa only through the actions of the white power structure and therefore our own interests are served by establishing a warmer relationship with the South African government. Yet, in light of the fact that the apartheid system has remained well entrenched and the prospects for peaceful change have grown more remote while we have consistently refrained from significant punitive actions, the administration's case for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

close cooperation would appear to be unsupportable. Indeed, the absence of fundamental change in South Africa during the time the United States has avoided a more forceful approach suggests that we may have more success in inducing political power sharing in South Africa if we make it clear, in deed as well as word, that our relations will deteriorate if the apartheid system remains in place.

It may well be that our impact on South Africa's ruling structure, whether we embrace the government or strongly oppose it, will be limited. We must not forget, however, that the audience for America's actions and statements does not begin and end in South Africa's parliament. The black majority in South Africa, as well as the leaders and citizens of other nations in Africa and around the world, are likely to view with increasing impatience and ill will America's refusal to match our ritualistic and rhetorical opposition to apartheid with even the smallest steps to make that opposition effective. The Reagan administration's strategy is fatally flawed because it vastly overestimates our ability to influence South Africa by treating it as a good friend and putative ally, while it enormously underestimates the damage our conspicuous tilt toward South Africa is creating in our relations with other African states.

In its first year in office, the Reagan administration undertook a variety of measures manifesting a new American partnership with South Africa. The United States entered serious discussions with South Africa aimed at resuming American shipments of nuclear fuel. Our government also trained South African coast-guard members; opened two honorary South African consulates here; expanded the number of defense attachés in each country; proposed the elimination of America's contribution to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, which helps meet legal defense costs for South Africans of all races accused of violating that nation's draconian security laws; cast a unilateral veto in the Security Council of a resolution condemning South Africa's invasion of Angola; and remained silent about South Africa's military actions in Mozambique.

That is hardly a record the American government, or its people, can point to with pride. In the absence of any inclination on the part of the administration to put additional pressure on South Africa to make the kind of changes that will be necessary to avoid a cataclysmic upheaval in the region, I believe the Congress should take the initiative and adopt a series of modest but meaningful actions limiting and changing the nature of our commercial intercourse with that country. In April 1981 I introduced legislation, now cosponsored by twenty-two other members of the House, that would: establish a set of legally enforceable fair employment principles for American firms in South Africa that have more than twenty employees; ban loans by U.S. banks to the South African government or its parastatal entities; mandate public disclosure of all other U.S.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bank loans to South Africa; and prohibit the importation into the United States of the South African krugerrand or any other gold coin minted or offered for sale by the South African government. If the United States, which now ranks as South Africa's largest trading partner and which has about $2 billion worth of corporate investment in South Africa, were to adopt this legislation, we would send an unmistakable signal around the world that we are distancing ourselves from the regime in Pretoria and affirming in concrete terms our affinity with the legitimate aspirations of black South Africans.

The fair employment standards mandated in my legislation are based upon the Sullivan Code but would significantly expand the code by guaranteeing basic organizing and collective bargaining rights for trade unions. Reverend Leon Sullivan, the code's author, has twice testified to the Congress that he strongly supports legislation making fair employment principles mandatory, given the failure of roughly half the American firms in South Africa to sign the code and the fact that some signatories are only paying lip service to the principles. Under the terms of my legislation, firms found to be in violation of fair employment standards would lose the right to: contract with the United States; use the services of the Export-Import Bank; export any goods or technology to South Africa; and receive any tax credit or deduction for taxes paid to that nation.

The overwhelming majority of black South Africans with whom I have spoken believe that the United States should withdraw all investment, or at least ban new investment, in South Africa. Significantly, they also believe that if these measures cannot be achieved and U.S. firms remain in their country, these companies should abide by a fair employment code that eliminates racial bias and provides equal opportunity in the workplace. The adoption of an enforceable code of fair employment should not be viewed as legitimating our corporate presence in South Africa. It could, however, have a positive impact on the lives of the 70,000 black men and women who work for American firms. It could help to foster the growth of black trade unions, in a nation where these organizations may be an indispensable building block in the construction of a new and more equitable political order. It could have a dramatic impact on the mining industry, where black workers have been subjected to blatantly discriminatory wages and working conditions.

The ban on bank loans to the South African government that my legislation proposes is intended to deny Pretoria the financial and psychological sustenance it derives from these transactions. The South African government has hailed the loans it has received from American banks as evidence of its international creditworthiness and respectability. South Africa maintains that these loans are used to support black development—but always in the context of separate development, rather

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than for facilities accessible to and benefiting all population groups. It is simply unacceptable for American banks to directly promote a policy of racial separation through these loans. The bill also mandates the disclosure of the amount, purpose, and recipient of U.S. bank loans to private entities in South Africa, on the grounds that the American people have a right to know the full extent of our economic cooperation with that nation.

Finally, my legislation would bar the importation into the United States of the krugerrand or any other gold coin minted or offered for sale by South Africa. Current holders of these coins would be allowed to keep or sell them. Since Washington removed the restrictions on the purchase of gold by American citizens in 1975, Pretoria has flooded the U.S. market with krugerrands. In 1980, U.S. citizens bought $941 million worth of these coins, thereby accounting for more than half of South Africa's worldwide sales of this item. This $941 million exceeds our 1980 trade deficit with South Africa — $860 million. By barring the importation of the krugerrand, Congress will prevent South Africa from draining away foreign exchange from our nation in a manner that supports apartheid. A prohibition on krugerrand sales will symbolize to black South Africans that the United States is increasingly allied with their struggle for human rights, social justice, and complete political equality.

Some critics of legislation regulating our commerce with South Africa complain that it is wrong to single out South Africa when many other African nations, not to mention other countries elsewhere, have engaged in a systematic denial of human rights, and escaped any punitive action by the United States. In fact, over the past several years, Congress has passed legislation directed against the Central African Empire, Uganda, Zaire, Cuba, Chile, Argentina, Vietnam, Cambodia, and other nations — in an effort to improve human rights or simply to express American abhorrence over the way people in these nations have been treated. Having imposed on these countries sanctions ranging from reduction in military assistance to a cessation of economic aid and trade, Congress would certainly be justified now in placing modest restrictions upon our commerce with South Africa.

Enactment of the measured, multifaceted legislative approach I have outlined here would not constitute an Emancipation Proclamation for black South Africans. It would, however, demonstrate to the majority of the people of that country, who will, sooner or later, determine the destiny of South Africa, that the United States is willing to act, as well as speak out, against the day-to-day horrors of the apartheid system. It would demonstrate to many of our friends on the African continent — including such economically and politically important nations as Nigeria, Kenya, and Zimbabwe — that the United States shares their view that South Africa's racial policies are unacceptable. It would also undermine efforts of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Soviet Union to portray us as defenders of the apartheid system, while itself posing as a champion of freedom.

Predictably, the administration has rejected this legislation, preferring to pursue its self-styled course of "constructive engagement." Yet throughout 1981, as Congress considered and eventually passed legislation that provides $4 million a year for undergraduate and graduate scholarships in the United States for black South Africans, the administration repeatedly refused to endorse this proposal. If a program providing training at American universities for black South Africans who have been denied educational opportunities at home is not what the administration means by constructive engagement, it is difficult to understand exactly what this concept entails.

The fuzziness of the administration's conceptual framework on South Africa was underscored by Crocker's incredibly inapt observation about not choosing between black and white. In fact, the choice we confront in South Africa is not between black and white, but between justice and injustice. During the last two decades of the twentieth century, the conflict in South Africa is likely to move to center stage in world affairs. For the United States to remain in the wings as this conflict is played out would be morally objectionable and politically counterproductive. When change does come to South Africa—as it inevitably will—we may wind up paying a heavy price for leaving the impression, our public pronouncements notwithstanding, that we did not offer meaningful opposition to the apartheid system.

Its shift toward a policy of accommodation with Pretoria hardly represents the Reagan administration's only failing in Africa. Its devotion to wiping out the Clark Amendment, thereby allowing American aid to insurgent forces in Angola, has aroused suspicions throughout Africa that we intend, again, to mount a covert military campaign in that country. Its efforts to drastically reduce funding of cultural and educational exchanges such as the Fulbright program overlook the advantages these programs hold for our own country, as well as for students from abroad who study here and then return to their own societies. The good will shown toward the United States by Zimbabwe, for example, is not unrelated to the fact that six members of Prime Minister Mugabe's cabinet, and a large number of subcabinet officials, were educated in the United States. Finally, the administration's invocation of the healing powers of private capital, coupled with its thinly veiled hostility to international financial institutions, cannot be considered an adequate response to the food-production and balance-of-payments problems confronting the poorest African nations.

But whatever the other shortcomings of its Africa policy, it is the moral and strategic bankruptcy of the administration's approach to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

South Africa that has the most negative long-term consequences for our nation. As long as the administration continues its conspicuous tilt toward South Africa, it will be incumbent upon Congress to resist our current rapprochement with racism and develop a wholly different policy reflecting our sense of national purpose and our national interest.

STEPHEN J. SOLARZ

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

World Development Report 1981

THE WORLD BANK

Adjustment, global and national, to promote sustainable growth in the changing world economy—this is the main theme of *World Development Report 1981*, the fourth in an annual series from the World Bank. Recession and inflation in the industrial countries, together with the rise in oil prices, have been the main forces at work in the world economy in the 1970s. The *Report* examines their effect on developing countries to see how adjustment has been managed and what lessons may be learned for the 1980s. Chapters present global and regional projections for the 1980s, consider international aspects of adjustment in trade, energy, and finance, and explore adjustment problems of different groups of developing countries and the prospects for human development. The *Report* also includes the 1981 World Development Indicators, a set of 25 tables of economic and social indicators for 124 countries. *World Development Reports 1978, 1979,* and *1980* are also available from Oxford.

Contents

Definitions

1 Introduction

2 A ten-year perspective
Growth in the 1970s
Prospects for the 1980s
Implications for poverty
Interdependence

3 Growth through trade
Trade in the 1970s
Developing-country trade policy and growth
Industrial-country policy
International cooperation

4 Energy: a new era
The energy transition
The special problems of traditional fuels
Energy and growth
Energy policy

5 External finance for adjustment and growth
External finance in the 1970s
Financial adjustment
Prospects

6 Country experience: managing adjustment
The oil-importing developing countries
China: adjustment and reform
The oil-exporting countries
Nonmarket industrial countries: the "intensive strategy"
(subsection headings omitted)

7 Human development: a continuing imperative
Human development and adjustment
Food and nutrition
Population
The role of external assistance

8 Overview
The nature of interdependence
Developing countries in the 1970s and 1980s
Global adjustment
Agenda for growth

Technical appendix

Bibliographical note

Annex World Development Indicators

1981 200 pp.; 36 tables, 30 color charts, 38 text boxes cloth $16.00 paper $6.95

Prices are subject to change.

Oxford University Press
200 Madison Avenue • New York, New York 10016

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BRIDGING THE BLACK-WHITE GULF IN AFRICA*

by Newell M. Stultz

The title of this paper, especially the idea of "bridging" racial conflict in Africa, derives from a loose paraphrasing of key elements in American foreign policy toward southern Africa at the time then-Secretary of State Kissinger dramatically brought his technique of "shuttle diplomacy" to the region in September 1976. On the day Kissinger returned from Africa to Washington, President Ford summarized this policy as follows: "The road is now open for an African solution to an African problem—free of outside intervention, violence, and bitterness. This has been the object of the United States, and the purpose of the skillful and energetic diplomacy that we have followed."[1] Bridging a conflict thus contrasts with an imposed external solution, or the zero-sum game, wholesale victory of one party and the complete defeat of the other, for the latter is scarcely possible without violence and lasting bitterness. Bridging means compromise and reconciliation, and it assumes some legitimate interest on the part of all the contending groups.

The "African problem" to which Ford referred was, of course, Rhodesia, and his optimism was based upon the news that Rhodesian Premier Ian Smith had just accepted the "Kissinger proposals" for a settlement of the Rhodesian dispute. Resting upon the principles of bargaining and compromise, the strategy of bridging conflicting interests offered hope of ending the violence that had arisen in Rhodesia beginning about 1972, promoting racial harmony there, and, candidly, keeping the Soviets or their Cuban surrogates out of the region. Within a few months, however, Ford's judgment in this matter was shown to have been wrong, or at least premature. An African solution to *this* African problem was not found for yet three more years, a period during which several thousand more persons died in the guerrilla war Kissinger had sought to end. Moreover, the 1979 Lancaster House agreement is perhaps better understood as a conditional surrender of the Rhodesian Front, representing the whites, to the Patriotic Front, the agency of the blacks, than as a genuine

*The author thanks Jeffrey Butler, Marion Doro, Mark Garrison, and Whitney Perkins for their comments on an early draft of this article.

[1]*U.S. Department of State Bulletin,* October 25, 1976, p. 528.

Newell M. Stultz is Professor of Political Science at Brown University and has been Visiting Professor of Political Science at the University of South Africa.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bridging of their conflicting positions. Still, Robert Mugabe did not ride into Salisbury at the head of a military column as Fidel Castro had entered Havana in January 1959. Instead, he and his associates were chosen to rule Zimbabwe in an internationally supervised election, and it would be an uncharitable observer who failed to credit the United States with an important role in this achievement, however it is characterized, even though at the critical moment it was the reassertion of British diplomacy that seemed decisive.

American foreign policy is once again engaged in a vaguely similar search for a peaceful "African solution" to the problem of Namibia, and few doubt that once this is accomplished, South Africa will be next on the world's agenda of unfinished business in Africa. The South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) and the African National Congress of South Africa can scarcely have missed the point that the Patriotic Front's resort to armed struggle in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe appeared to have given its candidates a decided advantage in the 1980 elections, and surely this awareness must encourage these organizations in the insurrectionist course that they, too, have felt it necessary to pursue for nearly two decades. From a different perspective perhaps, Zimbabwe was not yet born before some people were urging a Lancaster House–type conference for Namibia, and even for South Africa. The purpose of this paper is to reflect upon these and other relationships between what has been accomplished already in Zimbabwe and other territories to the north in the matter of race relations and the challenges that remain in South Africa and Namibia today. As in American policy, the focus throughout will be on the normative goal of a peaceful accommodation of divergent interests.

Forms of Bridging

The concept of bridging serious racial conflict in Africa can have two meanings. It can refer to the *process* of discussions or other "working out" of the conflict by which a settlement is reached, including under this heading a variety of "shape of the table" issues familiar to diplomats and negotiators in other contexts, or it can refer to the specific *content* of such settlements in which previous non-African experience may be only remotely relevant. Here we are adopting the second of these foci, and a useful way of initially organizing the following discussion is provided by the sociologist Austin Turk's 1966 taxonomy of eight possible "futures" for race relations in South Africa.[2] Turk derived these from a

[2]Austin Turk, "The Futures of South Africa," *Social Forces*, March 1967, pp. 402-412.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

simple sociological model of South Africa. He believed them logically to exhaust the possibilities of what could happen, assuming the present arrangement (then as now)—which Turk described as a "caste structure" of whites over blacks—to be fundamentally unstable.

Turk termed one of his eight possible futures "assimilation," by which he meant the development of a racially homogeneous population. We shall ignore this possibility here, for whatever the likelihood or long-term merits of biological assimilation, it obviously can provide no answer to the problems of racial conflict for several, and perhaps many, generations, and it is difficult to conceive how it could be promoted in any event. The second of Turk's possibilities, although it should be emphasized that it was only a logical and not a practical or normatively acceptable option, was "decimation" of the black population in South Africa, that is, their physical removal from South Africa. We shall ignore this future as being altogether unthinkable in practice, although later we shall have to consider Turk's counterpart future for the whites, namely, their removal from Africa. The next three of Turk's possibilities involve different forms of the idea of bridging. We shall consider these now before turning later to the final three possibilities, which are in a sense alternatives to bridging.

Multiracialism

This section might have been entitled "nonracialism" as the intent is to designate a political system in which race is not a relevant issue. The method that Turk and others have suggested to achieve this end, however, is the encouragement, or even the requirement, of multiracial political coalitions. Turk describes multiracialism as a situation in which white and nonwhite "haves" square off electorally against combinations of white and nonwhite "have-nots" with respect to the distribution of control in the country.

Indeed, in the early 1960s in colonial east and central Africa, Great Britain did try to force local candidates for electoral office to seek support from more than one racial group through the promise of electoral advantage. Although the electoral arrangements themselves were varied and complex, they did not always apply across the board, and at times they were probably unintelligible to ordinary voters, their basic principle was simple. A candidate who obtained support from only one racial group (usually his own) was declared ineligible, or at a minimum penalized. In the Northern Rhodesian constitution of 1962, for example, it was prescribed that a candidate's final overall electoral support in fourteen so-called national constituencies should be calculated by averaging the percentage received on each of two electoral rolls, one of which was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

composed almost entirely of black African voters, the other composed almost wholly of whites. To qualify for election from such a seat, however, a candidate had first to obtain at least 10 per cent of the vote of each race, and 20 per cent of the vote on one roll. A similar device was used in Kenya colony in 1961.

Apart from the challenge to democratic theory inherent in the different size but equivalent weight of the two electoral rolls, the problem with this arrangement, of course, is that it allows the "election" of candidates with very little support in the country as a whole, or that it can produce a situation in which there are no winners at all—when all of the candidates fail to qualify. In October 1962 in Northern Rhodesia, ten of the fourteen national-seat elections were in fact frustrated when voters of each race refused in sufficient numbers to vote for candidates who represented a significant section of the opposite race. The comparable experience in Kenya was more positive, but even where multiracialism did result in the election of moderate leaders committed to biracial cooperation, this bridge proved flimsy and ultimately of only brief usefulness.

Looking back, it is surprising that knowledgeable persons had expected otherwise. Although the premise of multiracialism was that biracial coalitions both for and against most political positions were possible, practice showed this premise to be an illusion most of the time. The fact of the matter was that in Northern Rhodesia in the 1960s, as in most of southern Africa today, the "haves" and the "have-nots" were essentially racially specific categories. Doubtless there are some questions not involving the distribution, or redistribution, of scarce resources concerning which it should be possible (at least in theory) to build biracial coalitions in Africa both for and against almost any given position—in foreign affairs, for example. But where such a dividing up of the national pie is involved (and in a country of great polarities in such matters as education, nutrition, real property held, housing, among others, one can scarcely doubt that this is most of the time), the idea that the final position can and indeed must somehow bridge short-term interests that are, objectively speaking, diametrically opposed is not, to say the least, very realistic.

Practically, what appears to be needed to bridge racial differences is effective political leadership capable of educating people (primarily the "haves," meaning the whites) to the differences between short-term and long-term interests, and persuading them to give priority to the latter. My assumption is that in a country such as Zambia, whose population is about 98 per cent black, the long-term interests of the non-African 2 per cent lie in recognizing and accommodating the will of the overwhelming majority. The structures we have been describing failed to provide this type of white leadership, because with a few exceptions, individuals who might have been inclined to try to play this role had

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

difficulty winning election to a position from which their efforts could have been effective. Except for the simplified variant described below, none of these "fancy franchises" survived the colonial period into independence in any of the African territories where they were tried. Multiracialism, the effort to *command* black-white political coalitions, accordingly failed. The words of Andrew Roberts with respect to Zambia are more broadly applicable: "The numerous whites who remained after independence [in 1964] were content to withdraw to the [political] sidelines."[3] Those whites who were not content to live under a government over which they had no control left. Marion Doro estimates that only about 10,000 persons of the 61,000 whites who were in Kenya in 1960 were still there in 1978, although the total white population in Kenya at the later date was 40,000 because of in-migrations of white expatriates after 1963 on temporary assignments.[4]

The one feature of the constitutional effort at multiracialism that survived into independence, at least in Zimbabwe, is the institution of "reserved" seats for whites in parliament. Twenty of the hundred seats in the Zimbabweian lower house are reserved for election by a whites-only voting roll. This arrangement is essentially a carry-over of a similar device in the previous "internal settlement" constitution of 1978, but with one important difference. The previous power of these white MPs to block amendments to the constitution for up to ten years, should they vote together, has been removed. This was one of several undemocratic features of the earlier constitution, aspects that discredited it in the eyes of the world and thwarted the efforts of the Muzorewa government to win international recognition. Even the present arrangement is unpopular in some quarters in Zimbabwe, and it would not be surprising if these reserved seats are eliminated in 1987 when the constitutional prohibition to do so expires. Meanwhile, the seats ensure a type of community opinion and expertise in parliament that would be unlikely under a simple Westminster arrangement in a country whose whites comprise but 3.5 per cent of the total population. This does not, of course, ensure whites a share of actual political power, although two white ministers were in fact taken into the first Mugabe cabinet.

Consociationalism

Reserved seats for whites in the parliament of a black African country produces a sort of racial proportional representation, though in

---

[3]*Africa South of the Sahara, 1980–81* (London: Europa, 1981), p. 1163.

[4]Marion E. Doro, "'Human Souvenirs of Another Era': Europeans in Post-Kenyatta Kenya," *Africa Today*, vol. 26, no. 3, 1979, p. 44.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Zimbabwe it is markedly skewed in favor of the minority population. The minority's ability—now lost in Zimbabwe—to block constitutional amendments is a form of "mutual veto." These are two features of a construct only recently recognized in social science as "consociationalism," meaning a political system wherein, to quote the leading authority, "the centrifugal tendencies inherent in a plural society are counteracted by the cooperative attitudes and behavior of the leaders of the different segments of the population."[5] The two other features now generally agreed to be part of the consociational model are (1) government by grand coalition of the leaders of all major population groups, and (2) a high degree of communal autonomy for each segment. Although the small size of the white minority in Kenya and Zimbabwe—less than 4 per cent in each—has made consociationalism an irrelevant idea for these territories, the concept concerning South Africa has been in the forefront of a great deal of academic thinking among whites during the past decade. The fact that in South Africa whites constitute 20 per cent of the total population and Africans 70 per cent (Asians and so-called Coloureds making up the difference) has caused some to believe that consociationalism might be successful here as a basis for multiracial cooperation. All authorities agree that consociationalism works best when there is a rough balance of power between, or better among, the segments. Such is arguably the case in South Africa only if the African population is defined not as a single black group but as a number of ethnic subgroups—Xhosa, Zulu, Tswana, and others. This resembles the government's own definition of the situation, which is one reason why the consociational formula has been met with skepticism overseas when efforts have been made to apply it to South Africa. Within apartheid, ethnic subdefinition of the various African groups is a hallowed tradition. Most liberal critics believe that Pretoria is trying to divide and weaken the African minority through this strategem.

Heribert Adam has listed some additional problems encountered by those who would apply consociational thinking to South Africa: (1) from the standpoint of many individuals within the black population, the government's definition of their identity is an imposed and unwanted definition. The premise of consociationalism, in contrast, is that groups accept their existence as groups and earnestly wish to continue that existence; (2) those nonwhite leaders the government recognizes and with whom it is prepared to work lack broad legitimacy within the nonwhite population; (3) there is insufficient understanding and trust across the color line; (4) the public is too politicized to accept government by "elite

[5]Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cartel''; and (5) consociationalism does not adequately address the problem of resource redistribution, which is critical for South Africa. In short, most specialists even within South Africa now agree with Adam that the crucial preconditions for consociationalism simply do not exist there.[6] If that is so, it is hard to see how those conditions could exist in Namibia either, where much the same conditions as in South Africa obtain except that the white population is just 10 per cent of the total.

Federalism

Federalism is as hoary an idea in these discussions as consociationalism is a new and unfamiliar idea. Indeed, if black-white relations in Africa are conceived of as merely a special variant of interethnic relations, then federalism must be considered one of the classic options for dealing with this issue. Federalism has actually been attempted in Africa in such diverse settings as Kenya, Uganda, and Nigeria as a means for containing ethnic or tribal tensions, although its success rate is scarcely reassuring. Only in Namibia, however, have black-white relations been subjected to a form of federal solution—under the 1977 ''internal settlement'' constitution—although the ill-fated Central African Federation of 1953–1963 (Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland) was certainly an early movement in this direction. But in South Africa, talk of federalism regarding the problem of race relations goes back to the beginnings of the country in 1910.

Important details vary, of course, but the essential properties of federalism include a rigid but democratic constitution, a central government of limited powers, and local autonomy in ''sensitive'' matters for the various federal units. The attraction of federalism for minority communities, obviously, is that it can offer them a partial escape—short of dissolving the state—from perpetual dependence upon the good will of the majority. Two prerequisites for federation appear to be (1) that the group(s) to be so protected be sufficiently numerous and geographically concentrated to make local autonomy a feasible proposition, and (2) that some reasonable balance of political and economic power exist among the federal units.

In Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, the small size of the white populations before independence made it impossible to imagine a plausible federal district or two within any of these countries in which the interests of whites might have prevailed democratically over the interests of nonwhites in local matters. The geographic dispersion of these popula-

[6]Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change?* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 286.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions was also a problem, although perhaps a lesser one. (The idea of a nonterritorial federalism, though a theoretical possibility, lacks the stamp of political realism.) In Namibia, the numerical position of the whites as a relative matter is only slightly more promising, but this advantage (from the standpoint of federalism) is more than counterbalanced by the near-majority standing (estimated at 47 per cent of the total) of the Ovambo people, who are concentrated in the north of the territory. As with consociationalism, federalism seems to work best when there are several constituent elements with none large enough to govern alone under a simple "winner-take-all" unitary constitution, which is practically the principal *democratic* alternative to federalism in contemporary Africa.

Some have argued that South Africa may be a qualitatively different case, although here, too, whites prevail numerically in just two of the country's 305 magisterial districts. The white population of South Africa, however, approaches 4.6 million people (23 times the number of whites living in Zimbabwe) and constitutes about 20 per cent of South Africa's total population. Moreover, the surface area of the country is twice that of Kenya or the Malagasy Republic. For these and other similar reasons, it is difficult to deny that it ought to be possible in South Africa to devise a workable federal structure that could emancipate the blacks from apartheid by incorporating them fully into the body politic while preserving guarantees for the legitimate interests of whites within certain parts of the country. At least this is the contention of the Progressive Federal party, now the major opposition party in the whites-only parliament in Cape Town.

A major difficulty, in South Africa, apart from the spatial intermixture of black and white, is the gross disparity in wealth from one region to another. The Witwatersrand, for example, is one of the wealthiest and most industrialized areas in the world; most of the African reserves are among the world's poorest and least developed. In 1971, one of the most distinguished South African liberals, an Afrikaner named Leo Marquard, attempted to deal with this problem by proposing that South Africa be divided into eleven federal regions (replacing the four provinces that now exist), none of which would then be disproportionately powerful. Marquard calculated that such a division would enable most of the eleven regions to have a particular ethnic character (Afrikaans, English, Zulu, among others), although none would have a culturally homogeneous population. In time, he thought, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, and Namibia might see the value in joining such a federation, making for a sort of "United States of Southern Africa" that clearly would be a power to be reckoned with in world affairs.[7]

[7]Leo Marquard, *A Federation of Southern Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Segregation

In terms of geographic scale, South African Premier P. W. Botha's notion of a "constellation" of southern African states is no less grand than Marquard's; indeed, in its maximum conception it is even grander as there is room for Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, and perhaps others too, in addition to South Africa (in several entities), Namibia, and the "BLS" (Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland) countries. The essence of the idea is an economic and development-oriented union of politically independent but mutually supportive neighbors in southern Africa. Just two years have elapsed since Botha unveiled his thinking at the Carlton Hotel in Johannesburg, but already one can say that the idea has been stillborn, save possibly for a drastically scaled-down version: white South Africa and the republic's present and former (now "independent") African "homelands." Nearly every black African leader of note in the region has perceived in the constellation plan the purpose of maintaining white domination over blacks in southern Africa with allowance only for, in Turk's words, "a much greater degree of autonomy for nonwhites within certain areas of social space." Turk aptly defines this as a "segregation structure." It is precisely for this reason that the proposal has been unable to bridge the gulf in black-white aspirations in southern Africa. While theoretically an advance of sorts over the "caste structure" of earlier years, the constellation idea has failed as a practical matter because it lacks a plan for the deracialization of the economic core area, which is, of course, South Africa. The participation of any black state could thus be interpreted as its acquiescence in the hated apartheid policy. Should apartheid be abandoned in South Africa, attitudes toward constellation might change, for the significance of the South African economy to the region can scarcely be overstated. However, in this event South Africa's own interest in a constellation may also change as the republic's security needs concurrently lessen.

Alternatives to Bridging

White Exodus

Although the wholesale elimination of black Africans from any of the countries we are considering is unthinkable—save perhaps from a portion of South Africa as part of a racial partition plan (to be discussed below)—the same cannot be said for these countries' white populations. While only the most extreme examples of the rhetoric of African liberation have included references to "driving the whites into the sea," in fact an exodus of whites has already substantially occurred in both Angola and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mozambique, and something close to this also happened in Kenya, as we have said. The figures given by experts on this matter differ surprisingly widely, but it appears that at a minimum, about 335,000 whites lived in Angola during the last years of Portuguese rule, and at least 280,000 lived in Mozambique. Today the figures are said to be about 50,000 and 10,000 whites, respectively, some of whom have arrived (or returned) since independence. In both cases, the emigrations of whites occurred rather suddenly and were largely completed before independence. Amid what one observer has described as scenes of panic and hysteria, 300,000 whites were airlifted from Angola between May and November 1975 until just before independence on November 11. Relatively more whites stayed on through independence in Mozambique, but the end result was much the same, as the new government expelled several thousand whites and pressured others to leave in order to diminish a population whose loyalties it felt (especially after an attempted settler coup) could not be trusted.

The position in the case of Zimbabwe is still evolving. In 1968, three years after UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence), the U.S. Department of State estimated the white population of Rhodesia to be 235,000 individuals (5 per cent of the total population at the time). Ten years later, notwithstanding departures of whites in the mid 1970s during the guerrilla war ranging between 7,000 and 11,000 annually, the total number of whites was still 230,000 (one authority suggests 268,000). Obviously, whites came to Rhodesia during this period as well, many of them from neighboring Angola and Mozambique. Indeed, according to Robert Rotberg, approximately half of the country's whites in 1978 had arrived in Rhodesia *after* UDI.[8]

The net flow as present seems clearly to be out of Zimbabwe. Shortly after independence in April 1980, the number of whites was said to have fallen to 210,000, and recent figures suggest an emigration rate of about 13,500 a year. Many of these emigrate to South Africa, where one can scarcely doubt they strengthen the right wing of white South African politics. In 1978 more than half of all white immigrants to the republic (10,664 individuals) arrived from elsewhere in Africa. At what level the white population of Zimbabwe will stabilize is, of course, unclear. The Mugabe government, unlike the Machel government in Mozambique in 1977, does not seem to want to encourage whites to leave because their economic skills are important to economic development. Still, some further erosion in numbers seems inevitable, especially if growing racial tensions in and around South Africa should spill over and contaminate race relations in countries to the north in the manner the guerrilla war in

[8]Robert I. Rotberg, *Suffer the Future: Policy Choices in Southern Africa* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 235.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rhodesia/Zimbabwe is said to have undermined black-white relations in Zambia in the 1970s.

What does this suggest for Namibia and South Africa? As 70,000 of the 100,000 whites in Namibia are either South African citizens or Afrikaans-speaking "Southwesters" and another 12,000 are persons holding West German passports, it is not hard to foresee the white population of Namibia shrinking in the years immediately ahead to perhaps one-fifth its present size, ignoring any whites who may come to the territory as expatriate contract workers. This depletion would seem particularly likely if the guerrilla war now being mounted by SWAPO against the South African administration of Namibia should intensify and be drawn out. Clearly there is precedent in contemporary Africa for the exodus, voluntary or forced, of as many as 80,000 whites from a territory as it moves to independence. There is, however, no African precedent whatever for the several millions who would have to leave South Africa, were a similar development to occur there, although an estimated one million French colons did leave Algeria when that territory gained independence from France in 1962. The far larger size of the white South African population probably means that a greater proportion of whites will stay whatever the future may hold, both because there is some comfort and power in numbers and because, compared with the whites in the other territories mentioned, there is no place South African whites are legally free to enter. Certainly there is no place in Africa to welcome them as South Africa itself has welcomed white migrants from elsewhere on the continent up to now, and the opportunity to stay in Africa has its appeal for many of these individuals, whose families have lived in Africa for as long as 300 or more years. The crucial consideration in making their decision will probably be how bitter and bloody the transition is.

Black Supremacy

For Turk, this future entails a reversal of the previous caste roles of whites and blacks, with the former coming to occupy the menial positions that are now almost always filled by the latter. We will adopt a less deterministic view. By black supremacy we mean a political system wherein the political power of the black majority is unquestionably paramount, unfettered in practice by federalism, consociationalism, or other constitutional niceties, save possibly for legally entrenched minority rights of greater or lesser significance. How the exercise of that power can affect the lives of the white minority ranges across a wide continuum of possibilities—from a condition at one end that Turk refers to as "black totalitarianism" to its opposite at the other end, a racially benign, pluralistic democracy with considerable preservation of white privilege. In

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

short, as we view the issue, black political supremacy can mean black oppression of the white minority, but it need not always. The empirical question is how whites have actually fared in former "settler" countries in Africa once political power has been transferred to their African majorities.

Images vary. On the one hand, one recalls grisly photographs of some of the 200 or so French and Belgium nationals who were murdered in May 1978 in Shaba province by advancing Katangese rebels and, it seems, uncontrolled Zairean troops as well. (Thousands of black Zaireans died, too.) At the other extreme we have a reporter's recent account of black and white children attending school together in postindependence Zimbabwe, all still attired in their English schoolboy uniforms—kneesocks, blazers, and straw hats. There seems little point in documenting the difficulties experienced by whites since 1975 in Mozambique. The reduction in the white population of Mozambique by 96 per cent over just four years seems evidence enough of a basic incompatibility there between the interests of whites and blacks as interpreted by Frelimo. Kenya perhaps best illustrates a contrary set of possibilities and is worth close examination. Because of its similar colonial heritage, Kenya may be the best available harbinger of future race relations in Zimbabwe, and even South Africa.

According to Doro, once the Africans of Kenya perceived that the settler class had lost political power, they readily accepted the whites as part of the fabric of Kenya society.[9] An important milestone was Jomo Kenyatta's "forgive and forget" speech at Nakuru two years before independence. But such acceptance came at a price. First, it was accompanied by an end to the whites' dominating role in agriculture and desegregation of the so-called white highlands. Today, noncitizens of any race (and only 4,000 whites are estimated to have taken out Kenya citizenship) are prohibited by law from owning farm land in Kenya, and political pressures have gradually forced even those white farmers who are citizens to sell off their properties and leave the agricultural sector of the economy, except for some who have stayed on as farm managers. A government land-transfer program for purchasing farm land for subsequent resale to largely landless Africans has, however, maintained the market for agricultural land in Kenya. Begun before independence with funds subscribed by Great Britain, this program prevented a sudden exodus of whites from Kenya and continued previous capitalist economic patterns into independence. Also, the Kenya government's goal of Africanizing both the public and private sectors as soon as possible has

[9]Doro, "Human Souvenirs," p. 44.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dramatically curtailed wage-employment opportunities for whites, especially noncitizen whites, although technically skilled positions are still relatively immune from such pressure. Within these two constraints, the lifestyle of the white settler population reveals many continuities with that of the earlier years, although without the blatant racism. Certainly there has been no overt victimization of whites by the African majority in Kenya comparable with what Asians experienced in neighboring Uganda under Amin. Still, while an older generation of white settlers lives on in Kenya often very much as before—"human souvenirs of another era"—younger whites acknowledge that there will be minimal economic opportunities for them in the future. Thus in time, Doro concludes, "the vitality of the [white] community [in Kenya] will simply fade away."

Paramountcy of black African interests and no overt victimization of the white population—many observers believe this is about as much as any African country should be expected to concede to achieve racial harmony. If bridging the gulf between black and white aspirations in Africa does not include this prospect, then this perspective holds that Western policy should redefine its goal. In the end it was essentially this formula—"majority rule with minority rights"—that prevailed in the final negotiations over Zimbabwe in London at the end of 1979. In the context of the new Zimbabwe, victimization would mean concretely the taking of real property without appropriate compensation, or the abrogation by the state of earned pension rights. The constitution of Zimbabwe forbids the government to take either of these actions for a period of ten years, after which the hope is that it will be disinclined to. But apart from these two prohibitions, majority rule in Zimbabwe is synonomous with black African rule; the twenty reserved seats for whites in parliament do not have a great deal of practical significance. Still, most observers give the Mugabe government fairly high marks for its treatment of the white population over the eighteen months since Zimbabwe's independence, notwithstanding the much-publicized sacking of General Walls, the Tekere affair (referring to the murder of a white farmer by a black cabinet minister who was eventually freed), and the government takeover of the local press. In short, the Kenya experience appears to be repeating itself in Zimbabwe, with only minor variation in response to local circumstances. If the South African press can be taken as a guide, this evolution in race relations on their northern border is filled with significance for many white South Africans. Many, it appears, shared with Ian Smith his "pleasant surprise" at Mugabe's political sophistication and moderation, and some of these individuals, we can suppose, must now wonder whether it is really worth fighting a long, costly, and probably ultimately unsuccessful war to prevent something similar happening in the republic.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Partition

There is no evidence, however, that a change of heart because of the events in Zimbabwe has affected more than a small minority of South African whites. On the contrary, a majority of these whites appear to believe that it is still possible and desirable to stave off black majority rule in the republic. Some or all of the following suppositions seem to underlie this belief: (1) the present South African regime is in a far stronger position politically and militarily than other white populations have been elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa; (2) though whites may have been treated reasonably well in Kenya and in Zimbabwe since independence, the steady erosion in the size of these populations is evidence that the position of a white community in a black-governed country is not tenable in the long run; and (3) white South Africans seek to defend more than just a privileged way of life, they seek to ensure the continued existence of a distinctive national community.

This last point is crucial, though it must be said again that not all whites in South Africa subscribe to it by any means. It would seem that in terms of their social motivations, English-speaking whites in South Africa are probably not greatly different from whites in Kenya or Zimbabwe at comparable periods. Certainly the claims of white parties in Kenya before 1963, the Rhodesian Front ten years ago, and the opposition parties recently in South Africa contain many striking parallels. Even some Afrikaners in South Africa today talk primarily in terms of preserving "standards," "law and order," and economic "efficiency." For such individuals the option of living in an African-dominated state wherein the property rights and personal freedoms of non-Africans are effectively protected might be thought to be all the bridge that is needed, certainly all that they have any right to expect. After all, despite African domination, Kenya, Zambia, and the other former British colonies have remained within the commonwealth, English continues to be spoken, and many of their social institutions remain closely tied to the former metropole. It might even be argued that save in politics, not all that much has changed for the whites except that they have lost their former unearned status.

For most Afrikaners, however, their self-conception tells them that something more is at stake here than privileges, namely, Afrikaner nationalism, the preservation and advancement of the Afrikaner *volk*. In their recent book *Ethnic Power Mobilized,* Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee document the extent to which the South African state entrenches Afrikaner power and identity.[10] Certainly the *volk* would fare less well in a polity dominated by non-Afrikaners. In discussions of these

[10]See fn. 6, above.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

matters among white South Africans, the issue of language takes on great symbolic significance. Most of the new states of black Africa have adopted for official purposes the language of the departed colonial powers. But would Afrikaans continue to have anything like its present role in a black-dominated country? The 1976 demands of the Soweto students for an end to compulsory instruction in "the language of the oppressor" suggest not. At the most, Afrikaners might hope to survive in a black-dominated country as a tolerated cultural minority, much as Jews in white South Africa or Western Europe today. For many Afrikaners, Afrikaner Zionists if you will, this is not enough, and the result of this sentiment is a fierce determination to resist a loss of power to control their own affairs. Africans, of course, and other nonwhites are no less bent on enjoying self-determination. Some observers believe that the result of this confrontation of wills could end in the territorial partition of South Africa into one or more mostly black states and one mostly white state.

Partition is not a very popular idea, although few are so bold as to rule it out altogether. It runs against a widespread normative preference for existing international boundaries, almost as if these represented, in the words of Norman Pounds, "the intentions of the deity."[11] In the case of South Africa it is further noted that the spatially interspersed nature of the republic's population groups makes partition impossible without the resettlement of millions of persons; that South Africa's industrial economy could not tolerate the dislocation that partition would require; and that partition could not occur because no important group on the scene advocates it. But such factors, though not unimportant, have not prevented partition "solutions" from being attempted in other contexts. The case for partition in such places as Cyprus, Ulster, and Palestine was not that it was intrinsically a good idea, but that it was a better idea at the time than other available options, at least from the standpoint of groups that were in a position to impose their will.

I have argued elsewhere that the following conditions favor partition outcomes in chronically conflictual plural societies: isolation (in various senses) of minority communities; imbalance of communities; bipolarity of the basic conflict; political stalemate, tending toward higher levels of violence; isolation of the dispute from world politics; and the possibility of decisive third-party intervention. The last two points are probably the most damaging to the prospects for partition in South Africa. Because apartheid reserves to the whites of South Africa comprehensive material and other privileges vis-à-vis the nonwhites of the country and is internationally perceived to have this as its principal function—and not

[11] "History and Geography: A Perspective on Partition," *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 18, no. 2, 1964, p. 161.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

white self-determination—it is not surprising that the Third World in particular identifies with the excluded groups and seeks to advance their ends. The result is little sympathy outside the region with the idea that white South Africans should have a separate territorial existence. In particular, no outside power seems likely to intervene to protect the white minority from the consequences of African majority rule, as, for example, Turkey intervened in Cyprus to protect the Turkish-Cypriot minority from the Greek-Cypriot majority. In recent years, some Afrikaner nationalists in South Africa have likened themselves to the Jews of Israel—surrounded, embattled, but enduring. In their own minds it is a compelling analogy. Geopolitically, however, it lacks realism: while Israel has relied on the United States since 1948, white South Africa has become increasingly isolated and is now fundamentally alone in a moral and political sense. Thus, an important precondition for partition in South Africa is probably lacking.

Prospects for Bridging the Gulf

A major premise of the Turk article is, as we have said, that South Africa's racial structure is politically unstable and must inevitably undergo fundamental change. Still, fourteen years have elapsed since his article appeared, and few would dispute that the overall pattern of white domination within that country is not greatly different from what it was in 1967, though resentment of that domination within the nonwhite underclasses clearly seems to have increased. If change of a fundamental sort remains inevitable, as nearly all observers continue to believe, then it seems also true that there are important forces encouraging social continuity as well. How these countervailing pressures work themselves out—that is, the dynamic of change—should markedly affect the character of the resulting society.

In recent decades academics and others have produced a near avalanche of studies of actual and prospective change in South Africa, an avalanche that now threatens to engulf the casual reader. Within this literature a variety of schools can be discerned, and in turn are commonly reduced in popular analyses to a simple liberal/radical dichotomy, without perhaps doing too much violence to the complexity of the issues involved. The 1981 "Report of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa," for example, sets out two alternative scenarios for South Africa's future.[12] Key concepts in the first and more "liberal" of

[12]Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 400-407.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the two are government reform, containment of the guerrilla threat, cooptation of moderate black leaders, increased black economic power, political negotiations, "power sharing," limited violence, decentralization of power, controlled external pressures, and multiracial government. In contrast, the second and more "radical" scenario emphasizes racial polarization, rigidity of the ruling group, international economic sanctions, rising violence, white emigration, and eventual political collapse. This second scenario ends, the commission suggests, in either a "de facto partition or a Zimbabwe-type power sharing [sic] arrangement," both alternatives to interracial bridging, as we have used the term here. What the commission only implies, which is nonetheless likely true, is that the social tumult involved in the working out of the second, radical scenario would effectively preclude a bridging outcome, and especially a consociational outcome, because it would destroy essential habits of interelite trust and accommodation. Unless one follows the study commission's example and euphemistically describes as biracial "power sharing" as complete a capitulation of whites to the African majority as Ian Smith made in 1979, then it has to be said that interracial bridging, or true power sharing in South Africa probably requires an unfolding of future events generally like the commission's first scenario.

How likely then is such an evolutionary process? The question is at the heart of a keen and often bitter debate in the contemporary social science literature that deals with the future of South Africa. We can only outline some of the major conflicting arguments here, conceding that even this effort risks excessive conflation.

On the affirmative (proevolutionary) side, some authors emphasize the ability of the regime to adapt. Afrikaners, the argument runs, no longer seek racial supremacy, but only ethnic survival, presumably a less ideological posture. A long-established position is that the increasing industrialization of the region must inevitably undermine apartheid, and some observers already see power shifting significantly to organizations of black workers. The alleged weakness of revolutionary elements is a related focus. The empirical record demonstrates, it is said, that the ruling whites are both strong and capable, but that the rhetoric of African liberation in fact masks black disunity and political impotence. The efficacy of international pressures is doubted, especially against South Africa, but also in general as an instrument of statecraft. A final concern is with process. Changes away from apartheid that have already occurred, though widely conceded to have been of limited scope to date, are said to have ushered in a process of change that is now both irreversible and irresistible. Indeed, one developmental economist has written that assuming conditions of political stability, it is not unreasonable to expect South Africa to enter the era of the democratic welfare state about the year

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

2000.[13] It must be said, however, that this optimistic prediction has attracted few adherents.

Of course, the opposing position disputes all of these points. It is argued that regarding adaptability, capitalist development, far from undermining apartheid, actually strengthens the apartheid state. The rhetoric of government-induced "change" in South Africa is sham, it is said; nothing of fundamental significance has occurred or can occur so long as the Pretoria regime is beholden to a whites-only electorate. P. W. Botha's government is only "modernizing" racial discrimination, not ending it. As to power, the Africans are said to be united in their determination to overthrow white domination; time and the "tide of history" are claimed to be on their side. Comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa, though difficult to muster, would, it is argued, prove decisive if only the world community would apply them absolutely. And regarding process, it is contended that the best guide to what will happen in South Africa in the future is the recent liberation of Zimbabwe, rather than an ahistorical, or at best imported, faith in incrementalism.

Resolution of this controversy obviously will not be found in the classroom or on the pages of scholarly journals, but through the course of actual events as they unfold in the region. Academics do not yet have the tools to ascertain whether the incremental or apocalyptic mode of change is more likely, or indeed which mode would be in the best interests of all the interested parties. What we can say is that the American political tradition predisposes American scholars to favor incremental change, notwithstanding our revolutionary origins, but that should be irrelevant to prediction. At the moment all a scholar can say with certainty is that the pace of events in southern Africa seems to have slowed somewhat since the birth of Zimbabwe, but for most the direction of events is still unclear. Social science is, however, usually more successful with simple "if/then" propositions than with macrolevel predictions, and in these terms it may be possible to venture the following suggestions with some confidence:

1. Rising levels of racial violence in South Africa and on its borders, should this occur, will undermine the prospects for interracial harmony and cooperation throughout the region (and, according to some, throughout the world, although the Rhodesian war did not produce such a global result).
2. Successful, or relatively harmonious race relations in independent Zimbabwe will lessen white fears in South Africa of a shared community with Africans, but they will not eliminate these fears, because of differences in the contexts of the two situations.

---

[13]M. C. O'Dowd, "The Stages of Economic Growth and the Future of South Africa," in Lawrence Schlemmer and Eddie Webster, eds., *Change, Reform and Economic Growth in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1978), p. 36.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

3. Increasing levels of violence within South Africa can prompt and accelerate efforts to bridge racial differences, but high levels of community violence sustained over a long period will undermine (as in Northern Ireland) those popular sentiments on which successful bridging solutions depend.

4. Political stalemate in a conflictual situation such as South Africa encourages negotiations that can result in efforts at interracial bridging. However, political stalemate *and* rising levels of intercommunal violence increase the likelihood of political partition—a nonbridging solution.

Whatever South Africa's own future, no one doubts that fundamental change will come to Namibia first. What happens in Namibia thus should in some degree influence the course of events in the republic. In this context, the contemporary problem of Namibia presents Pretoria with three interrelated challenges. First, there is an ideological challenge that the West and SWAPO are pressing to Pretoria's preference for making race and ethnicity the fundamental organizing principle of political association. Second, there is the challenge to South Africa's security and economic interests that would necessarily arise were an unstable or hostile government to come to power on South Africa's northwestern flank. And third, there is the opportunity that the Namibian negotiations present for South Africa to obtain guarantees from the West advancing the republic's own interests and security independent of the issue of Namibia. Of these, the first is certainly the least important. Apartheid, which has never been applied in Namibia with the same doggedness as in the republic, has been gradually abandoned in the territory in many of its particulars in recent years, and even the official addiction to ethnicity seems more a strategy for countering SWAPO than a principled question of social identity.

The two other points are crucial, however, and enjoy a tradeoff relationship with each other. The more closely Namibia approaches (with South Africa's consent) a Zimbabwe-type independence settlement, the greater Pretoria believes its future danger from Windhoek can be, but the more concessions the republic will likely be able to extract from the West. On the other hand, the more intransigent Pretoria is, the less the immediate danger from SWAPO but the greater the probability that Britain and the United States will accede to Third World demands for economic sanctions against South Africa. (France's veto of sanctions seems already lost.) The republic's calculation of the optimal mix of such conflicting interests is confounded, of course, by uncertainty that any alternative political grouping to SWAPO could win a free election in Namibia, recognition underlined by the recent French elections of the fickleness of friends, and the feeling that South Africa's present military posture in Namibia is strong, but once relinquished, could never be regained.

All of these considerations seem to foretell a long and difficult process of international negotiations over Namibia, an escalation of guer-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rilla attacks within the territory to the extent that SWAPO is able to mount them, South African reprisal raids into Angola, and agitation at the UN. One can scarcely doubt, however, that at the end of this process the result will be a black and probably SWAPO-dominated Namibia. Some Third World countries clearly hope that the Namibian issue can be used meanwhile to spark a more general international assault upon the power of the South African state. While possible, timely concessions by Pretoria should forestall this. The linkage, then, between Namibia and happenings elsewhere in the region, including the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, may be minimal, or, because of "secret covenants, secretly arrived at," difficult to see.

Possibilities for U.S. Intervention

This brings us to a final topic: is there anything the United States can do to assist bridging the black-white gulf in contemporary southern Africa? Some individuals will doubt that we should wish to do so, either because they feel that an African-supremacy "solution" to the conflict in Namibia and/or South Africa is normatively preferable to any bridging outcome (as we have defined this), or because they feel that such an effort on the part of the United States must inevitably fail. In 1980 I was asked rhetorically by a senior foreign diplomat in Pretoria, "Why, if the Afrikaner regime is bound to reject any form of power sharing with the blacks, should the West publicly urge power sharing when the only sure result will be to antagonize the Africans who want majority rule?" My questioner assumed (as I do) that sooner or later apartheid will be overthrown and that some of these Africans will come to power. The remarks that follow rest on the unargued belief that bridging political differences is no more objectionable in southern Africa than it is other parts of the world, and that whites in South Africa (and Africans, too) might still be persuaded in sufficient numbers to embrace some such program before a loss of power on their part makes their wishes politically irrelevant.

If, then, the promotion of interracial bridging in southern Africa is the goal, social science and/or common sense recommend that U.S. foreign policy should seek to do the following: (1) structure regime incentives for Pretoria in order to encourage the belief within South African ruling circles that movement toward a bridging solution with the nonwhites is preferable to the status quo; (2) build up black institutional power but discourage violence that can undermine essential interracial trust; (3) start with an empathetic appreciation of how the opposing parties see and feel their situations and work from there to narrow the differences; and (4) avoid inadvertently delegitimating *all* bridging formulae in the course of necessarily condemning apartheid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Admittedly, this is not an easy prescription to enact. Violence is clearly part of the South African picture already, seems likely to increase in any event, and in limited amounts is probably functional in inducing the ruling whites to take black aspirations seriously. For their part, international pressures for reform are most likely to succeed when they point to concrete steps that are within the power to accomplish of those who most feel the pressures, and when the steps intended are not seen as more value-depriving than the pressures themselves. In fact, there have been few such cases, and they are not easy to imagine. Most of the world pressure against apartheid so far is either highly symbolic in nature or logically directed at altering fundamentally the entire South African political system. Neither type has had much success, which is as we probably should have expected.

Regarding the third point, social scientists have in several instances tried to use behavioral science techniques in controlled small-group situations to promote cognitive and emotional understanding by leaders across bitter "real world" cleavages, such as those found today in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and the Horn of Africa. An apparently less controlled, but still similar, "experiment" bringing white and black South African leaders together (with some Americans) was tried in mid 1978 in Rustenberg, Transvaal. At best, the results of these structured encounters are only moderately encouraging, and in any event it is difficult imagining an interested third-party government filling the role of substantively disinterested academics in the examples cited, although possibly Carter's role at the 1978 Camp David meetings of Begin and Sadat comes close.[14] They do, however, point up the need, if bridging of differences through mediation is the goal, of recognizing that all sides have some legitimate claims. There is undeniably great wickedness in the daily implementation of apartheid in South Africa, and the carrying out of revolutionary strategies inevitably results in the killing of innocent persons. Still, it is important from the standpoint of contributing to a bridging of this conflict for Americans to keep in mind that the leaders of the National party as well as the leaders of the African National Congress seem themselves in honorable, if in fact not heroic, terms. Incessant descriptions (in the press) of these protagonists as "racists" or "terrorists" cannot on the face of it be very useful to bridging differences between them.

The final point amounts to ensuring that American spokesmen say what they mean. As what they say involves what their listeners understand them to say, this is often more difficult than it sounds. In May 1977, for example, following a lengthy meeting in Vienna with Prime Minister

[14]For some discussions of these efforts, see M. R. Berman and J. E. Johnson, eds., *Unofficial Diplomats* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), esp. pp. 153-221.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Vorster, an unwary Vice President Mondale was trapped by a reporter's question into declaring that the American government believed a "one man, one vote" constitution would be "healthy" for South Africa. This was immediately understood in the republic as Carter administration support for a black-supremacy "solution" to the country's difficulties, an implication that was deeply resented in official circles. Many observers later attributed in part the National party's record performance in the general election in October to white reactions to Mondale's statement, coming on top of Andrew Young's frequent indiscretions, reactions that were skillfully manipulated by the government in the Afrikaans press. Months after this episode, Mondale took pains to say publicly that in his view the principle of "one man, one vote" could be accommodated within a variety of different constitutional formats, presumably including among them the American federal system with its rigid constitution, separation of powers, bill of rights, and judicial review. South Africans, however, both black and white, had understood Mondale's May statement in terms of their own Westminster political tradition, which lacks of course any of these features. For them, "one man, one vote" connoted merely the extension of the franchise in South Africa to all adults irrespective of race within an otherwise unchanged constitutional setup. There can be no question that in the South African context this would immediately produce a black-dominated polity. Mondale could say sincerely that he had not intended to favor (or indeed to exclude) such an outcome, that from an American standpoint his words were reasonable, and that accordingly he had been misunderstood. Nevertheless, if Mondale's object was to persuade white South Africans to move away from apartheid, the burden of ensuring that he was comprehended at the outset surely was his.

The difficulty, of course, for any statesman hoping to discharge such a burden while dealing with the problems of deeply divided, plural societies is that the rhetoric of democratic aspirations today runs to simplifying slogans of great emotional appeal, especially in the Third World. In contrast, the language of political bridging (the term "consociationalism" being a good example) is unfamiliar, and relevant concepts are difficult to summarize succinctly. However important theoretically and practically, the proposition that political differences can and should be bridged is thus a difficult idea to advance politically. Those who might wish to do so accordingly require particular care and deliberation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AFRICAN FLASHPOINTS: PROSPECTS FOR ARMED INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT*

by Raymond W. Copson

Certain developments in Africa have given rise to concerns over a possibly dangerous militarization of African international politics. The Libyan intervention in Chad has attracted much recent attention, but it was preceded by Tanzania's 1979 intervention in Uganda and the second Somalia-Ethiopia war of 1977-1978. The presence of perhaps 15,000 to 19,000 Cuban troops in Angola, a country that is subject to repeated South African incursions, is a source of worry, as is the Cuban presence—estimated at 11,000 to 17,000 troops—in Ethiopia. Huge caches of Soviet weapons are known to exist in Libya, and Ethiopia's war against the Eritrean rebels is being fought with Soviet arms, which reportedly include Soviet-built helicopter gunships. In southern Africa, Zambia's purchase of a squadron of MiG-21s has raised questions about the plans and expectations of that otherwise lightly armed country. Meanwhile, in the same region, South Africa's military build-up proceeds apace, and while some analysts still speculate as to whether South Africa has acquired nuclear weapons, others are more concerned about what types of weapons will be developed or have been built already and about the circumstances in which they might be used.

But is there a significant probability of substantial armed international conflict in Africa during the remainder of this decade? After all, independent Africa of the 1960s and 1970s, despite major civil wars in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and a few other countries, has seen few international wars, and those that have occurred have been modest in scale. With the independence of Zimbabwe, ending a major source of international conflict in southern Africa, and Somalia's restrained behavior following the thrashing it took in 1978, it might be argued that this decade is likely to be less violent than the past.

In view of the weaponry and manpower available to several African countries, and the strong grievances that mark some African dis-

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and may not in any way be attributed to the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress.

Raymond W. Copson is an Analyst in International Relations with the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. A former Lecturer at the University of Nairobi, Kenya, and at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, he specializes in African affairs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

putes, however, it is clear that armed international violence is possible, primarily at four major flashpoints: the regions bordering South Africa and Namibia; the Horn of Africa; Libya's borders and the borders of the Libyan sphere of influence, now extending into Chad; and Morocco's borders, including the borders of Morocco's sphere of influence in the former Spanish Sahara.

Three of these potential flashpoints have been constant sources of tension in African international politics over the past two decades. The Algeria-Morocco border war of 1963-1964 had at its core the claim of the sultan of Morocco to religious and temporal authority over a wide area of Northwestern Africa—a claim that was perhaps intensified by the presence of valuable mineral deposits in specific disputed areas. The core of the current conflict is the same. Similarly, the first Ethiopia-Somalia war, in 1964-1965, as well as the counterinsurgency war Kenya was forced to fight against Somali guerrillas until 1967, were manifestations of tensions that remain at the heart of regional tensions today. And of course southern Africa, where the region's wealth and climate, as well as Portugal's initial indifference to the "winds of change," meant that decolonization proceeded more slowly than elsewhere on the continent, is a long-standing problem in African international relations.

Only the Libyan challenge is new. Just a short time ago, this country was one of the "poorest of the poor," but today Libya's oil wealth, the quantities of weapons at its disposal, and Colonel Qaddafi's ideology of Islamic fundamentalism, Arab nationalism, and Arab socialist revolution have made Libya a direct military threat to neighboring states and an indirect source of insecurity to countries well south of the Sahara.

Whether any of these flashpoints explodes into a large-scale war during the 1980s depends on the restraints and inducements set by a variety of internal and external factors. In southern Africa, the internal situation of South Africa will clearly be a principal factor determining the future course of regional international politics. If South Africa is able to prevent or control insurgency within its boundaries over the next several years—and many observers believe it will be able to do so—then major confrontations between South Africa and its neighbors, as distinct from brief South African incursions, are more likely to be averted or postponed. Another critical factor will be the course of the negotiations on Namibia. If a settlement can be found there, the prospects for regional violence will be reduced. In the Horn of Africa, internal instability that tended to make Ethiopia, Somalia, or Kenya newly vulnerable to attack could greatly exacerbate regional tensions. With respect to Libya, which has ample means for launching international conflict, Qaddafi's assessment of the ability of states in northern and sub-Saharan Africa, perhaps backed by external powers, to contain his thrusts will help to determine the issue of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

peace or war. The assessment of President Sadat's successor of Libya's ability to resist a pre-emptive strike could also play an important role. In the western Maghreb, the decisions of an individual will also be important. If King Hassan II concludes, as he may already have done, that African disapprobation of his movement into the Spanish Sahara, together with the political and economic costs of the war within his own country, have grown too great, then he may put off his regional ambitions for another day and further regional violence may be averted. But while conflict may not occur at any flashpoint, each retains the potential for substantial armed violence.

Elsewhere on the continent, the prospects for armed international violence are quite limited over the remainder of the decade—limited by the modest capabilities of the African states and by the genuine reluctance of black African regimes, which do share a certain sense of solidarity with one another, to become involved in costly disputes that could threaten domestic political stability and damage prospects for economic development. Most African armies are simply not large enough or well enough equipped to allow African leaders to entertain hopes of permanent foreign conquest, even if some might otherwise be disposed to do so. Idi Amin is one whose ambitions to a strip of Tanzanian territory exceeded his grasp, and he suffered the consequences—Tanzanian armed intervention in coordination with Ugandan revolutionary forces. But Amin was an unfortunate anomaly in African politics, and surely others are not likely to be so foolish. Meanwhile, Tanzania's inability to maintain its forces in Uganda until order was fully restored (the cost was just too great) demonstrates that limited capabilities must limit ambitions.

Moreover, the majority of African governments remain committed to avoiding outbreaks of armed violence among themselves. While the Organization of African Unity (OAU), because of concerns over issues of sovereignty that have troubled similar organizations elsewhere, has as yet been unable to create a permanent military force of its own,[1] it strives mightily, through the conciliation efforts of the secretariat and through commissions of "wise men" made up of heads of state, to resolve disputes and avert war. Measuring the effectiveness of these OAU efforts is perhaps not possible, but it seems clear that the OAU has contributed to the reduction of tensions in several instances, even in regions as disturbed as the Maghreb and the Horn.

An interesting development in West Africa has been the May 1981 agreement among a majority of the members of the Economic

[1]African heads of state decided at their 1981 Nairobi summit to put the long-standing question of an OAU Defense Force to a committee. The decision followed the failure of an April 1981 meeting of OAU defense ministers to agree on the establishment of a force or on the creation of a Security Council-like organization to make decisions on its use.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on the establishment of a defense force to be made up of units earmarked by each member state. Use of the force is to be decided upon by a defense council consisting of all the ECOWAS heads of state; in addition, there is to be a defense commission, made up of defense ministers, to carry out the details of planning and administration. This agreement will not come into force until it has been ratified by seven ECOWAS members, and clearly there is much that could go wrong before the force becomes a reality—just as much could go wrong when the first proposal for using the force is made. But the fact that matters have gone this far is at least a sign of the determination of the leaders of this large region to avoid or contain international violence.

In addition, there is a growing acceptance in Africa of policing actions by well-respected states that can have the effect of reducing prospects for armed conflict. The most recent instance was the intervention of Senegal in Gambia, at the request of the briefly ousted president, to terminate a rebellion, the leaders of which had declared their intention of establishing a dictatorship of the proletartiat under the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist party. Had this coup succeeded, the potential for future armed violence on a much larger scale would have been great. Tanzania's intervention in Uganda can be viewed in the same light. Even though the situation within Uganda remains unsettled, the removal of Amin has eliminated a source of considerable uncertainty and potential violence from the African scene. While the acceptance of policing interventions of this sort could obviously be abused—the Nigerian military government strongly felt, indeed, that even Tanzania's action in Uganda set a "dangerous precedent"—their use is likely to be limited by Africa's limited capabilities.

Perhaps the only cause for major concern outside the four flashpoints is Nigeria. This vast, proud, oil-producing nation of 80 million or more, is far more powerful than its neighbors, and its army, first expanded in response to the civil war in Biafra, still numbers 130,000. Nigeria has a modest stock of Soviet- and British-built tanks and a navy that includes four Corvettes and two small amphibious assault craft (LSTs).[2] Nigeria's comparative military advantage has led some to speculate on possible future Nigerian designs on the oil wealth of neighboring Cameroun or the island portion Equatorial Guinea, which lies across a short stretch of ocean. Or, it is argued, Nigeria's burgeoning nationalism and its apparent sensitivity to slights by its neighbors might push it into chauvinistic military adventures. The demands by sections of the Nigerian

[2] *The Military Balance, 1980-81* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), pp. 53-54.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

press for an invasion of Cameroun after the May 1981 slaying of five Nigerian soldiers in a border clash is cited to bolster this view.

All that can be said of this speculation is that such actions on Nigeria's part are possibilities. It is significant, however, that Nigeria has not struck against Cameroun. To do so would entail widespread denunciation in Africa and the world, the sacrificing of Nigeria's claim to a position of leadership in African affairs, the crystallization of long-simmering if repressed resentments among Nigeria's much weaker neighbors, possible hesitancy on the part of potential private investors in Nigeria, and a number of other costs. On balance, such considerations seem likely to continue to restrain Nigeria in the years ahead.

The Flashpoints

Southern Africa

The quantities and the destructive power of the weaponry in southern Africa today, together with the depth of the underlying antagonism between South Africa and its neighbors, make this region a particularly dangerous flashpoint. The peoples and governments of the "front-line states"—Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania,[3] and Botswana—can hardly avoid close identification with the cause of South Africa's blacks, and their support in some form for South African black movements opposed to continuing white rule is inevitable. The South African government, for its part, has not been one to eschew a military response to perceived threats from neighboring states. Raids into Angola against the camps of the Namibian guerrilla movement, SWAPO—and some would allege in support of the UNITA-armed Angolan opposition as well—have been undertaken repeatedly under a claim of the right of hot pursuit and are now almost routine. The January 1981 South African assault on buildings in Mozambique belonging to the African National Congress (ANC), by far the most effective of the South African black opposition movements, was the first attack into Mozambique and possibly the harbinger of similar strikes there and in other countries.

South Africa is well equipped to carry out such raids, with an air force that includes Mirage fighter and fighter-ground attack aircraft, as well as five helicopter squadrons and ample transport capability. The 71,000-man army has more than 300 medium tanks and much other armored equipment, including 1,600 armored cars and 1,000 high-speed armored personnel carriers (the Ratel), both of South African manufacture.

[3]Though one of the front-line states, Tanzania does not share a common border with South Africa, and as a result is probably in less immediate danger of South African intervention.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Against this array of equipment, South Africa's neighbors are not able to prevent its armed incursions, although Angola's Soviet-supplied antiaircraft equipment, perhaps including missiles, and other arms do exact a certain toll. The Cuban troops in Angola, reported to have been badly bloodied when they went up against South African units in December 1975, do not appear eager for a new encounter.

Given South Africa's military might and the present weakness of its neighbors, it may well be that armed international violence in the region will not escalate beyond current levels. Governments in southern Africa are well aware of South Africa's ability to inflict damage on their countries and are understandably cautious about extending the kind of support to South African or Namibian liberation movements that could provoke retaliation on a larger scale.

But there is a palpable danger that conflict in the region could move in a far more violent direction, and one critical determinant of this possibility will be the situation within South Africa. If South African internal politics are marked by increasing unrest and violence, then South Africa's neighbors will find themselves drawn, even if reluctantly, into providing increasing support for South African dissidents—just as Mozambique and Zambia were drawn into escalating assistance to the Zimbabwe guerrillas despite the violent response of Rhodesian armed forces. It is too soon to tell whether the recent bombings and other terrorist incidents within South Africa portend an early deterioration of the security situation within the country. The prevailing opinion among informed observers seems to be that South African security forces are fully capable of controlling such violence for many years to come. It hardly needs pointing out, however, that the South African situation is a volatile one, and that the possibility of larger-scale internal unrest with an expanding inflow of arms and men from the north cannot be dismissed. The second key determinant of the course of events in the region will be the situation in Namibia. An indefinite prolongation of the fighting there will carry with it the continuing potential for a wider regional confrontation.

The consequences of increased international violence in southern Africa are not pleasant to contemplate. With the weapons already mentioned, together with total mobilizable strength of 500,000 men, motorized arrays of locally produced "Stalin organ" rockets, and long-range artillery, South Africa would be able to inflict great damage on its neighbors, and its capability for doing so is increasing steadily as its defense budget expands year by year. But South Africa's neighbors are not powerless. They too have the ability to mobilize manpower, ultimately far greater manpower than South Africa's five million whites can provide, and—what South Africa largely lacks—to call for help from other countries. Black Africa may not be able to defeat South Africa in a military

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

confrontation, but it may well have the ability, particularly if, as seems likely, the Soviet Union and its allies are willing to help provide the military means, to tie South African forces down in a long-term, indecisive conflict, ranging over vast territories — a conflict that will drain the ability of the white regime to maintain its power at home.

It is in the context of such a conflict that the questions surrounding South Africa's nuclear option become so alarming. Wouldn't the use of small nuclear weapons, perhaps of an enhanced radiation capability, against guerrilla encampments or other military concentrations make sense, from the South African point of view, as a low-cost means of dealing with the guerrilla threat? Wouldn't the destruction of economic targets or even civilian population centers with just a few bombs appear attractive to hard-pressed military planners eager to dissuade neighboring countries from continuing to support the guerrilla opposition? South Africa and black Africa are probably a long way from having to face these questions today, and they may not have to be faced in this decade. But the awesome prospect of large-scale conflict, perhaps even nuclear conflict, will exist in southern Africa as long as the region's underlying racial confrontation remains unresolved.

The Horn

Doubtless the world has not seen the last war in the Horn of Africa. Despite President Siad Barre's recent talk of a peaceful settlement with Ethiopia, no one believes that Somalia's territorial ambitions in the Ogaden region have weakened. And while Somalia may no longer advocate the annexation of the Somali-inhabited northern region of Kenya by force, reports of continuing sporadic clashes between Kenyan authorities and small groups of armed Somalis can only leave the Kenyan government and its friends uneasy.

But in the immediate future, a renewal of large-scale conflict seems quite unlikely. While little reliable information from the Ogaden reaches the outside world, it appears that Ethiopian armed forces — with what sort of assistance from Cuban troops and Soviet advisers can only be guessed — inflicted serious defeats during 1979 and 1980 on the Somali forces that remained in or had reinfiltrated the Ogaden after the end of the 1977-1978 war. This Ethiopian operation was no doubt responsible for the mushrooming of the Somali refugee population that took place at the same time. Some observers have suggested that Somalia has been able to certify that all of its regular forces have been withdrawn from the Ogaden (a certification that was necessary to meet a congressionally imposed condition for U.S. sales of defensive equipment to Somalia) not because

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of any voluntary withdrawal but because its remaining troops were expelled by force.

In any event, Somalia does not appear to be in a position to resume combat today. The country's economy has been badly damaged by drought and by the burden of more than a million refugees in a country that previously had a total population of 3.5 million. The equipment Somalia is to obtain from the United States, which is directed toward air defense, communications, and engineering, would be of little use in a new Ogaden offensive, and any such attack would jeopardize Somali-U.S. relations at a time when U.S. economic assistance is crucial. Egypt, which has probably been a major source of arms for Somalia in the past, is cooperating with Sudan in an effort to stabilize the region, partly by improving relations with Ethiopia, so that Egyptian backing for a new attack would be questionable at best. Meanwhile, Ethiopian jets seem able to attack Somali border villages at will, and with the Eritrean situation improving for Ethiopia, that country may be entering a new period of comparative strength. Thus, for the present, the Somali emphasis must be on defense rather than offense.

Somalia's concern for its current condition helps to explain Barre's recent peace offensive. While Somalia rejected the June 1981 recommendations of an OAU good-offices committee reasserting the principle of respect for the borders existing at independence as a basis for resolving the conflict, Barre did meet with Kenya's President Moi while in Nairobi for the OAU summit, and the two presidents issued a statement pledging their commitment to better understanding between their countries. Barre then visited the leaders of nine other African states in order to emphasize his new commitment to a peaceful political solution to the Horn conflict.

What events might precipitate a renewal of international violence in the Horn? Clearly, a breakdown of the Ethiopian government's very fragile hold on the countryside would be tempting to Somalia. Somalia's 1977 offensive into the Ogaden seemed timed to coincide with the chaos prevailing in Ethiopia at the time, and in fact Ethiopia was able to put up little resistance until massive Soviet arms supplies and Cuban troops stiffened its backbone. At the present moment, Ethiopia appears more stable than it has been in several years, but the country is an empire of disparate peoples and one still very much in the throes of revolution against a centuries-old form of government. Further upheavals cannot be ruled out. In Kenya, widespread instability seems far less likely, but there are strains in Kenyan society today, and Somalia can probably be expected to exploit any major distractions that develop at the Kenyan center.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nor can instability in Somalia itself be ruled out as a possibly destabilizing force in the years ahead. One tribally based Somali dissident group is apparently receiving support from Ethiopia today, and there are those in Ethiopia who would urge their government to take advantage of any widespread resistance to the Barre regime. In short, while renewed international conflict in the Horn does not appear to be an immediate prospect, future outbreaks are certainly possible.

Libyan-Centered Conflicts [4]

The two most disturbing things about Libyan leader Qaddafi are the breadth of his ambition and the tremendous resources at his command. Qaddafi is a leader who has been both willing and able to lend his support to groups as diverse and far flung as the Islamic fundamentalist guerrillas in the Philippines, the Ugandan government of Idi Amin, and the Irish Republican Army. He has done so inspired by an ideology that stresses "anti-imperialism" (Libyan adventures in Africa are by Qaddafi's definition anti-imperial rather than imperial), Arab nationalism, a return to traditional Islam, and an Arab socialist revolution. His undertakings are financed by huge oil sales that leave a significant surplus after the needs of Libya's three million people are generously met.

Libya's military base, at least in terms of equipment, is impressive. A vast cache of Soviet-supplied weapons, valued at an estimated $12 billion, is now in place in Libya, together with a variety of arms that Libya has purchased from other nations. The Libyan inventory includes some 2,400 Soviet-built tanks; 19 guided-missile patrol boats, all carrying anti-ship missiles, built in the Soviet Union, France, and Britain; 4 larger Italian-built Corvettes, also carrying ship-to-ship missiles; 3 aging Soviet submarines; and nearly 300 combat aircraft, including late-model MiG-25s from the Soviet Union and advanced Mirage ground-attack planes from France.[5] There are, in addition, a squadron of Soviet-built bombers and a large number of French- and Italian-built helicopters. Three new Daphne-class submarines, to be built in Spain under license from France, are on order.

Qaddafi's intentions in amassing this stock of arms are inevitably a source of much worry and speculation. The quantity of weapons in Libya today clearly exceeds the manning capabilities of the country's

[4]For background, see Nathan Alexander, "The Foreign Policy of Libya: Inflexibility Amid Change," ORBIS, Winter 1981, pp. 819-846.

[5]*The Military Balance, 1980-81*, p. 45; Lean Labyle Couhat, ed. *Combat Fleets of the World, 1980/81*, A. D. Baker III, trans. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1980), pp. 349-354.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

53,000-man armed forces, and this has led to some to suggest that at least the Soviet weapons in the Libyan inventory are nothing more than pre-positioned equipment for use by Soviet troops in a Middle East war. Others, noting the extensive training of reserves thought to be going on in Libya as well as Libya's recruitment of enlistees and officer-candidates throughout the Arab world, believe that Qaddafi fully expects to use his country's weaponry for his own purposes at some time. Already reports have appeared of Libyan units in Lebanon manning antiaircraft rocket installations. Qaddafi's relations with PLO leader Yasir Arafat are quite friendly at present, and the announced "merger" with Syria, while not reflected in any integration of governmental institutions, has apparently not yet run into the difficulties that destroyed Libya's other merger attempts. Consequently, it may be that Qaddafi someday plans to throw his growing armed might into a direct confrontation with Israel. Or perhaps he will concentrate first on the creation of a Saharan nation sweeping the former Spanish Sahara, where he is the foremost supporter of the POLISARIO guerrillas against the Moroccan presence, into a union with Mauritania, Niger, Chad, and other countries as well as Sudan. This is the great worry of Sudan's President Numeiry, as it was of Sadat, who feared that Libyan-backed subversion and perhaps Libyan military action launched from Chad could place a Qaddafi-dominated government astride the Nile at Khartoum.

Whether Libya would be able to accomplish anything approaching such ambitions is of course open to question. Libyan "volunteers" in Uganda were badly mauled in their confrontation with Tanzanian troops in 1979, and this was a source of much embarrassment to Qaddafi. Moreover, the country is known to rely on expatriate personnel, including North Koreans, Syrians, Pakistanis, and Palestinians, for manning its equipment; and there has been speculation that the Soviet and East European personnel in Libya also have manning responsibilities in addition to their duties as trainers. Not all of these outsiders are likely to be available for combat duty in every Libyan cause, and this is a source of weakness. Libya's combat aircraft are normally deployed at just six air bases,[6] and although attention is being given to the construction of airstrips for emergency use, the country would appear to be vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike that would virtually eliminate air power as a military asset.

A particular concern of Qaddafi at present is the possibility of a pre-emptive attack from Egypt, which launched a brief attack in 1977 after a series of terrorist incidents within its borders. After this outbreak,

[6] "Libya's Air Power: National Aspiration and Soviet Surrogation," *Air International*, April 1981, p. 197.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sadat said, "It was intended to teach [Qaddafi] a lesson, and if he can't absorb this lesson, well, there will be another lesson for him."[7] The August 19, 1981, incident over the Gulf of Sidra, which saw two Libyan jets shot down by carrier-based U.S. F-14s, should have indicated to Qaddafi that the potential U.S. response to his plans would also have to be taken into account.

Nevertheless, Qaddafi may be encouraged by the new effectiveness shown by his forces in their rapid move into Chad, and perhaps not incidentally by his diplomatic success in avoiding a clear-cut denunciation of his moves by the OAU. The OAU, indeed, has adopted a remarkably tolerant, wait-and-see attitude toward Qaddafi and is going ahead with plans to hold its 1982 summit in Tripoli—a summit that will automatically make Qaddafi OAU chairman for the following year.[8] Thus, it is entirely conceivable, even likely, that Qaddafi will judge the circumstances auspicious for further adventures at some point during this decade.

The results of further Libyan adventurism could be quite grave. If Egypt were finally provoked into a second attack, the scale of the fighting, given the advanced weapons at Libya's disposal, could be very large. While some Arab governments, long impatient with Qaddafi, might welcome Egyptian action against him, the Libyan leader has surrounded himself with enough of the aura of a romantic Arab nationalist and revolutionary to raise the possibility of a strong reaction against the late President Sadat's policies in the Arab world—a world from which many Egyptians already feel too isolated. The United States would suffer from this reaction even if it were not directly involved in the fighting, and the consequences of direct U.S. participation in an anti-Qaddafi war would reverberate loudly throughout the Middle East. Nor can the possibility of Soviet involvement, however the Soviets might wish to avoid a costly and potentially dangerous defense of their client, be excluded.

Thus, a real possibility exists that Libyan foreign policy will precipitate further armed international violence in Africa, which could escalate into a confrontation with consequences extending well beyond Africa itself. Such a confrontation is not inevitable, however. While the OAU has not been able to frame a decisive response to Libyan adventurism, many individual states are extremely wary of Libyan intentions and anxious to enhance their own capabilities for resisting Libyan-

---

[7] *Africa Research Bulletin*, July 1-31, 1977, p. 4495.

[8] President Goukouni of Chad attended the 1981 OAU summit in Nairobi and seems to have impressed many African leaders as a genuine nationalist and not a Libyan puppet. Thus, Libya was not condemned at the session. Instead, a resolution was passed calling on neighboring states not to engage in destabilization in Chad and providing for a force of African peace-keeping troops to be sent to the country. The validity of the OAU's judgment of Chad remains to be proved.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sponsored destabilization efforts. Should they prove able to do so, there will be reason to believe that Libya can be contained and a wider future war averted.

The Maghreb

Algeria and Morocco, each with populations of about 20 million, have long been rivals in this region of Africa. In part they are ideological rivals, and Algeria's socialist system forms a marked contrast to the Moroccan monarchy, with its deep roots in history and religion. In part, they are military rivals as well. Algeria's army numbers about 90,000, with Morocco's numbering about 105,000, and each country possesses substantial equipment. Algeria does enjoy an advantage in aircraft and armor, however—about 650 tanks to Morocco's 180. Thus, some analysts have been uneasy about the stability of the military balance in the Maghreb, particularly in view of the ongoing fighting in the former Spanish Sahara between Moroccan troops and Algerian-supported POLISARIO guerrillas. Clearly, there is some possibility that this fighting could escalate and lead to a direct confrontation between these two long-standing rivals, as well as a chance that other disputes, perhaps over mineral deposits along their joint border, could lead to war.

But Morocco's King Hassan II, like President Barre of Somalia, is at present engaged in a peace offensive. Some observers had predicted that Hassan, anticipating a warmer relationship with the United States under President Reagan, would escalate the level of fighting in the former Spanish Sahara in a drive to at last bring the territory firmly under his control. But instead of a wider war, Hassan launched his peace initiative at the June 1981 Nairobi summit of the OAU by announcing that he was prepared to agree to a "controlled referendum" in the territory, apparently under international supervision. The OAU accepted this proposal and appointed an ad hoc committee to work toward its implementation. Two days after proposing the referendum, at a meeting in Saudi Arabia, Hassan moved to restore diplomatic relations with Mauritania—relations that had been broken in March when Morocco was accused of sponsoring an attempted coup in order to install a government that would force the POLISARIO out of its Mauritanian bases.

Whether these new developments signal the end of the conflict, which began with Hassan's extraordinary "Green March" of thousands of unarmed Moroccan civilians across the territory's border in 1976, remains highly uncertain. Hassan may try to impose a restrictive definition of what constitutes a "citizen" of the territory in an effort to exclude what he claims are Libyan-financed outsiders brought in by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLISARIO. Disputes are also likely on the issue of whether the referendum should be held while the Moroccan army remains in the disputed region. Nonetheless, prospects for a peaceful settlement in 1982 are brighter than they have been for many years.

One factor that was probably important in Hassan's decision to move toward a referendum is the cost of the war, which is thought to be draining the Moroccan treasury of millions of dollars each month. The riots that broke out inside Morocco in June 1981, after the government announced increases in the prices of basic commodities—a decision made under the pressure of IMF demands to establish a realistic pricing system in order to combat balance-of-payments problems—underscored the seriousness of Morocco's economic situation. Another factor in Hassan's peace offensive may have been the continuing isolation Morocco suffers in Africa and the Third World because of the Saharan war.

Still a third explanation places a rather more sinister interpretation on the king's motives. According to this view, the Moroccan army may have succeeded in establishing control over El Aiun, the capital of the territory, and over the potentially highly profitable phosphate-producing area, by building a 500-mile earthwork studded with mines and sensors monitored from the air. From this perspective, Hassan may be intending either to obtain a breathing spell from international disapproval while he consolidates his control over this most important part of the territory or he may be planning to pack the area with his own supporters in order to obtain a referendum result that will legitimate his control there, if not in the rest of the territory. If his intentions run along these lines, then an end to the fighting in the former Spanish Sahara is probably not in the cards.

But in any event, a large-scale outbreak of international violence at this African flashpoint does not appear very likely in the next few years. Neither Morocco nor the POLISARIO seem capable of escalating the battle beyond its present level, and Algeria, which is embarked on a significant industrialization program, appears to have little interest in a violent direct confrontation at this time. Hassan will probably not, however, give up his claim to authority over the entire region—a claim that is an important basis of his legitimacy within Morocco itself—so that the possibility of further violence in the more distant future remains.

Issues for U.S. Policymakers

Does the United States have a significant interest in attempting to restrain outbreaks of armed international violence in Africa? Clearly, the emerging consensus is that it does. Africa has in the past been remote from U.S. national security concerns, apart from the early episodes on the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Barbary Coast and the use of facilities in Liberia for ferrying planes from the United States to distant theaters during World War II.

In today's more interdependent world, however, Africa has risen to new prominence. The proximity of East Africa to the vital petroleum-producing areas of the Persian Gulf has led to agreements on U.S. access to military facilities in Kenya and Somalia, and it gives the Soviet presence in Ethiopia a significance it would not otherwise have. Moreover, despite the present abundance of petroleum supplies in the world market, policymakers can hardly be indifferent to the long-term importance of the petroleum reserves of Nigeria or Libya, or to the continuing petroleum discoveries along the West African coast. And of course Africa's wealth in nonfuel minerals—in chromium, cobalt, manganese, and the platinum group—that have essential applications in industry and defense is a matter of concern to analysts of current international affairs, whether or not they believe that a global resource war is already under way. These minerals are concentrated in the southern and central portions of the continent, so that the Soviet and East European arms and advisers, as well as the Cuban troops, present in this area inevitably cause anxiety.

Concerns such as these create an interest in minimizing outbreaks of armed international violence—violence that can disrupt transport, damage petroleum and nonfuel mineral production facilities, endanger the stability of regimes that have been cooperative with the United States, and, as happened as a result of the two wars between Somalia and Ethiopia, create opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence. Other, less immediately pragmatic, interests also tend to promote an interest in limiting African international conflict. Few indeed would wish to encourage policies that might add to Africa's refugee burden or further distract African leaders from the essential tasks of creating viable political systems and promoting economic development.

While there may be general agreement on the existence of a U.S. interest in minimizing violent outbreaks of conflict in Africa, however, there is much room for disagreement on specific issues related to implementing a policy aimed at realizing this interest. A comprehensive policy would require at least five elements: (1) avoiding arms sales that might contribute to local tensions; (2) using arms sales to correct potentially destabilizing local imbalances of military power; (3) stabilizing potentially vulnerable countries through economic assistance; (4) restraining other external actors in African international affairs; and (5) contributing to the resolution of African international conflicts. Fulfilling all five elements of such a policy would be a difficult task indeed, even if agreement could be reached on how this could best be done. In fact, however, there is much disagreement over the kinds of U.S. actions that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

might best contribute to the reduction of conflict in Africa and, in addition, over the priority that should be given the goal itself in relation to other U.S. interests.

Security Assistance

There is a general recognition that in those parts of Africa where there have not yet been major outbreaks of armed international violence—that is, most of sub-Saharan Africa—the United States has no interest in creating tensions by adding to the military inventories of potential conflict participants. Congress has made this point explicit in the Arms Export Control Act, one section of which reads: "It is the sense of the Congress that the problems of Sub-Saharan Africa are primarily those of economic development and that United States policy should assist in limiting the development of costly military conflict in the region. Therefore, the President shall exercise restraint in providing financing for sales of defense articles and defense services to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa."[9] An examination of the list of recipients under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program (Table I) indicates that this general approach, which also reflects attitudes long held in the executive branch, has been adhered to. Few sub-Saharan countries receive arms under the FMS program, and the sums going to most of sub-Saharan Africa under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program are marginal and primarily of symbolic value.

The Reagan administration has spoken of enhancing the role of security assistance as an instrument of national policy, and a look at the proposed FMS and IMET figures for fiscal 1982 does reveal substantial increases in the overall amount of security assistance, and several countries that have not previously received IMET funds will come in for small amounts in fiscal 1982.

One other departure in policy is noteworthy: proposals for the first sales of M60A main battle tanks in Africa, apart from recent sales to Egypt. Morocco has been promised 108 of these weapons, and Tunisia 54. When the United States wanted to help Kenya protect itself against the tank threat from Somalia, it focused on providing antitank weapons rather than tanks themselves. Supplying tanks, which have an obvious offensive capability, opens a new chapter in the U.S. military relationship with Africa, although one that is as yet confined to North Africa.

[9]Public Law 90-629. Growing concern over the security threat in parts of Africa in 1979 led Congress to use this language to replace an earlier $40 million limit on arms sales in Africa. This limit could be waived (and frequently was) by the president when he judged it in the national interest to do so.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE I

FMS AND IMET FUNDING IN AFRICA
(fiscal years, millions of dollars)

	FMS					IMET				
	1978	*1979*	*1980*	*1981**	*1982†*	*1978*	*1979*	*1980*	*1981**	*1982†*
Botswana				.5	.5			.1	‡	.1
Cameroun	5.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.5			‡	‡	.1
Cape Verde										‡
Congo										‡
Djibouti					1.0					.1
Equatorial Guinea										‡
Gabon	2.0			2.6	2.6			‡	‡	.1
Ghana						.2	.2	.2	.2	.4
Guinea-Bissau										‡
Ivory Coast								‡	‡	‡
Kenya	27.0	10.0	20.0	6.0	51.0	.4	.4	.5	.5	1.3
Liberia§	.5	1.2	2.5	4.7	12.3	.2	.3	.2	.4	.6
Malawi								‡	‡	‡
Mali				.2			.1	.1	.1	.1
Morocco	43.0	45.0	25.0	30.0	30.0	1.2	1.1	.9	1.0	1.3
Niger									.2	.4
Rwanda				1.5	1.5			.1	‡	‡
Senegal				.5	2.0	.1	.1	.2	.2	.3
Somalia			20.0	20.0	20.0				.3	.3
Sudan‖		5.0	25.0	30.0	100.0	.2	.3	.4	.6	1.3
Tanzania									‡	‡
Togo									‡	‡
Tunisia	25.0	20.0	15.0	15.0	95.0	1.1	1.1	.6	.6	1.3
Uganda									‡	‡
Upper Volta							.1	.1	.1	1.3
Zaire	17.5	8.0	6.1	6.0	10.5	2.0	1.8	.8	.8	1.6
Zimbabwe										.1
TOTAL	120.0	91.2	114.6	118.0	327.9	5.4	5.5	4.2	5.4	10.0

*Projected
†Proposed
‡$50,000 or less
§Liberia also has a Military Assistance Program (MAP) worth a projected $1 million in fiscal 1981.
‖In addition, Sudan has a MAP program valued at a projected $1.7 million in fiscal 1981 and $.2 million in fiscal 1982.

SOURCES: U.S. Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, July 1, 1945–September 30, 1979* (Washington: 1980); U.S. Department of Defense, *Congressional Presentation: Security Assistance Programs, FY 1982* (Washington: 1981).

Critics of administration policy in Africa argue that these changes are potentially disruptive to African stability and should not be made. But defenders point out that the general pattern of distribution of U.S. security assistance in Africa has not altered. It remains true that only a few countries are receiving arms aid under FMS, and, indeed, just seven countries—Kenya, Sudan, Liberia, Morocco, Somalia, Tunisia, and Zaire—will account for 97 per cent of the fiscal 1982 FMS program.

Most of the large increase in the program is accounted for by substantial increases over 1981 amounts for Kenya, Sudan, and Tunisia, countries that in the administration's view have legitimate defense needs

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and require aid if local power balances are to be established or maintained. It is argued, then, that Morocco needs tanks to redress an imbalance with Algeria,[10] while Tunisia must be bolstered to protect itself against Libya. For Sudan, facing the Libyan advance into Chad, the need for increased arms aid is, in this view, obvious.

Another argument, made by both this administration and its predecessor, is that some security assistance is required by interests other than the interest in minimizing African international violence. Arms aid to Morocco has been necessary, according to both the Carter and Reagan administrations, not only because of Moroccan security needs but also because the United States needs to demonstrate its reliability to the Hassan regime and its gratitude for Morocco's friendship. In any event, it has been suggested, the arms going to Morocco are not sufficient to give it a meaningful offensive capability against Algeria and would not even be very useful in the former Spanish Sahara. The M60 tanks, supporters of this argument maintain, could not be maneuvered in the rough terrain of that territory.[11] Similarly, according to the executive branch, security assistance to Zaire is needed partly in order to demonstrate U.S. support for the government of that mineral-rich country, and moreover, since such aid consists primarily of nonlethal equipment, it will not pose a threat to Zaire's neighbors.

Counterarguments can be and have been made to virtually all of these and other similar contentions. But the point here is that few if any are entirely without merit, and they tend in the aggregate to exert strong pressure against a policy of abstaining from arms sales in Africa. While a need for restraint in arms sales to Africa is generally recognized, policymakers will continue to see the need for such sales when a regional imbalance is evident or other interests tend to argue in favor of sales.

Economic Assistance

Economic-development assistance could form part of a policy aimed at reducing conflict in Africa if such aid could make a significant contribution to promoting stable political conditions. There is evidence that much international conflict in Africa is linked to internal political instability—instability that makes regimes vulnerable to potential enemies and that, at the same time, makes them highly sensitive to

[10]See the testimony of Lieutenant General Ernest Graves, director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, in U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on Africa and on International Security and Scientific Affairs, *Arms Sales in North Africa and the Conflict in the Western Sahara, Hearing*, 97th Congress, 1st Session, March 25, 1981, p. 8.

[11]Testimony of Morris Draper, deputy assistant secretary of state, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, ibid., p. 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

foreign threats, whether real or imagined.[12] If aid could be channeled to Africa in sufficient quantities, then perhaps some of the underlying conditions that give rise to conflict could be ameliorated. Unfortunately, in view of the immensity of Africa's development problems, and of the pressure of other demands on the resources of the developed countries, there is little reason to believe that the substantial increases in aid that would be needed to significantly improve the overall African economic situation will be forthcoming.

A more direct approach to reducing conflict potential in Africa has, however, been used by the United States. Under the Economic Support Fund (ESF) created by Congress in 1977, the executive branch can respond to U.S. security needs in Africa and elsewhere by providing economic assistance to countries in amounts that might not be justified solely on the basis of economic need. In practice, this fund has allowed the injection of resources into several potentially unstable and vulnerable countries at Africa's flashpoints. Countries benefiting from the program (Table II) have included Zambia and Sudan, where there have been large U.S.-financed commodity-import programs that have helped prevent a descent into regionally destabilizing instability. In Zimbabwe, the ESF is financing rural reconstruction, technical training, and other programs that may help to keep that country's economy on its present moderate course and reduce the chance of a leftward turn.

Some critics of U.S. aid policy believe that the fund is being overused, and in particular that it has become a device for quickly committing large amounts of aid on grounds of political expediency without sufficient attention to the efficient use of aid for promoting economic development. There is also some feeling that the growth of the fund has reduced amounts available for other programs that must, by law, be more strictly devoted to meeting the basic human needs of the poorest of the world's poor. But the fund is understandably popular in the executive branch, where it grants considerable flexibility to policymakers, and both the Carter and the Reagan administrations have favored large increases in ESF aid for Africa. It seems likely that the fund will be used increasingly in the years ahead.

Restraining Others

A policy that attempts to influence the policies of other countries toward Africa, and particularly arms-sales policies, could also help to reduce tensions on the continent. The Soviet Union would obviously

[12]On this point, see my "African International Politics: Underdevelopment and Conflict in the Seventies," ORBIS, Spring 1978, pp. 228-232.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE II

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND AID IN AFRICA
(fiscal years, millions of dollars)

	1978	*1979*	*1980*	*1981**	*1982†*
Botswana	15.2	11.1	13.0	10.0	10.0
Djibouti				2.0	2.0
Kenya			14.5	5.5	10.0
Lesotho	5.5‡				
Liberia		5.0	5.2	7.0	10.0
Mauritius					2.0
Seychelles					2.0
Somalia			5.0		20.0
Sudan			40.0	50.0	50.0
Swaziland	12.8‡				
Uganda		3.0			
Zaire	10.0‡				
Zambia	30.0	20.0	24.0	20.0	20.0
Zimbabwe			22.9	25.0	75.0
Southern Africa Regional Fund	37.2	13.9	8.1	25.0	30.0
TOTAL	110.7	53.0	132.7	144.5	231.0

*Projected
†Proposed
‡Programs in these countries have been moved to other accounts under pressure from Congress, where it was found that they were essentially economic-development programs and not primarily security-oriented.

SOURCES: See Table I.

be the most important target of such a program. The weapons that pose such a great threat to Libya's neighbors are primarily Soviet weapons, and Soviet arms made possible Somalia's 1977 attack on Ethiopia. But other countries, notably France and to a lesser degree Italy, have also supplied arms to Africa, and their arms aid may at times have contributed to the potential for violence. Certainly with respect to Libya, at least, their role seems to have increased the international danger. The arms flowing from a variety of countries to southern Africa, probably including some clandestine aid to South Africa in violation of the 1978 mandatory UN Security Council embargo, have added immensely to the tensions in the region.

The difficulty with attempting to restrain other countries, of course, is that each has its own interests, as well as its own sensitivity to U.S. pressures, that may give it little incentive to heed U.S. appeals. Given the current mood of U.S.-Soviet relations, an agreement on limiting arms

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sales in Africa seems remote indeed, and in any event it is difficult to imagine the Soviet government, except in unusual circumstances, resisting African appeals for arms. Perhaps the Soviets would like to see some limit on the Libyan arsenal—at least a limit that keeps nuclear weapons out of Qaddafi's hands—but the opportunities offered by arming southern African guerrillas, the Ethiopian army, and others are no doubt too great to be foregone. Perhaps the Mitterrand government in France would be amenable to an agreement with the United States on limiting arms in Africa, but talk of possible French arms supplies to liberation movements in southern Africa suggests that disagreements on this issue could lie ahead.

Resolving African Conflicts

Finally, a U.S. policy that sought directly to resolve African disputes could clearly have an impact on reducing armed international violence. The value of this approach is well recognized by U.S. officials, who have devoted so much time and effort to solving the Namibian conflict. If only a settlement satisfactory to all sides could be arranged in Namibia, South Africa would no longer have a rationale for its attacks into Angola, the justification for the Soviet and Cuban role in Angola would be undercut, and there would be reason to hope for an evolution of the entire southern African situation in a more peaceful direction. But the difficulties encountered by the United States in Namibia, where neither the Carter tactic of strong public pressure on the South African government nor (as yet) the more conciliatory approach of the Reagan administration has met with success, illustrate one of the handicaps that would confront the United States if it sought to become an African peacemaker. As the Western superpower, the United States is inevitably perceived, however unfairly, as the heir to the Western colonial role in Africa, and can hardly avoid being suspected of ulterior, "neocolonial" designs. This suspicion affects the black African parties to negotiations involving the United States, and their supporters, while even the white Afrikaner-dominated government of South Africa, whose leaders live in the shadow of the Boer struggle against British imperialism, are affected by it.

On the other hand, and somewhat paradoxically, the United States, because it had no African colonies and lacks status as a former metropole, is not widely recognized on the continent as a country that can legitimately play a major role in African affairs. In some instances, indeed, a former colonial power can be more acceptable as an African mediator than the United States. Britain, for example, was in a better position to play the critical catalytic role in Zimbabwe, although the United States was an important behind-the-scenes influence at the Lancaster House

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

peace talks. In any event, the African states today seem more inclined to use OAU-sponsored committees to resolve African disputes than to rely on outside mediators, and with respect to disputes among OAU members, this reduces the United States to the role of an interested spectator to the conflict-resolution process, albeit a spectator who supports and encourages the process.

In short, it is difficult to see the United States playing a more active role as a mediator of African disputes than it does today. But the potential importance of behind-the-scenes influence should not be underestimated. In the Zimbabwe case, the United States, by refusing to recognize the "internal settlement" of 1978 or the Muzorewa government after the April 1979 election, exerted considerable pressure on the internal parties to come to the negotiating table. But on the other hand, the possibility of U.S. recognition of Muzorewa may have been a factor in influencing Mugabe to come to terms. Meanwhile, the offer of substantial U.S. aid to Zimbabwe after a settlement (however large or explicit that offer may or may not have been) suggested to all concerned that there was real hope for a stable and prosperous Zimbabwe if only they could agree. This is a model that could have application in other African disputes, but its successful application requires an active diplomacy and a willingness to commit both political and financial resources.

Conclusions

Perhaps it is wisest to conclude on a note of some pessimism. While large-scale armed international violence does not appear likely in most of Africa, it can occur at any of Africa's flashpoints. In the Horn and the Maghreb, conflict may not be an immediate prospect, but the underlying bases for conflict remain. The potential for conflict involving Libya is much greater, and the tensions in southern Africa will surely become explosive if the security situation within South Africa begins to deteriorate.

U.S. policymakers can contribute to the prevention of violent outbreaks by showing restraint in arms sales, encouraging the stabilization of regional military balances, and following other lines of policy that have been briefly discussed here. But the effectiveness of these steps is limited by constraints arising from the characteristics of the African and global situations today and from the limits on U.S. resources. Thus it would be imprudent to have more than modest expectations of any policy aimed at reducing African international conflict.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Get the facts...fast!

Put all the who, what, when, where, and *why* of international affairs right on your bookshelf

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD: 1981

Edited by A. S. Banks & W. Overstreet

"Recommended as the first place to check for basic political information about the independent countries of the world" – *Booklist*

Authoritative analyses of and full details on international and regional trends • national parties, movements, issues, and events • vital social and economic factors • legislatures • heads of state and cabinet members • news media • imports and exports • and much more. Plus in-depth data on the composition and activities of all major intergovernmental organizations. *704 pp., 8½ x 11, $39.95*



The Current History ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DEVELOPING NATIONS

Edited by C. L. Thompson, M. M. Anderberg, & J. B. Antell

Unprecedented, thoroughly up-to-date,A-Z coverage of 93 non-industrialized nations: the economic, social, political, and geographical forces shaping each country's development • the effects of change on everyday life • historical, cultural, and economic background • quick-reference demographic breakdowns • specially produced maps and over 200 photographs. *416 pp., 8½ x 11, $39.95*



ECONOMIC HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD: 1981

Edited by A. S. Banks, V. Carlip, R.P. DeWitt, Jr., & W. Overstreet

Accurate economic information about each nation on earth and the interrelationships between economies. Examines both long-standing and emerging national, regional, and global issues • the impact on international trade of such forces as the energy crisis, tight commodities markets, and worldwide inflation • political relationships with important economic implications • the activities, policies, and influence of every major international financial organization • and much more. *585 pp., 8½ x 11, $39.95*



Mail coupon for 15 days' FREE examination

McGraw-Hill Book Company
P.O. Box 400, Hightstown, NJ 08520

Please send me the book(s) checked for 15 days' free examination. At the end of that time, I will pay for the book(s) I keep, plus local tax, postage, and handling, and return any unwanted book(s) postpaid with no further obligation. I understand that if I include payment with this order, McGraw-Hill will pay all regular postage and handling costs, and that the full return privilege still applies.

- ☐ POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD: 1981 (003629-2) $39.95
- ☐ THE CURRENT HISTORY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DEVELOPING NATIONS (064387-3) $39.95
- ☐ ECONOMIC HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD: 1981 (003691-8) $39.95

Name_____

Address: Apt _____

City_____

State: Zip_____

This order subject to acceptance by McGraw-Hill. Offer good only in the U.S.

57-J456-4380-3

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THINGS FALL APART?

by Dennis Austin

The record of African events over the past two decades has been so gloomy that, however one might stress the immensity of the continent, or its variety, or the capacity of its leaders for optimism, it is difficult not to be pessimistic about the next ten or twenty years. Fortunetellers of course like to prophesy doom—if only because Cassandra was a better prophet than Pangloss—but there is a pervasive mistrust of what lies ahead, among African as well as external observers.[1] It was not altogether the merits of the story that brought Chinuah Achebe's major work its international esteem: the title was illustrative, it seemed, of the condition of African politics. Indeed, who at the beginning of the 1980s could say whether the center would hold in every African state or what rough beast, its hour come round at last, was slouching toward Lagos to be born—or to Kinshasha or Maputo or Kampala? The total picture is not irredeemably brutal, but even where some kind of democratic order has been retained, it is precarious, and where injustice holds sway, the likelihood of reform seems remote. The best, one might say, lack all conviction, and any passion lies with the worst.

Throughout the past twenty years or so, African states have been in flux, moving in and out of misfortune. Some, like Uganda, perpetrate atrocities, such as the murder of their citizens; others, like Somalia, are burdened with discarded and famished refugees. The treachery of political life has been very real: armed coups, civil war, public executions, the threat of secession, the recurrence of famine, the fanaticism of religious beliefs, regional wars, the near-genocide of entire communities, the transitory nature of military and party regimes, and the indebtedness not only of corrupt dictatorships (as in Zaire) but also of governments that still struggle to preserve an element of political decency in their national life (as in Tanzania). The UN Commission of Refugees places Africa at the head of its lists of disadvantage, an unenviable record. And is is proper to ask in relation to our own decade why so many African states have been

[1] A typical comment: "Most of the governments of the OAU member states are dictatorships of the right or of the left.... The OAU turned a blind eye to the mass murders and systematic genocide of Idi Amin, Bokassa and Nguema and the ruthless mass killings in Burundi of the numerically superior Huti tribesmen by the minority but dominating Tutsi tribesmen. Nor did the OAU raise a finger at the heinous murder of its first Secretary-General, Diallo Telli in prison in Guinea (Conakry)." Olajide Aluko, "The OAU and Human Rights," *The Round Table*, July 1981.

Dennis Austin is Professor of Government at the University of Manchester, Great Britain. His most recent book is *Politics in Africa* (University Press of New England, 1978).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

disturbed, whether the disorder is likely to grow worse, and what effect present and future problems will have on the world of international relations. I will address the three questions separately, although they are of course connected and it will be necessary later in the article to consider them together.

The Causes of Discontent

All African states have suffered enormously in the change from their precolonial rules to their present status as members of an international world of sovereign states. It is well known that the present map of the continent is totally unlike precolonial Africa. Then there were societies, regulated by tradition, in which political life was sanctified by custom and ceremony. Tradition also confirmed inequalities of birth: social power was hierarchical and the "state" was largely synonymous with the social fabric. As well as governments of kings and Muslim rulers there were communities obedient only to elders. But where there were recognizable states they were not very different from the preindustrial states of Europe, and where there were self-regulating societies ("acephalous communities") they were not too dissimilar from other societies that had escaped a feudal hierarchy of control.

Into this world intruded the European mercantile powers, intent on booty and prepared to exercise control by creating colonial territories. African societies were lassoed together, trade was directed outward to the new industries of the West, a disciplined framework of administration was imposed under a cadre of obedient officials, law and order prevailed. If no meaningful consensus existed there was at least cooperation between the new colonial masters and their bemused, often bedazzled, subjects.

The consequences were profound. I single out what I see as the three most important. First, the dissolution of traditional society or, more prudently expressed, the process of its dissolution. As the most notable prophet of the nineteenth century foretold, there came about a "revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation. Fixed relationships with ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions were swept away, all new ones became antiquated before they could ossify. All that was solid melted into air, all that was holy was profaned."[2] Colonial rule sought "the rapid improvement of instruments of production [and] immensely facilitated means of communication that draw all, even the most barbarian, nations

[2] Karl Marx, *Communist Manifesto* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1948), pp. 124-125.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into civilisation," but it sought also "to create a world after its own image,"[3] deeply disturbing whoever fell under that rule. The process of dissolution is by no means complete. "Tradition" in the independent African states has proved capable of survival under many new forms, including what are loosely called "tribal" interests based on a shared history, a common language or religion and a sense of local grievance against central government. Tradition of that kind is usually seen as an enemy of the nation state. Such tradition, however, is no longer capable of justifying inequality based on rank and birth. Politics have become instrumental, legitimacy has to be earned.

Second, there grew the notion of economic development based on industrialization, with the hope of benefits on the largest scale: good water, good roads, hospitals, fixed wages, urban living, television, air travel, ample supplies of food. The new nationalists assumed that colonies were poor because they were dependent; plans arose to nationalize the means of production under an African socialism, which would speed the process of industrialization since the two were thought to be concomitant. Thus, the demand for economic development became synonymous with the need for successful government, and failure to deliver the goods was judged politically. Once upon a time monsoons or the spread of disease among cattle and crops were seen as calamities inflicted on men by the gods, calling for atonement and sacrifice. Now disaster is attributed, like the rise in oil prices or the high cost of living, to the misrule of governments that, being unable to atone, are seen as ripe for sacrifice.

Third, there was the spread of ideas of liberty, equality, fraternity, parliamentary rule, constitutional government, and the right to vote. Nationalism arose as well, breathing life into the artifice of the colonial state. The spread of such beliefs sapped the authority of French and British rule since they clearly contradicted the reality of colonial government: a manifest inequality existed between white and black, European and African—hence the demand for political equality. The ferment of nineteenth century liberalism was at work in an Africa no longer so tightly bound by tradition: Africa for the Africans, nationalism for the colonial territory, freedom for the people. The natural home for such beliefs was among the educated elite, an elite, however, schooled in a foreign idiom. They were eager to disseminate their beliefs among the masses since they needed to mobilize support against their colonial mentors, but what was sauce for the colonial goose became sauce also for the African gander once it became clear that the inequalities of ruler and ruled were no less

[3] Ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(and indeed often greater) under nationalist leaders than they had been under the British, French, Belgians, and Portuguese.

The total effect became a familiar sight in African colony after colony. An anticolonial movement would appear within the colonial states. Political weapons were borrowed from the West—the ballot, parties, parliaments, boycotts, and strikes. They were used to press the claim for self-government in colonies under British rule, and for *egalité* against the French and Belgians. Promises of rapid economic development became the stock in trade of party manifestoes. At the highest level of rhetoric, the anticolonialism of the nationalist leaders held out a secular vision of salvation, transmuting colonialism into independence, oppression into liberty, poverty into wealth, bad into good. But this future paradise also held unpleasant fruits of knowledge that, once eaten, quickly robbed the leaders of their innocence.

The problem these new leaders have had to face can be expressed simply. Twentieth-century governments, if they are to avoid widespread disorder, need either effective coercive power or the legitimacy of popular consent plus the capacity to maintain at least a basic level of prosperity. Three desiderata exist: political control, social consensus, economic growth. Are these not the minimum needs for some kind of contemporary order now that men no longer rule by right of tradition under the sanctity of custom? Unfortunately, and it is pointless to heap blame on the heads of African governments, few of the newly independent states have been able to fulfill the requirements. They frequently lose control, they are precariously based in popular esteem, and, except for the oil-rich countries, they can scarcely meet even the fundamental needs of their once-hopeful followers. No wonder governments are overthrown or the current mood is pessimistic. What follows, therefore, is no more than an amplification of this triple dilemma.

The Inability to Control

Many African governments are accused of being little more than a continuation of the former colonial regime, but that is simply abuse. The primary need of African leaders, in party or military uniform, has been to keep the colonial state going. But the problem is very difficult. It is true that the former colonial territory is upheld as a sovereign entity in the sense that the frontiers of all—or almost all—the European possessions are protected under the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), but how to recreate the mechanisms of colonial control has been a tough puzzle. Whatever the similarities, there is after all a major political difference between a colonial government and its African successor. The former was an intrusion, however devoted its officers might be to those

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they ruled. They were a foreign elite, banded together under the governor as much by a code of colonial behavior as by instruction; and although there might be some backsliding ("going native"), they were—as Kipling portrayed them in India—always a disciplined hierarchy. It was not the lawlessness but the law of the jungle that ruled their conduct as a set of guardians whose strength lay in the pack.

Now these are the Laws of the Jungle, and many and mighty are they;
But the head and the hoof of the Law and the haunch and the hump is—Obey!

African governments have had no such code of ethics or surety of racial solidarity. They are under party or military leaders who retain control by exercising power over their own kind. The difference can be sharply expressed at its extreme by noting that no governor ever hanged one of his colonial officers, whereas Nkrumah in Ghana imprisoned his own party colleagues, and Idi Amin in Uganda beat to death civil servants, judges, university teachers, and his fellow army officers alike.

The fundamental difference is that while the colonial state was essentially bureaucratic, the postindependence regimes have been ultrapolitical. They have also been largely unsuccessful, even according to their own lights. Even the most brutal—Bokassa in the Central African Republic, Nguema in Equatorial Guinea, Amin in Uganda—have been unable to survive, although it is prudent to note that it took the Tanzanian army to dislodge Amin. In addition, many of the once-successful leaders—Nkrumah, Modibo Keita in Mali, Haile Selassie in Ethiopia, Tolbert in Liberia—failed to protect themselves against rival sources of power, despite considerable effort. The usual pattern has been for the ruling party or military junta to set about colonizing the state—monopolizing positions of power, appropriating offices of profit, browbeating the civil service, and seeking to control trade unions and farmers' organizations. But only a few governments—in Kenya, the Ivory Coast, Tanzania, Botswana, Lesotho—have been able (so far at least) to entrench themselves behind their monopoly. And the explanation behind those who have succeeded is revealing. It has either been because the economy has actually grown (Kenya, the Ivory Coast), or because the party does represent a dominant interest (Kenya and the Kikuyu entrepreneurs, Botswana and the cattle barons), or because skillful leaders, whether left, right, or center (Nyerere in Tanzania, Banda in Malawi, Bourguiba in Tunisia, Kenyatta in Kenya, Ahidjo in Cameroun), have been able, like the crocodile, "to sleep with one eye open."[4] Elsewhere the story is dismal. Some states, it is true, have tried to make a new start under new leaders and constitutions—Ghana in 1969 and again in 1979,

[4] The phrase is Houphouet-Boigny's.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nigeria in 1979 — picking up the threads of civilian rule that the army had broken. Others have been able to draw on a residual, general loyalty to kingship, as in Morocco, Swaziland, and Lesotho. Although the detailed picture is varied, however, the overall impression is one of a lack of control, whether under party or military government.

There is something very sad in this African failure to control the would-be nation state. The leaders can neither evolve toward the "*apparat* state" of Marxist practice nor use the institutions of change devised for independence. There is, to be sure, no shortage of would-be *apparatchiks*. But there is no *apparat* strong enough to exert control. Certainly no trade union in Africa could conceivably play the role of Solidarity in Poland: weakly articulated, the African unions are too divided and too unrepresentative of the rural majority. Nor does the Christian church have a strong national impulse: it divides countries like Uganda and Lesotho between Catholics and Anglican/Protestants, and it is in direct conflict with Islam in the Sudan, Chad, and Nigeria. Armies seize control but then break into factions that try to build support on local (usually tribal) interests as, indeed, the liberation movement under Mugabe and Nkomo divided in Zimbabwe between Shona and Ndebele. The mainstay of most states has been the direct descendant of colonial rule, the administrative service that — when it is not being derided by army or party leaders or feared by the general public — maintains the state during periods of misrule or during an interregnum between armies and parties. Meanwhile, the nationalist party, where it has survived, moves fearfully toward a narrowing base of support not least because, as in Zambia between Kaunda and his Bemba opponents, it is opposed by rival groups that reject the national authority of those in power. To adapt the phrases used by Professor Ionescu: the centrifugalism of rival interests is much stronger now under African self-government than the centripetalism of nationalist politics during the colonial period.[5] It is a melancholy fact that no civilian government in Africa has been defeated and replaced through the use of the ballot box. It has happened in India and Sri Lanka and Jamaica but not in Africa. Parties have ceased to be able to link the particular following they serve to any broad national interest: the nationalism they once asserted now lacks sufficient force to create the nation.

Social Consensus

The plain fact is that most African states are artefacts. Not all: small states like Lesotho and Swaziland in southern Africa and Somalia in the Horn of Africa can appeal to a national homogeneity based on their

[5] Ghita Ionescu, "Reading Notes Spring 1981," *Government and Opposition*, Summer 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

precolonial history and a common language.[6] But most are colonially divided. There are, so to speak, no Nigerians in history, but there are, indisputably, Hausa, Fulani, Tiv, Yoruba, Ibo, Efik, Ejaw, Ibibio, and many other communities within the present territory of Nigeria, each having a chronicled history, shared customs, a common language, and (in their eyes) distinct economic wants. They joined together, with difficulty, to oppose the colonial power during the 1950s, but once self-government was achieved many more than one "self" appeared to claim a share of the prize. The Nigerian problem can be seen not only in the history of the civil war but also in current arguments over the number of states into which the federation of seventy or eighty million people should be divided. Prior to independence in 1960, there was a federation of three, then four, regions. That endured until the first coup in January 1966, when Major-General Ironsi decreed that Nigeria should be one country. In May 1967, after Ironsi had been killed, General Gowon divided the country into twelve states. Civil war ravaged the country, the Ibo leader, Ojukwu, was defeated, Gowon was forced to resign, and his successor Mohammed and (following *his* assassination) Obasanjo raised the number of states to nineteen. The present civilian regime under Sheheu Shagari has so far resisted pressure for a further subdivision, but the demand for "state creation" is persistent.

Nigeria typifies almost every African country in the number and diversity of its subnational communities. But it is as true of Nigeria, and of the excolonial countries in general, as it is of the United States or Britain that the nation state in the twentieth century needs a consensus of belief and trust in the institutions and procedures of government if it is not to be coerced or, still worse, to lose control amid disorder. But where is such a consensus to be found in these recently independent African countries?

The familiar solvent of communal and religious differences is class. Popular notions of "class conflict" forget the historical role that classes performed in unifying the state, if only (as Marxists aver) in their own interest. But in most African states classes are too weak or too externally related to play such a part. Admittedly, no visitor to Casablanca, Nairobi, Abidjan, Dakar, or Lagos fails to distinguish between rich and poor, educated and illiterate: the differences are grotesque and repellent. But — North Africa apart — classes are not, or not yet at least, the primary source of conflict, nor are they the basis for a "middle-class solidarity." They are embryonic. Marx and Engels might have recognized the similarities with, say, Germany in 1848 with its nobility, the bourgeoi-

[6] Somalia had no precolonial state structure, but the possession of a common language gave force to national policies under British and Italian rule.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sie, the small merchant class, shopkeepers, artisan class, and peasantry, but those observers would also have to note the very strong force of ethnicity or petty nationalities.[7] It is an ironic comment on the anticolonial movements that their stress on "being African" under various forms of *négritude* or an African personality stirred the longing for "alternative states" among communities that have persistently attempted to assert historical identities opposed to the colonial state — Baganda, Ashanti, Casamance, Biafra, Bacongo.[8] The colonial legacy prevails today because an alternative map of a traditional Africa in modern guise defies belief; but it has not been strong enough to efface the memory, or the longing, or (one should add) the material hopes, of communities that would like to redefine self-government in terms of a very different history from that of the colonial power. At worst, the demand poses an ever-changing, ever-constant threat to huge caravanserai countries like Zaire while, at best, it means endless friction within the central governments of Nigeria, Zambia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and similarly constituted states.

It is true that educated elites govern alongside traditional emirs, sultans, chiefs, and elders. But they are not numerous, and they are divided by their followers. It is the reverse side of the coin of popular government. If the problem were simply that of elites against masses, or classes against tradition, or education against illiteracy, the chances of cohesion might be promising, particularly as secular beliefs grow stronger. But it is too simple a contrast, just as the use of the category "tribalism" is too clumsy a description of what one might, more pleasantly, call a "local patriotism," except that that, too, is misleading: it suggests a basic unit of loyalty from which an overall consensus might be built. Unfortunately, however, one section or another of the elite is often in league with its own local community against the center. The search for votes pulls national leaders apart toward rival bases of communal or regional support. Governments therefore exist precariously, and their members grow distrustful of one another. They remain in office only because the possibility of change is held in check by the very plurality of forces that makes them precarious. The dilemma is aptly contained in Nolutshungu's description of Nigeria — applicable to many African states — as held together in an uneasy balance only by "the conjunction of negatives": the elite is too feeble to dominate, but the masses are too divided to rebel.

It is this absence of a firm center of authority that breeds distrust. It is a marked feature of African politics: distrust among leaders,

[7] See Engels, *Revolution and Counter Revolution in Germany* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1933), p. 13.

[8] Some of course are historical fictions — "tradition" is very skillful at recasting history according to its present needs — but that is not to deny their modern appeal.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

distrust among rival sources of power in the army, party, or trade unions, distrust between the government and local communities. Perhaps it is simply the age in which the African states have come to independence. They exist in the strange world of factitious sovereignty: not Robinson Crusoe but Friday in his island state. The African states also have to endure a world divided between states that are industrially developed and those that are struggling to develop. Distrust therefore comes from the less developed countries' inferior position internationally as well as from the precarious base of their own misrule. Yet they equivocate in their distrust. Illiterates distrust their educated leaders but wish their children to become like them. African governments distrust the developed world of the rich but are dependent on their help to join their number. The elites talk of decolonizing the basis of their culture but are eager to adopt Western ideologies and Western forms of learning. Perhaps the colonial years were too much for them in their transition to the land of promise:

> Because several of their generations had lived in a traditional land, pitching their tents between the houses of their fathers and the real Egypt, they were now unanchored souls, wavering in spirit and without a secure doctrine. They had forgotten much; they had half assimilated some new thoughts; and because they lacked real orientation, they did not trust their own feelings. They did not trust even the bitterness that they felt towards their bondage. (Thomas Mann, *The Tables of the Law*)

Economic Growth

Almost all the African governments have boasted much and achieved little. It is a politician's common fault, but the gap between promise and fulfillment in Africa has been inordinately great. Socialism, Pan-Africanism, industrialization, social welfare, plus the end of white rule in South Africa, have all been held out as attainable ends over and above the material advantages that would accrue to a free people. Nowhere were the promises so loudly trumpeted as in Ghana under a succession of leaders: Nkrumah, Ankrah, Afrifa, Busia, Acheampong, Akufo, Limann. Now Nkrumah is dead, Busia is dead, Afrifa, Acheampong, and Akufo executed, Limann deposed, and the state is bankrupt. The effect is disillusionment — not only in Ghana — among the several communities that constitute local society, together with the loss of that conditional assent that is given to national governments only as long as they can materially reward their followers. To succeed is to be praised, but to fail is not to be forgiven:

> Overnight everyone began to shake their heads at the excesses of the last regime, at its graft, oppression and corrupt government: newspapers, the radio, the hitherto silent intellectuals and civil servants — everybody said what a terrible lot; and it became public opinion the next morning. And these were the same people

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that only the other day had owned a thousand names of adulation, whom praise-singers followed with song and talking-drum wherever they went. Chief Koko in particular became a thief and a murderer, while the people who had led him on — in my opinion the real culprits — took the legendary bath of the Hornbill and donned innocence.[9]

Are the poorer states disordered, the rich more stable? A common-sense answer would verify that equation. It would note that Nigeria has a relatively free, pluralistic regime on the basis of oil revenues without which the return in 1979 to parliamentary rule would surely have been more hazardous. (Hence current anxieties over the loss of revenue from the downturn in oil exports.) The transition to a new leadership in Kenya after the peaceful death in office of Kenyatta must owe something to the relative success of an industry-based economy as well as to Kikuyu dominance. Without oil and with a bankrupt economy, Ghana offers a gloomy picture of its politics: indebtedness, coups, corruption, coups within the coup, market shortages, inflation of over 100 per cent annually, a fearful government and no comfort in sight. Fluctuations in Zambia's copper-based economy have borne very heavily on Kaunda's leadership, moving it always toward intolerance, coercion, and a nervous instability. Oil keeps even Qaddafi in office? Famine destroys even the minimum of public order in Karamoja? The picture is not quite that straightforward since countries like Tanzania, which is certainly poor, have known some degree of "domestic tranquility," but it is certainly easier to keep people's loyalties if they have enough to eat.

Rather more puzzling are relationships of dependence. The problem of dependence is real: it has been examined closely by international commissions and an army of dependent economists, but the facts of particular cases are never as clear as the general arguments. The predicament of African governments is said to be their dependence on markets and agencies located outside the continent in the developed capitalist world, and that there is such a dependence is very clear. But the argument goes further. The African states cannot (it is said) escape since the ruling elites in the African capitals profit from the relationship; indeed, it is the basis of their rule. The states are prisoners of the developed world, the elites their jailers. Disorder and riot largely originate, therefore, in the fact that most African states are "rooted in the international relations of exchange rather than in the social organisation of production in the country itself."[10] Because there is no locally rooted class to control the state, the effect is "destabilizing."

[9] Chinuah Achebe, *A Man of the People* (London: Heinemann, 1966).

[10] Björn Beckman, *Organising the Farmers: Cocoa Politics and National Development* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1976) p. 235.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The argument would be stronger if it could be shown that the most dependent are either the poorest, the least tranquil, or the most prone to rebellion. But no clear correlation exists. Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Algeria, and Kenya are locked into the industrial market economies of the West, but the leaders appear to be in firm control domestically if only because the economy has grown. Zaire is heavily in debt to Western countries, but who can tell whether Mobuto is in control or not: he is dependent not only on financial help from abroad but also, from time to time, on external military rescue. Nigeria used to have a mixed economy that was dependent on several markets abroad; it was perhaps the prospect of new oil wealth, plus Ibo resentment over its distribution, that led to civil war. It is now overwhelmingly dependent on oil exports, but who can say whether that fuels domestic discontent or keeps the federation intact? Sekou Touré in Guinea (Conakry) has moved in and out of varying degrees of dependence on France without quite losing control of a brutal regime. Botswana under Seretse Khama and his successor, like Lesotho under Chief Jonathan and Swaziland under King Sobhuza, have been more or less peaceful, although there is said to be a "liberation army" among a handful of desperadoes in the Maluti mountains of Lesotho. Botswana is a more open society under its cattle barons than either of its two former associates. But is the relative stability of the three countries despite, or because of, their dependence on South Africa? The pattern is too complicated to decipher. The scapegoat of dependence may help ideologically to deflect discontent but it is probably unfair (as always) to the goat. The very poor countries, such as Upper Volta and Mali in the Sahel, have no one to be dependent on; the middle-level states — Tunisia, Kenya, Ivory Coast — seem to have prospered by their dependency.

A more direct relationship between the lack of economic development and the growth of unrest probably lies not in dependence but in the realm of political promise. This is true not simply because promises are empty but because soldiers and party leaders alike frequently insist that political direction — and coercion — are necessary to "force the pace" of growth toward some distant mecca of industrialization. The claim is never believed by ordinary people; and it is, moreover, invariably untrue. Marxist-Leninist regimes, particularly in Angola, Benin, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, seek to justify a perpetuation of their rule by such promises; but if the Tanzanian experiment of "villagization" is illustrative, the consequences are likely to be bad. Criticism is stifled, thus provoking dissent, and mistakes are made that might have been avoided with criticism. Industrialization and the collectivization of peasant agriculture were enforced in the Soviet Union, but the coercive powers of most African governments rest insecurely on an uneasy party, a divided

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

army, and a reluctant civil service. Under such direction the economy slumps, political tension grows, and the regime falters.

Prospects

Will coups, civil wars, assassinations, public executions, riots, strikes, guerrilla warfare, famine, and border conflict increase? "Political control, consensus, economic growth": none can be guaranteed, and it is right to be apprehensive about the future, although there are areas of the continent where revolutionary change, however "disorderly," is likely to be seen by many of its citizens as a large improvement over the status quo. It was thought to be so under the French in Algeria, under Amin in Uganda, and under Rhodesian rule in Zimbabwe. Americans profited from revolution 200 years ago. Black South Africans hope to profit similarly by throwing off Afrikaner control. The stability of a Duvalier in Haiti, or of Francis Nguema in Equatorial Guinea, or of fascist regimes in Europe, was not exactly prized by either their citizens or their neighbors. But in the light of the problems examined earlier and considering "peaceful change" simply as one descriptive category, and the likelihood of public disorder as another, what can one foretell for Africa?

If the top is placed firmly on the pot, it may boil but not boil over. If it is loosely fastened, one must expect the worst. If however there are safety outlets, including the possibility of removing the lid, the pot may merely simmer. The analogy is homely but it has relevance in the political world of legitimacy and consensus, illegality and coercion.

In some states, the lid is as tight as the rulers can make it. One must then reckon with the possibility that dictatorship will succeed in Africa in the 1980s. It is after all a familiar pattern elsewhere. The growth of technologically based societies may require the parallel growth of an educated and self-assertive society, but much of the African continent is still far from the world of the advanced economies. Moreover, the degree to which a sullen cooperation can be exacted without any sense of legitimacy is strikingly exemplified in the most economically developed country in Africa. The Republic of South Africa is oppressively controlled not primarily because it is poor or economically dependent or post-colonial — although all three are critical elements in its fate — but rather because it is racially divided between a privileged minority and a grossly disadvantaged majority. The country is rich, the people are poor. It also uses — or misuses — democratic means to reinforce its dictatorship, a common enough phenomenon. But will it remain an area of "stability," the lid held down while the pot boils? South Africa has the oldest African nationalist party and the earliest communist party but also the most efficient apparatus of armed control in the continent, and prophecies of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

imminent, fundamental change have always underestimated the effectiveness of white power. That power is backed by four million whites—a formidable number—among whom fear of reform, of having to pay a price too high for their comfort, has consolidated Afrikaner control, except insofar as the limited concessions of the Nationalist party have offended right-wing opinion. The economic strength of South Africa dominates a network of supply that extends over an area far to the north of its immediate neighbors whose leaders in Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are digging in for survival over the next decade, not reaching out for further sacrifices. Therefore, I see no reason to suppose that the pattern of the past thirty years will change fundamentally in the 1980s. Unrest will grow. Violence will increase in the townships. Sabotage will become more sophisticated. But African resistance will have to encounter equally sophisticated methods of repression; the limpet mine and mortar versus the police computer and the helicopter.[11] Meanwhile, the outside world, condemning apartheid, will, I suppose, continue to profit from its stability.

There are fearful long-term dangers to the efficiency of South African order. The situation is a pressure cooker that will, one distant day, explode. But further north, the pattern of the 1980s will surely be different—a repressive *dis*order alternating with attempts to find an agreed-upon basis for authority. As argued earlier, most black African states are too divided to provide a permanent home even for tyranny, although many have tried. There were—still are—times when the Hutu in Burundi, like the Tigre and Eritreans in Ethiopia, or a majority of the population in the Central African Republic under Bokassa, and in Uganda under Amin and Obote, have been oppressed to a greater degree than the black majority in Namibia and South Africa. The difference, however, is not in degrees of cruelty but in its permanence. The oscillation between civilian and military governments, and between one set of leaders and another, has tended to limit the tenure, if not the ferocity, of would-be dictators. It also seems unlikely over the next decade that there will be a major accumulation of domestic capital in any African state to sustain an exploitative class, although Kenya, the Ivory Coast, Tunisia, and Senegal will doubtless move further in that direction. It is interesting that Kenya achieved an orderly succession to a new (non-Kikuyu) leader on the basis of the status quo being preserved (Botswana, too, on a similar basis of a social-economic order?). In many other African states, however, the sequence of events in the 1980s is likely to correspond to that of the 1960s and 1970s. The colonial state will survive, and its mainstay will be the

[11] I have tried to set out the tentative assumptions behind such an appraisal in "Cooperation Without Consensus," chapter 5 in *Politics in Africa* (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1978).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

administrative service; but it would be foolish to suppose that parties and armies will become no more than epiphenomena: they are all too real once in office. The problem is that they are largely unsuccessful, and although disorder may be the ally of change for the better, it can also drag down the not so heinous regimes.

The likelihood, then, is a recurrence of "one-leader regimes." If the head of state falls, the regime goes with him. "Never alone did the King sigh but with a general groan." The failure of party-based governments to satisfy even their own followers will open the way for the army; the termination of military rule, when the soldiers tire of politics, will shift the location of power to new leaders. It will be a familiar sequence of rise and fall, reconstruction and collapse, as if the center of political life were hollow or so uncertain of any national focus of allegiance that the state is vulnerable to gratuitous seizures of power—Master Sergeant Doe in Liberia, Field Marshal Okello in Zanzibar. The failure, too, will be familiar, a failure of institutions—parties, parliaments, bureaucracies, armies, trade unions—through which more settled societies conduct their affairs, and a failure of trust, corrupted by communal and regional differences that divide African states "segmentally." It is sensible, therefore, to expect further upheavals during the 1980s particularly in states where the lid is insufficiently tight because of frightened leaders whose belief in coercion outruns their capacity to coerce. The incidence of breakdown will be random, messy, often cruel: Ethiopia, Guinea, Uganda, Mauritania, Ghana, Chad, Malawi, Rwanda, Mozambique, Zaire, Zambia. Who can tell where the next blow will fall?

Matters might, I suppose, take a different turn if intervention by African governments in neighboring or like-minded states, with or without foreign help, were to increase. There has always been the air of a holy alliance about the OAU, and individual member governments have acted in support of faltering regimes—troops from Guinea in Sierra Leone in aid of Siaka Stevens and in Liberia on behalf of Tolbert prior to his final downfall, Senegalese troops in Gambia, Moroccan troops (with French help) in Zaire. Soviet support props up the Dergue in Addis Ababa, the Cubans sustain Angola, the Americans help the Sudan and Somalia as well as Egypt. But maintenance and rescue are far from easy. They do not always yield a full measure of gratitude. And such successes are often offset by attempts by one regime to undermine another, often with outside assistance: Tanzania against Amin, internal opposition plus French help against Bokassa, the Americans against Colonel Qaddafi, Colonel Qaddafi *contra mundum*—or so it is believed. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the instability and disorder of a number of African states will continue.

Without hope or respite? The picture is not unredeemably

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tragic; certain African states are still poised between order and disorder, and (a few others) between democracy and dictatorship. It may be because of residual legacies from a traditional past, or from the former metropolitan country, that parliaments and ballot boxes have not everywhere been bundled away or subverted. There are theories of control, too, that are said to offer grounds for hope. And if there were one—just one—African state that could survive the next decade democratically controlled, on a free consensus of public opinion, without squandering its wealth or making its poor still poorer, and if such a country were as large and important as, say, Nigeria, then some of the present pessimism might be dispelled. But does such a possibility exist?

The hope is that a limited accommodation can be reached at a national level between rival segments, or separate pillars, of a plural society, an accommodation that can keep an orderly process of government intact. Lijphart has attached the term "consociational" to his account of plural states; Dudley used its arguments in defense of Nigeria.[12] Cooperation comes about, it is argued, on practical grounds, either because the cost of not doing so is too high—on the scale, say, of the Nigerian civil war—or because no one element in political life can so dominate its rivals as to drive them out of existence. Single-party rule, therefore, is impossible. But so, too, are familiar British or U.S. models, since the multiplicity of political interests and the rivalry between them call for a planetary rather than a binary system.[13] Since the return to civilian rule in 1979, Nigeria has been under a constitution that does try to give institutional direction to a loose federal arrangement of four or five parties and numerous local interests among its nineteen states. The day-to-day working of the constitution has in a sense been an attempt to rebut Nolutshungu's pessimism about the "conjunction of negatives." The stress is on minimal rather than total government, but even so there is a positive commitment to Nigerian unity. There is an active federal government and a federal public service that is sensibly willing—and obliged—to recognize the autonomy of state interests. And such is the nature of Nigerian society that local demands are always sufficiently numerous to keep alive a diversity of alliances.

On the other hand, the disadvantages are also severe. Models of government that maximize the strength of local interests may end by

[12] See Arend Lijphart's analysis of the Netherlands, *The Politics of Accommodation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), and his comparative study *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977). See, also, B. J. Dudley, *Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1974).

[13] A comparable model for such a political universe would be India since 1947: dominance by Congress until the break in 1977 but also dissent from an array of opposition parties that exist with the hope of being able to form a new center once the dominant party is torn apart by its own internal segments. See W. H. Morris-Jones, "Dominance and Dissent," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 1, no. 4, 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consolidating them. The assumption behind such theories is that the elites of each "pillar of the state" cooperate, and their followers obey. The result, however, may be that local loyalties become entrenched at the expense of any national consensus. The model is also "rational" in the sense that bargains are struck and benefits shared under restraints on both government and opposition that are clearly recognized. But the danger is that one section or another of the parties to the bargain, including the armed forces, will destroy the balance. Too great an insistence on sectional interests may simply erode the center until it crumbles into communal violence. There is ample evidence of that in the recent history of Nigeria. One must remember that the first general election of 1959, on the eve of independence, was based so strongly on regional interests that the outcome proved incapable of sustaining a national government in the 1960s. The 1979 elections—after thirteen years of military rule—showed much the same concentration of local loyalties: it was with some difficulty that Shehu Shagari was accepted as president. It is not clear how much has changed politically since the first election, despite the enhanced authority of the federal government from vastly increased oil revenues and the division of the four regions into nineteen states. During 1981, the assertion of local interests led to murderous riots in Kano and the breakdown of relations between the governor of Kaduna State and the federal government. The possibility is therefore that the next election (scheduled for 1984) may end in paralysis or widespread disorder, as in the former western region in the mid 1960s. Is "consensus government" able to bear the strain, or will it once again be swept aside by the army whose "next coup" is all too often predicted among disgruntled groups of Nigerians?[14] Communal distrust that tears at fragile agreements is the great enemy of the composite state, sadly and savagely exemplified in the dark tragedy of Lebanon. For that, too, was once held up as a model of consociationism.

In the Middle East, however, the prime villain in creating disorder (it might be argued) was not warring local interests but, rather, involvement in international quarrels that might otherwise have been contained. It is time, therefore, to turn to the third and final problem.

International Involvement

It was said earlier that the colonial map of Africa has continued largely unaltered: but under whose dominion? The excolonial powers are

[14] Very little is known about the latent political mood of the Nigerian officers and rank and file, but it is prudent to suppose that there are some politically interested officers who might be drawn into alliance with radical northerners, antisouthern Muslims, anti-Muslim southerners, disaffected Yoruba, disappointed Tiv, frustrated Ibo, among others.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

no longer quite so prominent despite treaty arrangements under the European Economic Community, (British) Commonwealth membership, and a close association still between France, the Maghreb states, and *l'Afrique noire*. Other rivals have appeared: the United States, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Cuba, China. They offer help and supply arms, advise on security, establish trading links, conclude treaties of friendship, look for allies among the African leaders, and view one another no less suspiciously than they are watched by African governments. They entice and browbeat according to circumstance, giving rise to charges of opportunism, and they act under policies of calculated self-interest—arousing fears about their long-term intentions. The apprehension grows that these powers are a particularly dangerous source of instability not least because they are hard-nosed, less sentimental, and more capricious than their colonial predecessors. They are "free booters" except insofar—and it may not be very far—as they can be persuaded to come to the aid of African regimes that run up a Marxist-Leninist flag of belief or whose leaders are seen as allies of the "free world." Most African governments still profess to be hostile to any form of outside interference, but the majority are also heavily dependent on external markets and sources of supply. No wonder, then, that there are fears of a new partitioning of Africa into rival spheres of influence, or that earlier theories of dependence, born of the inequalities of wealth and power between the United States and Latin America, have now been dusted down and reapplied to Africa.

Partition. The word is full of echoes. *Imperium expellas furca tamen usque recurret?* Perhaps the ghosts of the Berlin Conference are already gathering to watch the re-enactment of their play? The argument of course is not whether Africa will be redefined as a map of nonsovereign states. It might be more stable if it were. But the international world is no longer willing to admit the legitimacy of empire. It prefers the subterfuge of treaties of friendship and local advisers. Nor are twentieth-century governments, particularly those newly independent, willing to abandon their sovereignty: it is the one mark of distinction that weak states can assert. The danger is that international rivalries and African weaknesses will pursue an erratic course together. For it may be that the struggle for African resources is only just beginning. Cobalt and platinum are rare minerals; along with uranium, diamonds, gold, iron, and copper, they are vital to the industrial world. Unhappily, however, the countries richly endowed are either feebly governed or the object of international conflict: Zaire, Zambia, Namibia, Western Sahara, Chad, Angola. It is also the case that strategic rivalries between the superpowers are now firmly planted in Africa: if the CIA is active in Somalia and Zaire, Soviet agents are hard at work in Benin and Mozambique. Ideologies have followed in their

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wake—or, perhaps, gone before. Once upon a time there was a simple divide between (radical) state socialists and (moderate) state capitalists. Now there are the extreme conservatives (Mr. Banda?) and the extreme Marxist-Leninists (Guinea-Bissau, Benin, Angola, Mozambique, the Congo Republic, Ethiopia, and the Malagasy Republic) as well as revolutionary Islamic states. Perhaps labels should not be taken too seriously. Ethiopia appears to be under a feudal, military, Marxist, Amharic-imperialist regime that may not be very different in the eyes of its disaffected minorities or its rural poor from the imperial government of Haile Selassie. But flags of convenience have also become signals of distress, calling for international help from Angola, Namibia, Zaire, Chad, the Western Sahara, and the Horn of Africa. Individual African states, notably Morocco and Libya, have seized the opportunity to intervene. But the spread of regional conflicts and guerrilla warfare has also opened the way to non-African powers to the point where it would not be too difficult to shade in areas of the continent in order to demarcate Soviet, Cuban, Eastern European, South African, and Western spheres of influence. How distant the prospect is from the early days of pan-African unity and Third World neutrality!

The Soviet Union might be thought to be well placed for the 1980s. It is untainted—in Africa—by any history of colonialism. It supports the liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia. It is pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel. It is a willing supplier of arms. It proclaims, indeed enshrines, a doctrine that has great appeal among the educated young, many of whom half believe that Moscow has the secret of rapid industrialization—a topsy-turvy belief since it asserts that industrialization will be achieved through Marxist socialism and not (as one might suppose) via the intermediate stage of capitalism. Very likely, too, the Soviet leaders command respect for their tenacity of office, for however bad it may be for states to be one-leader regimes, that is not the view of the African leaders: certainly none of them wishes to be a one-term president. The Soviets also know a good deal about religious minorities, national cultures, and pluralistic societies, and they are unlikely to be squeamish about local methods of control. In brief, they are willing to advise, prepared to arm, and eager to trade.[15] They have, additionally, a useful ally—an ally rather than a proxy—in the Cubans, with their African ancestry, taste for adventure, and reputation for success against

[15] The definitive statement is said to be Kosygin's announcement to the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1976 that Moscow wanted economic relations with developing nations on the basis "of a stable division of labour counter-posed to the system of imperialist exploitation" since through trade "the Soviet Union will have the opportunity to satisfy the requirements of its own economy more fully." *Pravda*, March 2, 1976, quoted in Richard Loewenthal, *Model or Ally?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 359.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the odds. Cuba may be a difficult ally, pursuing its own path to glory, but the Soviets can properly bask in the warmth of an African verdict that (with exceptions) welcomed the MPLA victory in Angola and FRELIMO in Mozambique.

And the Soviets have the capability today to help at long range. They can sustain Mengistu in Addis Ababa, look after security in Benin, and convey arms to Namibia. The elderly Soviet leaders ought to be delighted by their progress as heirs of Peter the Great, moving ever outward from their own immense land into the wider world, as the true progenitors of revolution. They can wait throughout the 1980s for further prizes, giving support to SWAPO and the ANC, dispatching advisers, supplying arms, extending trading links, and signing treaties of friendship. They need not venture troops nor promise more than they can deliver. They can watch the turn of events in Namibia and South Africa, helping where they can to turn them in a favorable direction for the Soviets. No great cost will be involved since Africa is not Afghanistan or Eastern Europe. It is frontier territory between the superpowers or, more aptly perhaps, it has become a vast chessboard across which they play the Great Game of move, check, and countermove.

Yet Soviet entry into the Africa game was not without mishap. Earlier hopes of a privileged position in Guinea under Sekou Touré, Ghana under Nkrumah, and Egypt under Sadat were soured by changes in local politics.[16] It is plainly as difficult for the Soviets as for the Americans to monitor — still less control — changes in the fortunes of particular states. The superpowers were both late to recognize the rise of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. Within the general framework of a commitment to "Marxist Socialism" and "African Liberation," the Soviets have simply seized their advantage where and when they can. But that, too, has its consequences. The change from Somali to Ethiopian support may have been politically and strategically sensible but it probably added to a view of the Soviet Union as simply the "other superpower," whose trading needs and international policies are shaped by non-African interests. The view from Beijing of course is that the Soviets are much the more wicked of the two superpowers, steeped in "socialist imperialism, big power hegemony and aggressively expansionist policies." [17] Few African governments are quite so extreme, but it would be surprising if some were not a little uneasy today before the image of the Soviet Union as the true godfather of revolution. What was welcomed in colonial Africa, and

[16] See, in particular, the classic study by W. Scott Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-66* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969).

[17] *Peking Review*, September 29, 1978, quoted in James Mayall, "Africa in the International System," *Government and Opposition*, vol. 14, no. 3, 1979.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

advocated for South Africa, can have little appeal for the leaders of independent Africa. Revolution, it may be asked, for whom?

If in fact the two superpowers are compared, the advantage is by no means Moscow's. The Soviet Union has the distinction — even the attraction — of being newly arrived there, but the West has been in Africa for a century or more, and is deeply entrenched in its commerce, finance, administration, education, and that hybrid *Afrique-française,* Afro-Saxon culture that affects the lives of far more than the educated elite. There is an intimacy of love and hate, and the United States rides on the back of the former colonial powers in this respect. It does so more easily of course in English-speaking Africa, but throughout the continent Americans benefit from a postcolonial dependency that African leaders criticize but know that they need. Nor are Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola exceptions. They are in no sense comparable, say, with Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia. They may be politically Marxist but they are a long way from COMECON. As Mayall has observed:

> . . . the proportion of Algerian merchandise exports to the Eastern area increased from 1 to 2 per cent between 1970-76. Since the Soviet Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation with Angola and Mozambique were negotiated in 1976 and 1977 respectively, and are to run for 20 years, it is plainly too early to predict with any confidence their long-term economic yield. But the World Bank's figures of their current trade with the centrally planned economies — less than 1 per cent for Mozambique and a fall from 2 to 1 per cent for Angola between 1960 and 1976 — hardly suggest a dramatic restructuring of either country's trade.[18]

Critics are quite right, therefore, when they point to Africa's fundamental dependence on the West and the fact that local elites profit from it. There is no shortage of examples. Angola (like Mozambique) is Marxist in politics, Western-based in its economy. American dollars from the Cabinda enclave, paid through Gulf Oil, pay for Soviet arms, finance SWAPO guerrillas, and sustain the 25,000 or more Cubans who service the MPLA regime.[19] Small, mountainous Lesotho has a remarkable number of young would-be Marxists in the National University at Roma, but it is a temporary tie: once they graduate, the best and the brightest migrate to Maseru or Johannesburg to join the public service or a multinational company or UN agency — well on their way to their first Volvo. Tanzanians — at least the party elite — long for *Ujamaa* but are dependent for their very survival on the monsoon, American wheat, or frequently both. Guinea turned from Paris to Moscow, then tried to stand alone, but

---

[18] Mayall, "Africa in the International System," p. 352.

[19] "Gulf Oil is the source of more than 60 per cent of Angola's foreign exchange. U.S. companies find the Marxist-Leninists in Luanda a firmly pragmatic lot and not particularly difficult to do business with." (*London Daily Telegraph,* August 28, 1981.) Oil production is expected to reach 2 million barrels a day by 1985.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

necessity—and the desire for a stable currency—brought the regime back into association with France. Zimbabwe traveled from Britain to North Korea for help with its new army, but it cannot alter the direction of its road and rail network, its reliance on South African locomotives, and its need for Western capital. The plain truth is that African states can change their political spots but not their economic skin. The United States, Western Europe, and Japan—the "capitalist West"—are in a strong position, therefore, since they are the chief suppliers and market for African needs. Although economic power is often resented, it can also be cloaked by formally sovereign governments, and it is maneuverable; it can be adjusted quickly to new masters and unusual circumstances, as in Zimbabwe or Angola or Mozambique.

But whatever the advantages may be for those who came recently to Africa, or for those who never fully left the continent, the degree of foreign influence (which seems bound to increase) is clearly a misfortune for Africans. One can be optimistic and stress both the impermanence and the resilience of African politics; the model perhaps is Sadat's Egypt in the sense that no African state is likely to be totally subverted. Even though the leaders may be corrupted and strongly influenced by this or that foreign power, governments change and circumstances alter. There is also the basic belief in "Africa for the Africans," which seems to outlive the immediate needs of particular regimes. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the presence of these suppliers of arms and protection is an additional and major source of disturbance. African rivalries draw in the rich and powerful who then vastly complicate the problem of building local structures of control. The entry of the Soviet Union into the Horn was brought about by the Somali-Ethiopian war; the Cubans arrived not because of the strength but the weakness of the MPLA against their foreign-backed opponents. And it is because Zaire is so incompetently governed that it has to kowtow to the Belgians, French, Moroccans, and the International Monetary Fund. If blame is to be fixed, therefore, it must be laid at the door of both domestic victim and foreign predator. But it is the essential predicament of these weakly constituted states and their custodians that they are readily persuaded of the need for outside help, until the point has now been reached when the shadow of great-power rivalry falls across almost every African dispute. In this respect the South African government acts like a foreign power located within the continent. South Africa is clearly determined throughout the 1980s to cause maximal disturbance among its African neighbors through armed incursions into Angola, economic pressures of one kind or another against Zimbabwe and Mozambique, and control of the borders with Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana.

The danger is further compounded by rivalry among the inter-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nationalists themselves. The communist bloc extends its Sino-Soviet quarrels to Africa, where China's apparently random support for various factions — some "revolutionary," others "reactionary" — can usually be explained by the elementary rule of backing the side opposite to those supported by Moscow: its help to Mugabe seems to have been largely determined by Soviet backing for Nkomo. But the Western powers, too — excluding the politically neutral, morally free, economically avid Japanese — are in disarray. They compete for contracts, extend their protection to different protegés, and are at odds with one another over which policy to adopt concerning South Africa and Namibia. And behind the major powers are not only lesser governments like East Germany — jackals behind the predators? — but also a variety of interests offering help and looking for profit: international companies, armament dealers, shady financiers, security experts, and secret agents. So it comes about that rival governments within the OAU, and opposition groups opposed to national governments and those uneasily in power, reach out for assistance — whether for tanks, aircraft, trucks, missiles and equipment, or for money, teachers, food, and medicine. Countries borrow money, import arms, sign treaties of friendship and articles of association, and are met by demands for services rendered. The pattern is so varied, the options so numerous, that no forecast of likely victims or victors is possible. All one can say of the 1980s is that these semienforced relationships of varying dependencies between African and non-African powers will surely multiply. Pliny wrote that out of Africa there is always something new, but this may cease to be true. *Ex Africa semper eadem?* It will be more of the same, and it will hardly be pleasant.

The outlook, then, is grim, though not necessarily for every state. The oil-rich may prosper. One or two may succeed in moving their economy forward, a prospect more likely among state capitalist than state socialist regimes. Backed by oil revenues, Nigeria may achieve some kind of balance among local feuds and may succeed in keeping the boundary intact between national politics and external pressures. But nothing is certain, and for most African countries the prospect is bleak. The ceremonies of innocence that once proclaimed their birth are gone indeed. Nor are the chances of improvement in the 1980s very good. The fear of widespread disaster is always present. If, for example, the South African government, against the odds, lost control, the effect would be calamitous, closer to Iran than to Kenya or Zimbabwe, disorder alternating with violence over a huge area of southern Africa; there would be no residual colonial authority to turn to, no Lancaster House settlement. For the present, however, it is the independent African governments that appear at highest risk. Not even "revolution from above" will maintain order in states that, lacking any firm center of power, can be seized only tempo-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rarily, almost by rote, between military bureaucrats and party managers.[20] The times are very much out of joint for the fifty or so African governments. "Fortune," Machiavelli noted, can be good or bad, although "it favours good order." But what is truly needed in political life is *virtù*, by which intelligent men can either mitigate the disadvantages imposed by fortune or enlarge the opportunities it provides. The great example (for Machiavelli) was the Romans: "No bad luck ever made them abject nor did good fortune ever make them arrogant."[21] The princes who rule in Africa in 1981 are very far from that degree of *virtù*.

[20] See Ellen K. Trimberger, *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1976).

[21] Machiavelli, *Discourses* 3.36. See Robert Orr, "The Time Motif in Machiavelli," in Martin Fleisher, ed., *Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought* (London: Croom, Helm, 1972), p. 183. I am grateful to Professor Ionescu for the reference.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REVIEW

A journal of scholarship and opinion publishing articles in the fields of philosophy, political science, economics, literature and social criticism. THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REVIEW is made available free of charge to faculty and students four times during the academic year by the Intercollegiate Studies Institute. Subscriptions are invited from those outside the academic community: one year, five dollars; two years, nine dollars; three years, twelve dollars. Subscriptions and inquiries should be addressed to: ISI, 14 South Bryn Mawr Avenue, Bryn Mawr, Pa. 19010.

Contributors to recent issues:

Hanson Baldwin	Gerhart Niemeyer
Louis I. Bredvold	Robert Nisbet
Goetz Briefs	Stefan T. Possony
Yale Brozen	Peter Stanlis
George Carey	Frank N. Trager
John Davenport	Stephen Tonsor
Roger Freeman	Ernest van den Haag
Henry Hazlitt	Eliseo Vivas
Will Herberg	Robert Penn Warren
Russell Kirk	Francis G. Wilson
Thomas Molnar	Donald Atwell Zoll

Contributors to previous issues:

Raymond Aron	Willmoore Kendall
William Bark	William R. Kintner
Andre Beaufre	Wm. Oliver Martin
Karl Brandt	Ludwig von Mises
Colin Clark	Leo Strauss
Donald Davidson	Robert Strausz-Hupé
Lev E. Dobriansky	Eric Voegelin
M. Stanton Evans	Richard M. Weaver
Lawrence H. Gipson	Simon N. Whitney
Otto von Habsburg	Frederick Wilhelmsen
Arthur Kemp	David McCord Wright

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MILITARY RULE AND MILITARY ORDER IN AFRICA*

by Henry S. Bienen

Africa continues to have a mix of military and civilian regimes. Some countries are ruled by military men who have been in power for a relatively long period, such as Mobutu in Zaire and Nimeiri in Sudan. But these two countries, and others in Africa, have seen the development of party or movement organizations underneath executives led by individuals who came from the armed forces and whose continuance in power depends largely on military support. In other African countries, the rulers have been civilians in power since independence who continue to rely on single parties to carry out legitimating and representative functions. This is the case in Zambia, Guinea, Tanzania, the Ivory Coast, and Cameroun. In Senegal and Kenya, a transfer of power from a founding father to a civilian successor has already occurred. Elsewhere, military personnel have replaced one another or have aborted experiments to return to civilian rule, although the leader produced by new elections may have been a military man, as in Upper Volta. To make the picture yet more complex, there are cases in which the transition to civilian rule seems to have taken hold, as in Nigeria and (perhaps more tenuously) in Ghana. And there has been a recent coup that ended a long-standing civilian-led government in Liberia and that might have ended one in Gambia if not for Senegalese intervention, which led to the restoration of the civilian ruler.

Since the mid 1970s, with the collapse of Portuguese rule and the end of Emperor Haile Selassie's rule in Ethiopia, regimes that seem serious, at least partially, about implanting Marxism-Leninism in Africa have come to power. In Ethiopia, we can still label the regime as a military one.

We must try to explain what is happening in Africa by describing briefly the variability of military regimes. The reasons for persistence of military intervention have to be discussed, in the light of concerns with corporatism and professionalism in African armed forces. We should then try to assess what difference the fact of a military regime makes for

*This article was written under the auspices of Princeton University's Center of International Studies.

Henry S. Bienen is Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University, and Director of Princeton's Research Program in Development Studies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

patterns of social and political change. In addition, of what consequence are military regimes for evolving U.S. policies in Africa?

The Variability of Military Rule in Africa

The nature of military rule in Africa has been extremely variable in the 1960s and 1970s and will continue to be so. A number of different trends exist with respect to military intervention, military rule, and military extrication from overt rule. In Liberia, a coup by enlisted men and noncommissioned officers overthrew a regime of long standing and killed the head of state, President Tolbert, and many of the leading officials and notables in the regime. Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, poorly educated, with no social, economic, or political base beyond his control of immediate force, was installed as leader of the revolution and head of state. In Ghana, junior officers and enlisted men, led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings—who was incarcerated for a failed earlier insurrection—carried out a coup and then tried generals Akufo, Acheampong, and Afrifa, all former heads of state, executing them and five other senior military officers. Nevertheless, the "June 4, 1979 Revolution" in Ghana, which overthrew the Supreme Military Council led by General Akufo (who had in turn removed General Acheampong), continued the process of allowing party politics and elections opened up by General Akufo. The People's National Front party, led by Dr. Hilla Limann, won the election and was allowed to come to power; once in power, it moved Rawlings to the sidelines at least for the moment.

Ghana and Liberia illustrate the breakdown of chains of command within the armed forces and the pressures from junior ranks, complaints that are expressed as much against senior officers as they are against civilian elites: politicians, businessmen, and civil servants. Nigeria, however, shows a very different pattern of disciplined and concerted military withdrawal orchestrated by the military high command. From the inception of military rule in 1966, all Nigerian military heads of state—generals Ironsi, Gowon, Mohammed, and Obasanjo—promised a return to civilian rule. Ironsi was killed in a second coup in mid 1966; Gowon, after announcing his Nine Point Program for return to civilian rule by 1976, was perceived to have reneged on his commitment, and his rule was imperiled. He was replaced by Mohammed in a third coup of 1975. General Mohammed (himself assassinated in February 1976) set in motion a process of return to civilian rule, which was carried out by his successor. Indeed, whatever the doubts or disagreements within the Nigerian armed forces over a new constitution, party politics, and free elections, the armed forces remained intact during the process of transition back to civilian rule. This process was intricate and sensitive, requir-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing the creation of new states and the reform of local government in 1976. A constitutional drafting committee deliberated for many months, elections were held for a constituent assembly to debate the draft constitution, and, finally, staggered elections were held from July to August 1979 for state and federal executive and legislative offices. During this transition period, military officers who had served as executives in the cabinet of the head of state and who had served as governors of the nineteen states had to return to their military commands. If they did not, they were forced to retire from the armed forces on the resumption of civilian rule.

Some officers retired from the armed service and went into political life, standing for the national assembly or for party positions.[1] Most high-ranking officers either retired or returned to military posts.[2] The military remained in the barracks even after an election that was somewhat called in question: Shehu Shagari was declared president, although it was not clear that he had satisfied the constitutional provision of winning at least 25 per cent of the votes in two-thirds of the nineteen states, and the candidate who came second, Chief Awolowo, accused General Obasanjo and the Nigerian military of throwing the election to Shagari and the National Party of Nigeria (NPN).[3] Through all this, the Nigerian military remained disciplined, under control of its central commands, and committed to the return to civilian rule.

The Nigerian case of a relatively smooth transfer of military rule back to civilian rule, and the Liberian case of a coup from the lower ranks and pressure on the ruling sergeant to execute members of the elite, represent extremes with regard to retention of control by high-level officers. But they do not by any means exhaust the range of variation within African militaries and their relationship to civilians, nor do Ghana and Liberia represent the extreme case of lack of discipline within African armed forces. Chad, for example, shows a greater breakdown of unity within the armed forces and the dissolution of the military into sets of warring camps, with shifting alliances and a range of outside patrons, including Libya, France, the Sudan, Egypt, and, from time to time, Nigeria. In Uganda under Idi Amin, the leader of the armed forces turned the army against society and eventually used control of the state to wield one army faction against the others. Amin's base within the armed forces became

[1] Robert Adeyinka Adebayo and Hassan Usman Katsina, major generals, were involved in the formation of the National Party of Nigeria.

[2] General Obasanjo retired, as did General Garba, who had served as Nigeria's foreign minister.

[3] Shehu Shagari won a plurality of votes, and he won 25 per cent in twelve states. He won somewhat less than 25 per cent of the vote in the thirteenth state. His legal adviser, Richard Akinjide, argued that 25 per cent of two-thirds of the states meant 25 per cent in twelve states and 20 per cent of the vote in the thirteenth state, since two-thirds of nineteen is twelve and two-thirds. This interpretation was upheld by the Nigerian Federal Election Commission, and after appeal by Chief Awolowo it was upheld by the Special Election Tribunal and finally by the Nigerian Supreme Court.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

narrower and narrower. He finally had a relatively small group he could rely on from the western part of Uganda after he purged Lango and Acholi from the army. Even groups from the northwestern part of Uganda were eliminated, and Amin's army support came to be Nubians, Kakwa, and Moslem elements.[4]

Since Tanzania invaded Uganda and what was left of the Ugandan army scattered and fled to the Sudan and Zaire, it has been exceedingly difficult to restore order in Uganda or to reconstruct an armed force that will be responsive to political leadership. The military commanders who, with Tanzanian cooperation, came to control groups of armed men, were able, also with Tanzanian cooperation, to remove civilian presidents Lule and Binaisa. After a disputed election, Milton Obote once again came to be Uganda's elected leader. But anarchy continues to reign within Uganda, and its armed forces remain under loose control.

Uganda and Chad, then, are even clearer examples than Liberia of chaos and breakdown of discipline within the armed forces. Moveover, the civil-service structure has remained more firmly in place in Liberia than in Chad, and, in addition, the territorial integrity of the state has been retained in Liberia. Nor is the Liberian coup from below a thoroughgoing revolutionary event. True, there was a displacement of authority from the Americo-Liberian elite that had ruled Liberia; in this sense the coup was historic, an actual status reversal in favor of indigenous peoples. African coups, however, have brought such ethnic reversals before. Idi Amin for a time carried marginal ethnic groups to power, enhancing the role of Moslems in Uganda. Northerners felt that the January coup of 1966 had brought Ibos to power in Nigeria. It remains to be seen whether the rule of Mengistu in Ethiopia represents a shift away from Amhara dominance to southern and historically lower-status people. Mengistu himself is perceived by many to be a "baria," or low-status—even slave-descended—person from the south, although his father was a low-status Amhara.[5] Mengistu has opposed the dissolution of Ethiopia and has also opposed autonomy for Oromo peoples as well as for Eritreans and Somalis. Thus he remains in the role of a consolidator of the Ethiopian Empire. But whether this will mean an Amhara-dominated empire remains to be seen.

---

[4] For an insightful discussion of ethnicity in Uganda and of the Nubian question, see Nelson Kasfir, "Explaining Ethnic Participation," *World Politics*, April 1979, pp. 365-388. See also, Aiden Southall, "General Amin and the Coup: Great Man or Historical Inevitability," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, March 1979; Dennis Pain, "The Nubians: Their Perceived Stratification System and Its Relation to the Asian Issue," in Michael Twaddle, ed., *Expulsion of a Minority: Essay on Ugandan Asians* (London: Athlone Press, 1975).

[5] Marina and David Ottaway, *Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution* (New York: Africana, 1978), p. 131.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Persistence of Military Intervention

Certainly many coups and countercoups in Africa have been motivated in good part by ethnic fears and grievances, although not all such coups have led to such profound ethnic reversals as occurred in Liberia, partly because few African countries have had the cumulative social, political, and ethnic cleavages Liberia has had. The Liberian coup and the regime of Master Sergeant Doe have not yet led to fundamental economic transformations within Liberia, although the players at the top may be recruited from different ethnic groups in the country. It is hard to see Liberia as undergoing a social and economic revolution.

The armed forces find that ad hoc interventions—such as knocking down market stalls, putting ceilings on prices, or beating up traders in Ghana—do not constitute a revolution any more than does confiscation of Americo-Liberians' Mercedes and their use by noncommissioned officers.

Nor is Liberia the first African country to be led by noncommissioned officers. After independence, African countries recruited their officers from different channels. Some were men who had been hastily sent overseas for training. They may have had as little as six months' or a year's training before returning home to become leaders of their armed forces. Some had had nonmilitary careers, coming into the army in the terminal colonial period. Mobutu is an example. Some officers were university graduates who were sent to staff colleges abroad and by the time they entered the higher officer ranks had a good deal of military training and perhaps even combat experience through UN missions, especially in the Congo. But most of the officers who had combat experience were noncommissioned officers who had served during World War II or had served within Africa in colonial armies. Idi Amin had served in Kenya in the King's African Rifles. Generals Bokassa (Central African Republic/Empire), Lamizana (Upper Volta), and Soglo (Dahomey/Benin) were noncommissioned officers who had served in France's army. Very few officers in the 1960s and early 1970s were recruited from guerrilla anticolonial fighters in Africa south of the Sahara.[6] General China, Waruhiu Itote, did not get a regular commission in the Kenyan army after Kenya's independence. He entered the national youth service after military training in Israel. Many of the other Mau Mau leaders had been killed during the struggles or were kept at a distance by the Kenyatta government. It was only in the latter part of the 1970s, after successful struggles

[6] Even in Algeria, many of the guerrillas who had fought inside the country lost out within the army to "regulars" who had been based in Morocco or Tunisia.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, that guerrilla military leaders entered the regular armed forces.

The first African officers were recruited from different streams, had different levels of education, and frequently came from different ethnic groups because the colonial regimes had recruited noncommissioned officers from noncentral ethnic groups. Not Baganda, but Acholi and Kakwa in Uganda, not Kikuyu, but Kamba and Kalenjin in Kenya dominated the noncommissioned officers. In Nigeria, many people from the Middle Belt areas were represented in these ranks, which created certain tensions in the armed forces. Not only were individuals from lower ranks promoted in the terminal colonial period in the haste to Africanize armed forces, but they also brought strong pressures to bear after independence. Thus, soldiers who feared demobilization were involved in the assassination of Olympio in Togo. Disorder was rife in the army of the Congo. The officer corps disintegrated in Sierra Leone between January 1966 and February 1967, and for a time noncommissioned officers were determining short-run outcomes.

What is striking about Liberia and Ghana is not that lower ranks have been prominent in instigating coups or even in ruling, for that is not new in Africa, but that the phenomenon persists. While the phenomenon of intervention by the lower ranks is not new in Africa, however, its causes are to some extent variable, just as military interventions in Africa have sprung from different sources.

African civilian regimes have remained weak in the tasks of development and the ability to use the instruments of the state to extract resources from society and to control social, ethnic, and economic groups. Indeed, in some important ways, the tasks of rule have become harder over the last decade: terms of trade have frequently moved against African countries, and many more actors intervene in African affairs, often as destabilizing elements. African countries can exert influence on one another, sometimes through military interventions or through economic transfers to opposition groups. Demographic problems have increased with continued high rates of population growth. Urbanization has proceeded apace. The structural instabilities that characterized Africa in the 1960s have persisted into the 1980s, modified but sometimes intensified.[7]

The possibilities for military intervention also persist. And the motives for military takeover continue: personal and corporate grievances; civilian pressures for the military to intervene; fear that someone else will act first or that countermilitaries will be created such as general service units, personal-bodyguard units, militarized police forces; eco-

[7] See Aristide Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa," *American Political Science Review*, March, 1969, pp. 70-87.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nomic problems that force curtailment of defense spending and military privileges; general ethnic tensions that spill over into the armed forces; internal factionalism or dissolution of central authority within the armed forces, leading factions to think they must control the state in order to control the military.

At the same time, it would be wrong to say that nothing has changed in Africa in a decade and a half. The military's own claims to stand above factionalism, to represent the nation as a whole, and to constitute a reservoir of legitimacy have no standing, if they ever did. One can go further and say that in certain countries at least, the military is not seen as a legitimate ruler. While systematic surveys of public opinion in Africa are lacking, there is good reason to believe that in Ghana, Nigeria, and Kenya—all countries with relatively high levels of political participation—military rule would be perceived as highly illegitimate.[8] Repeated attempts to float ideas of military-civilian diarchies were received poorly in Nigeria;[9] in Ghana, Acheampong's attempt to create a "reconciliation regime" floundered.[10]

The Nigerian officers perceived the declining tolerance for their continued rule, just as they recognized that continuation in office threatened the cohesion and corporate autonomy of the armed forces, since effective rule meant alliances with civilians and the increasing politicization of the military. Perhaps even the popular Rawlings and his officers were aware of the repeated failures of the Ghanaian military to address social and economic problems, and of their own limited ability to do so, and of the need to reconstitute authority within the Ghanaian military as a first order of business.

Of course, a concern for corporate cohesion and a desire for a professional military do not motivate all African officers and non-commissioned officers. We cannot take for granted that militaries are determined to preserve above all their own integrity and autonomy as well as the state. It is not infrequent that a faction within the military is willing to destroy the state apparatus and even destroy the military as a functioning organization in order to preserve its own power in the short run. This happened in Idi Amin's Uganda and in Macias's Equatorial Guinea. Military factions can be not much more than gangs of thugs maintaining their power at times—willing to risk the stability of the state and the military's own cohesion and identity to keep that power. They may act in the name of revolutionary goals, or they may act in the name of stability and order.

---

[8] For a survey analysis of Nigeria, see Margaret Peil, "A Civilian Appraisal of Military Rule," *Armed Forces and Society*, Fall 1975.

[9] See Henry Bienen, *Armies and Parties in Africa* (New York: Africana, 1979), pp. 252-260.

[10] See Donald Rothchild, "Military Regime Performance: An Appraisal of the Ghana Experience, 1972-79," *Comparative Politics*, July 1980.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The military is not always an elite of the state, committed to its preservation. And even where this commitment exists, military actions may destroy the state or lead to loss of independence or loss of significant territory through miscalculation. Furthermore, the relationship between corporate interests and professionalism on the one hand, and policy commitments, intervention, and civil-military relations on the other is complex and circuitous. Many factors intervene to give different outcomes; high levels of professionalism lead to different directions and commitments for militaries within particular contexts, national histories, and external environments.

There is nothing wrong with hypothesizing that armed forces have distinctive organizational characteristics as long as we examine whether this is really so. There is also nothing wrong with hypothesizing specific relationships between organizational characteristics and outcomes for regimes as long as those relationships are also investigated empirically.

Corporatism and Professionalism

Not all African armed forces have the same internal characteristics of size, education, training levels, and ability to maintain equipment and carry out military assignments (variables that measure professionalism). Not all militaries recruit from the same social categories or have the same values attached to the institution. The degree of consensus within armed forces varies. Different militaries are removed from societies or interact with them in different ways. That is, the extent to which militaries are insulated from societal tensions and have their own distinctive norms (variables that measure corporatism) is an empirical matter that we would expect to show variation across countries. Moreover, the degree of professionalism or corporatism in specific armed forces cannot be understood by a military's propensity to intervene. To measure discrete phenomena and to examine their interrelationships, criteria for professionalism should be independent from intervention. A military's own understanding of its corporate interests is critical to its very definition in society and its relationship to the state. Corporate concerns may loom very large as reasons for military intervention. Only investigation can tell whether the military really does act in a cohesive fashion and whether corporate concerns have triggered specific coups.

Armed forces break down and their cohesion disintegrates in various ways. Luckham has noted that civilian control of the military in the First Nigerian Republic was institutionalized only at the level of the highest military commanders and civilian government leadership. The pattern of civilian control of the Nigerian military did not correspond to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some of the organizational realities of that military; it did not take into account the junior officers' lack of support for the senior officers' authority.[11] In Sierra Leone, army officers became enmeshed in the internal tensions of the military organization and would not support the political undertakings of the highest-level officers.[12] In both cases, ethnic concerns affected relations between junior and senior officers. In both cases, complicated civilian-military interrelations broke down discipline within the armed forces and eventually exacerbated tensions in the society as a whole.

In East Africa—after mutinies in Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania in 1964—reconstruction took place differentially in the three armies and civilian-military relations evolved in different ways. In Kenya, the British were asked to reconstruct the Kenyan army and build it on a professional basis. In Tanzania, the aim was to impose party control over the armed forces by appointing political officers and integrating the military into the TANU party structure. In Uganda, no real reconstruction took place. Army demands for higher pay and more rapid Africanization were met. And as civilians used more force in dealing with social and ethnic problems, the army played an ever-larger role. But the army that carried out greater tasks in Uganda was not a disciplined or professional organization.[13]

In Liberia, the top-level military leadership as well as the political elite was Americo-Liberian. Thus, a change in ethnic relations would mean an alteration in relationships between ranks and the elimination of higher officers. Liberia was less an example of a period of bickering and infighting among senior officers backing different political factions than was Sierra Leone, and less a jockeying of officers with ethnic constituencies and civilian allies than was Ghana. Liberia was a case of a loss of legitimacy by an encrusted elite that had to rely on its army to put down dissidence in society and that then saw the army, in its lower ranks, react against a corrupt and bankrupt political, economic, and social hierarchy.

The noncommissioned officers and lower ranks that do assume command repeatedly find that they too require the expertise and support of civil servants and that they usually need politicians as well. Individual sergeants may promote themselves and assume control, but their own authority rests on their ability to re-establish chains of command. Loose hierarchies, such as the Derg appeared to be for some time

---

[11] Robin Luckham, *The Nigerian Military* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 115.

[12] See Thomas S. Cox, *Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 78.

[13] Henry Bienen, "Public Order and the Military in Africa: Mutinies in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika" and "Military and Society in East Africa: Thinking Again About Praetorianism," in Bienen, *Armies and Parties in Africa*, pp. 138-186.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in Ethiopia, tend to be extremely unstable and to have an elusive consensus. Lateral arrangements are hard to establish effectively within armed forces organizations. Rank legitimates relationships within armed forces; rank is the basis for command. Problems arose within the Nigerian military when governors of states were brigadiers or colonels, and they, as heads of their states, were visited by higher-ranking officers who were not executives within the state. In other words, anomalies arise when rank and executive command diverge.

Armies in Africa, then, are at different levels of professionalization and have different senses of themselves as corporate actors. Wherever we look we see complicated patterns of interaction between civilians and the military. We cannot even say that the military is always an elite of the state, committed to its preservation. In Uganda and Equatorial Guinea, the military became a gang simply demanding ransom from society through the capture of the state. In Chad, military groups vie with one another to seize territory and to claim the legitimacy of the state in order to act as entities sanctioned by international institutions and norms.

Whether distinctions among African armies in terms of their discipline or military abilities are greater or fewer than in 1960 or 1965 is difficult to say. Some African armies have undergone combat experiences through these years. The Ethiopian military has prosecuted a war against both Somali regulars and irregulars, as well as against Eritrean and other separatists. The Angolan army has fought against UNITA forces and South Africa. The Nigerian army fought a civil war, as did the Zairean armed forces through the 1960s; into the 1970s it was still fighting Katangese gendarmes. But as Zaire shows, combat experience does not always lead to greater cohesion and professionalism within a military.

Military Regimes and Sociopolitical Change

African societies may be distinguished one from another by relatively successful economic development (Ivory Coast, Kenya, Congo-Brazzaville) versus egregious failure (Ghana, Zaire), or relative political stability (again Kenya and the Ivory Coast) versus political breakdown (Uganda, Ghana). While political instability has been hardly conducive to economic development, there are nonetheless examples of poor economic records not immediately leading to high levels of political instability. Senegal and Mali are examples. Nor are the distinctions among countries in economic development neatly translated into levels of professionalism and coherence of armed forces, although, again, high levels of political instability tend to be associated with causes and consequences of military breakdown. In other words, we should not expect neat corre-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lations between change in society and change within militaries. There are too many variables to ensure one particular outcome.

We can still say with some conifdence that: (1) military regimes in aggregate do not form a distinctive regime type in the areas of performance in economic and social realms; (2) there is a degree of diversity within military regimes that is not dissimilar to the diversity found within civilian regimes; (3) the general degree of similarity or dissimilarity between military and civilian regimes varies from one variable, or one category of variables, to another.[14] Of course, observers who have done related statistical analysis differ on specific points depending on the kind of analysis employed, the kind of data utilized, and the time periods studied. Still, military rule does not explain a great deal of the variance when we compare social and economic factors, such as literacy rates or GNP growth. This is not surprising because military regimes, like that large residual category, civilian regimes, cover such a multitude of types. Time lags exist between military takeover and ability to influence social and economic change; change may be more responsive to external factors (for example, prices of exports or imports) than to anything that can be done domestically; and for any regime there will be constraints set by the past, and by the present environment and resources.

Furthermore, African military regimes, and civilian ones as well, have been mixed systems. Military regimes differ in terms of mixtures of civilian authority, size and capabilities of armed forces, policy outlooks, willingness to use coercion, and role of the civil service. However, just as the reasons for and kinds of military intervention tell us something about the prospects for the kind of military regime that will emerge, so the reasons for military breakdown and extrication enable us to see, at least dimly, into the future. Militaries that take over without any program for rule or through the impetus of their own trade-union-style demands are not likely to undertake far-reaching social changes, at least not deliberately. Militaries that take power in order to arbitrate among different social, ethnic, and political factors have a hard time extricating themselves from their mediating roles, and officers become vulnerable to countercoups, as in Upper Volta. Where military coup followed by countercoup has become the only way to change players, it is not likely that structural transformations will be brought about by a game of officers' musical chairs. Where the military intervenes to choke off political par-

[14] See, especially, Robert Jackman, "Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World," *American Political Science Review*, December 1976; R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan, "A Comparative Analysis of Political and Economic Performance of Military and Civilian Regimes," *Comparative Politics*, October 1975; McKinlay and Cohan, "The Economic Performance of Military Regimes: A Cross-National Aggregate Data Study," *British Journal of Politics*, July 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ticipation, it finds that it must bring civilians back in order to deal with intractable political problems, as in Ghana and Nigeria.

Militaries who think they have created revolutions by executing the representatives of the ancien régime find either that structural change does not take place ipso facto or that only by trying to organize inchoate social forces and creating new administrative and political instruments will fundamental social change be realized, as has occurred in Ethiopia. Yet most militaries have shown considerable reluctance to create political parties with a grassroots life of their own because they would threaten a military's own monopoly of power. At the same time, armed forces have been unwilling to handle political tasks of representative government, bargaining, and extraction of resources at local levels; carrying out such tasks threatens the armed forces' corporate cohesion as they become increasingly enmeshed in local politics.

Thus, tasks of representation and bargaining have been poorly and inconsistently performed by military regimes in Africa. Military regimes have frequently been highly personalistic with the maximum leader manipulating military commands and civilian postings in order to maintain both ethnic balancing and his own security. In Zaire the leader plays this game well, albeit at high cost to army professionalism and without developing channels for predictable representation at local levels.

It remains to be seen whether or not parties who came to power through violent anticolonial struggle in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Portuguese Guinea—and parties who might come to power in the future through secession and/or guerrilla struggle against African regimes—will create new types of civilian-military relationships. In communist systems, the boundaries between party and army have not always been clear, especially where the party-army developed together through guerrilla struggles—as in Yugoslavia, China, and Vietnam. Civilian-military relationships in Africa, as elsewhere, will be affected by the state of order in a polity, national traditions, and a country's military doctrine.[15] They will also be affected by the peculiarities of leadership and the importance of military factions, cliques, and ethnic relationships.

So far, the military has remained subordinate to civilian leaders in Zimbabwe although there are still problems in bringing together military groups with distinct party and ethnic alignments. The presence of a nucleus of the Rhodesian army that remained intact in the new Zimbabwe has facilitated cohesion and civilian supremacy.

In Guinea-Bissau, a military coup has occurred. In Angola and Mozambique, party supremacy has been maintained with military leaders

[15] David Albright, "A Comparative Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," *World Politics*, July 1980, pp. 553-576.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

playing important roles but through the parties rather than directly, although this may change in the future. The personal ties of guerrilla leaders with outside patrons, their experience as fighters, and their relationships with other elites can be expected to be consequential for foreign and domestic politics, but whether a marked break with African civil-military patterns occurs is less certain and depends as much on the kinds of parties that emerge in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and perhaps Ethiopia, as on the kinds of armed forces that evolve.

Implications for U.S. Policy

The United States will have to be sensitive to the variety of African military regimes that will exist in the 1980s. It will have to recognize the mixed nature of these regimes and the fluidity of civilian and military relations. Some armed forces will desperately require training so that they may become more professional structures. There should be no illusion, however, that an African military that is better trained to carry out its tasks and that has a more predictable and cohesive command and control system will either refrain from coups or be more inclined to hand power over to civilians. A better-trained Liberian army should be sought in and of itself, whether that army will go back to the barracks or remain in power. For in either case, it is important to have professional soldiers under central control.

If an army has broken down in the context of extreme political conflict, as in Uganda, it may be impossible to carry out training missions until there is some, at least tentative, political resolution. The problem, however, is that military fragmentation and breakdown of discipline hinder political conflict resolution. A chicken-and-egg situation appears that is difficult for outsiders to alter.

For the United States, knowing that an African regime is a military one does not settle foreign policy issues. African militaries are not, per se, more or less disposed to West or East. They are free floating concerning ideology and commitment. It is not even true that defense spending in Africa increases more rapidly under military regimes.[16] Under both civilian and military regimes, accountability for defense spending has disappeared.

It may be true that African military elites, as situational elites and not class ones—that is, as actors who depend on institutionally derived power—have a special concern for expanding the role of the state. But not only military rulers have tried to indigenize their economies,

[16] For an exploration of African militaries and foreign policy issues, see Henry Bienen, "African Militaries as Foreign Policy Actors," *International Security*, Fall 1980, pp. 168-186.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and some African military-based regimes have handed economic interests back to foreigners. This occurred in Zaire and Mali.

The policies of economic nationalism are constrained by economic structures and levels. Nationalistic responses may be necessary for military regimes that do not have broad support, but those responses may be largely a matter of rhetoric and symbolism. It may be true, as Claude Welch has observed, that junior officers who take power are less concerned with the norms of international relations and less concerned with precedent than are civilians.[17] Junior officers who come to power do tend to utilize a nationalistic rhetoric. Presumably, young party leaders would too if any of them came to power. Because African military rule has been personalistic, as was party rule before it, foreign policy pendulums can swing wildly. Military leaders have often responded impetuously to foreign policy exigencies, verbally at least. And since much African foreign policy consists of rhetoric, it may seem that junior officers are establishing radical and nationalistic foreign policies. But again, the nationalistic rhetoric is infrequently followed by radical change.

Both the United States and the USSR have stated their ideological preference for civilian governments. The United States claims to prefer democratically elected governments, while the Soviet Union has argued that a working-class party should lead a country. Both countries, though, have found it possible to see progressive tendencies in military regimes at different times both in theory and in practice, with the USSR elaborating different categories in which military governments are appropriate.[18] In practice, both the USSR and the United States have reacted to military coups in terms of who was replaced and what was the particular stance of the military regime. After initially seeing military coups as a dastardly neocolonialist plot (particularly the one against Nkrumah), the Soviet Union has since discovered many "progressive tendencies" in military regimes. Algeria was described as progressive. If the Soviets did not instigate the coup in Somalia, they clearly provided the wherewithal to make the military a more formidible actor there. The Soviets also provided ideological support for the military regime, which they saw as a legitimate one. It has been argued that the Soviet Union has pressed the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia to form a communist party. Whether they have or not, the USSR clearly has given massive support to the Ethiopian

[17] Claude Welch, "Radical and Conservative Military Regimes: A Typology and Analysis of Post-Coup Governments in Tropical Africa," a paper delivered at the 1973 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, September 1973.

[18] For discussions of Soviet views of African military regimes, see A. Iskenderov, "The Army, Politics, and the People," in Henry Bienen, ed., *The Military and Modernization* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), pp. 149-156; Robert Legvold, *Soviet Policy in West Africa* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 269-270; David E. Albright, ed., *Communism in Africa* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1980), passim.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military and has been willing to define the military regime as belonging to a camp of progressive nations.

The Soviet Union has been quite willing to support military governments that it did not favor with elaborate ideological formulations defining the regimes' progressive character. With little to offer in the way of economic support, the Soviet Union sought influence through military assistance and intervention in Africa. The beneficiaries of their attention have included the ideologically congenial, such as the MPLA in Angola, FRELIMO's regime in Mozambique, and Mengistu's Ethiopia. But such curious ideological bedfellows as Amin's military regime in Uganda, Qaddafi's in Libya, and Macias Nguema's rule by thuggery and terror in Equatorial Guinea all received Soviet aid and succor. Western governments, for their part, scarcely concealed their glee at the coup that toppled Nkrumah or the one that brought Mobutu to power. Indeed, the West had something to do with the latter coup at least. Amin was originally not opposed when he replaced Obote in Uganda, and a good deal of indifference has been shown toward military takeovers in a number of countries where it was clear that no profound changes in foreign policy relations between the West and the new government would occur.

In the past, U.S. contacts with African militaries through military assistance and training programs were meant to establish connections with important elites and to respond to requests from African governments, both military and civilian. Prior to the Reagan administration, the United States had not defined its interests in Africa as military and strategic ones, although some U.S. analysts argued that it should do so.[19] The United States did maintain an air base at Wheelus Field in Libya until the overthrow of King Idris, and it maintained a communications and tracking facility at Kagnew in Ethiopia until the Mengistu regime ended this facility, which had already become obsolete. The United States has wanted to prevent Soviet bases in Africa but had shown little desire to create new bases until recent events in Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa led to discussions with Kenya and Somalia about bases and/or port facilities at Mombasa and Berbera. The Soviet Union, too, has sought overflight rights and naval facilities and has gained (though not always maintained) such facilities in Somalia, Guinea, and elsewhere. So far, the Soviet position in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia has not led to

[19] For a statement of U.S. interests in Africa, see Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's address to the annual convention of the NAACP in St. Louis, July 1, 1977, published in the Department of State's *Bulletin*, August 1977. For arguments about the need to bolster American security interests in Africa, see Bruce Palmer, "U.S. Security Interests and Africa South of the Sahara," *AEI Defense Review* vol. 2, no. 6, 1978; Walter Hahn and Alvin Cottrell, Soviet Shadow Over Africa (Miami, Fla.: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1976). For an assessment of these arguments, see Henry Bienen, "U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing Africa," *Political Science Quarterly*, Fall 1978, pp. 443-464, and "Perspectives on Soviet Intervention in Africa," *Political Science Quarterly*, Spring 1980, pp. 29-42.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

full-scale Soviet bases in those countries. Nevertheless, a debate continues in the United States about Soviet intentions with regard to its political positions in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf area. Soviet bases in Aden and Socotra, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the collapse of the shah's regime in Iran, the large intervention in Ethiopia—taken in conjunction with some predictions that Soviet oil production has entered a period of decline and that the Soviet drive for warm-water ports will be intensified by the need for access to oil—lead American policymakers to rethink assumptions about the Soviet Union's strategic interests and thus about U.S. interests.[20] Moreover, the concerns and perceptions of Saudi Arabia and Egypt become significant factors in American policy responses. Thus, whatever the response the United States does make, the northeast quadrant of Africa and the states along the Indian Ocean littoral have acquired new significance in the eyes of strategic planners. The possibility exists for a new scramble for military bases in Africa.

Even if the superpowers decide that military bases in Africa are inessential or even harmful to their interests, and even if they continue to think that military forces in Africa will not alter worldwide balances of power and that African militaries will not be acting as surrogates for the great powers in the near future, the military dimension has had greater salience in the context of instability in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. The ever-increasing concern with access to resources raises questions concerning disruption of resource flows, which has occurred with the continued fighting in Angola and the cutting of copper exports via the Benguela railroad. Fighting in Zimbabwe and spillover of the struggle into Zambia have raised similar fears. The Shaba interventions and instability in Zaire continue to create concern over the supply of cobalt, diamonds, and copper. And, of course, the mineral-rich areas of Namibia, and of South Africa itself, face increasing instability and military threats. Whether or not regime changes would lead to cutting off Western access to southern African minerals, no U.S. administration can fail to think hard about the impact of instability and military actions on trade and investment ties.

Conclusions

There are good reasons to predict that Africa faces more, not less, interstate conflict. Growing economic differentiation proceeds apace within Africa. States increasingly have the wherewithal to translate disagreements into economic and military actions. A growing number of

[20] See Geoffrey Kemp, "U.S. Strategic Interests and Military Options in Sub-Saharan Africa," and Robert Legvold, "The Soviet Union's Strategic Stake in Africa," in Jennifer Whitaker, ed., *Africa and the United States: Vital Interests* (New York: New York University Press, 1978), pp. 120-152, 153-186.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

states have economic, military, and assistance relationships with Africa, including Japan, Saudi Arabia, India, and Cuba. The Western states want to maintain their economic and political positions in Africa. The Soviet Union has increased the chips it is willing to throw into the pot in the struggle for influence. China has not abandoned its own interests and concerns. At least one African country, the Republic of South Africa, has the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, and indeed may already have done so. In short, military factors in Africa can no longer be seen as just matters of domestic politics; they play a vital role in Africa's international relations and must affect the calculations of other nations that deal with Africa.

Although military factors are increasingly important in Africa, the role of the military in domestic politics remains highly variable. Moreover, looking at substantive foreign policy outcomes, we do not find that African military regimes align themselves in clear-cut ways in either inter-African affairs or global politics. Such regimes do not seem to have a bias for particular policy stances. African militaries do not appear as distinctive actors in the foreign policy process, although more attention should be given to military styles of decisionmaking. The fact that military regimes govern many African countries does not simplify our policy process toward Africa, for we cannot conclude much from that common factor. We must still deal with a diversity of regimes and with a foreign policy process that is the domain of only a few actors. The reality—that the actors are often military ones—is not decisive for understanding foreign policy in Africa or for making sound policy toward Africa.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE Atlantic Community QUARTERLY

Editors: **Francis O. Wilcox and John D. Hickerson**

A Publication of the Atlantic Council of the United States

As the publication of the Atlantic Council, the journal aims to promote closer mutually advantageous ties between Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Its objective is greater security and more effective harmonization of economic and monetary policies. Its articles include policy recommendations on important foreign policy questions, drawing upon the knowledge and experience of individuals with extensive backgrounds in government, academia, and international relations. It explores problems governments must deal with, and makes recommendations about them.

Recent issue includes:

Portugal and the North Atlantic Alliance	*Francisco Sa Carneiro*
The Alliance After Afghanistan: A Crisis in US-European Relations	*Robert E. Osgood*
Soviet Strategy, The Atlantic and the Defense of the West	*Robert Close*
Finlandization	*William Pfaff*
Europe and America: The Atlantic Alliance Needs Leaders Who Face the Facts	*David Watt*
No Time to Lose	*Richard M. Nixon*
The Crumbling Alliance	*Fred Luchinger*
Eurocommunism in the Aftermath of Kabul	*Pierre Hassner*
The Common Security Interests of Japan, the United States and NATO	*Atlantic Council Policy Paper*

Published four times a year. Founded 1962.
Subscription rates: $15/1 yr., $25/2 yr., $34/3 yr.; Institutions $18/1 yr., $30/2 yr., $48/3 yr.; Outside the U.S.A.: Add $1/yr.; Single copies: $4.
ISSN 0004-6760.

Please address inquiries and orders to:

Transaction Periodicals Consortium
Department TA 2000
Rutgers—The State University
New Brunswick, NJ 08903

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IDEOLOGY, PARTIES, AND FOREIGN POLICY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

by Michael Radu

The dramatic increase during the 1970s in the number of sub-Saharan states claiming allegiance to Marxism, Marxism-Leninism, or revolutionary socialism has received little attention. Even when their impact on Africa's stability was realized, its character was seldom linked to ideological factors. Similarly, the fact that many of the African Marxist-influenced countries are among the poorest in the world has gone unnoticed, although ideology may decisively affect their chances for economic development. When the existence of ideology is admitted at all, it is all too often dismissed as a rhetorical claim for domestic consumption—a particularly contradictory approach that implies that a domestic constituency does exist for a particular ideology.

Under the Carter administration, U.S. African policy grew out of precisely this type of assumption and perception, in some cases encouraging Marxist-oriented regimes through aid and diplomatic cooperation, and in all cases supporting their policies indirectly through support for these regimes' demands for financial aid from international lending institutions. African resistance to Marxist inroads, from within or from without, was often interpreted as actually causing such advances—and appeals for support to anti-Marxist governments and groups in Africa were seen as further proof of right-wing foolishness. At the most, African Marxism was considered a sort of infantile disease to be treated by development aid, understanding, and cooperation. Invariably, poverty, low productivity, bureaucratic growth as a substitute for economic growth, and repression were considered the cause and not the result of the increase in Marxist influence. Similar premises appear to influence the new French socialist government's African policy.

The object of this essay is to re-examine the importance, trends, and implications of Marxist ideology—in its various forms—for the internal political and economic development of African states, for their foreign policy, and for Western interests in Africa.

Michael Radu is a Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is the editor of *Eastern Europe and the Third World*, published by Praeger in 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Marxism and Marxists: Matters of Definition

The dismissal of Marxist regimes in Africa as merely revolution by word[1] and the acceptance of them as yet another example of the irrelevance of capitalism and democracy for Africa are both highly misleading approaches to studying such regimes—particularly because the approaches usually avoid defining "Marxist" or "revolutionary." On the one hand, many leftist scholars and theoreticians simply dismiss regimes such as those in Guinea, Tanzania, or even Angola as "state capitalist," pseudo-Marxist, and under the control of petty bourgeois elements.[2] On the other hand, other observers consider African Marxists to be completely different from the rulers of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, or the Asian communist states, judging their orthodoxy by different standards. Thus, when Angola's self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist regime tolerates or even encourages the activities of Western companies on its territory, its policies are defined as "pragmatic," a demonstration that Luanda does not really mean it when it pledges allegiance to Marxism-Leninism.[3] The confusion is heightened by statements of non-Marxist African leaders like Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal, Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, or Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, calling Marxism "alien" to Africa—a claim immediately accepted by liberals in the West as an argument that the African Marxists, to the extent that they "mean" it, will soon be forced by "African realities" to modify their policies. The argument has little value insofar as it cannot be demonstrated that Asia, Latin America, or Europe are any more compatible with Marxism-Leninism than Africa, or even that there is an "African tradition," as opposed to a variety of African social and cultural peculiarities. Concerning history, political culture, or economic structure, Africa is no more or less prone to Marxism than is any other area of the world.

---

[1] Kenneth Jowitt, for instance, refers to a presumed view of Marxism-Leninism in Africa resulting from "elite desperation with a consequent tendency to adopt quasi-magical solutions to overwhelming problems." Jowitt, "Scientific Socialist Regimes in Africa: Political Differentiation, Avoidance, and Unawareness," in Carl G. Rosberg and Thomas M. Callaghy, ed., *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Berkeley: University of California, 1979), p. 146; the interpretation of Marxist-Leninist statements in Benin and the Congo as rhetoric masking ethnic domination and personal thirst for power is also pervasive in Samuel Decalo, "Ideological Rhetoric and Scientific Socialism in Benin and Congo/Brazzaville," ibid., pp. 231-264.

[2] For critiques of Nyerere, see Issa Shivji, *Class Struggle in Tanzania* (New York: Monthly Review, 1976); for doubts about Tanzania's Marxist future, see John S. Saul, *The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa* (New York: Monthly Review, 1979), pp. 167-199; an ultra-leftist critique of Sekou Touré is to be found in Alpha Condé, *Guinee: l'Albanie de l'Afrique ou néo-colonie américaine* (Paris, 1972); for an attack against MPLA in Angola from a similar perspective, see Claude Gabriel, *Angola: le tournant africain?* (Paris: Editions la Brèche, 1978).

[3] Characteristic in this respect is the description of the Angola regime as "businesslike and nonideological" by Melvin J. Hill, the president of the Gulf Oil Exploration and Production Company, the *New York Times*, June 27, 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The problem of defining the characteristics of African Marxism — or Marxisms — should be approached from the standpoint of those who use the label "Marxist" or "revolutionary socialist" to describe their own ideological beliefs. To begin with, no African ruling party describes itself as communist — though not all Eastern European or Asian Marxist-Leninist parties do so, either. Socialism as a revolutionary ideology and socialism as a philosophy of social reform should also be separated, since most if not all African Marxists claim socialism as their goal, while certain virulently anti-Marxist parties also proclaim it as their ultimate political and social goal. For instance, the funding members of the Socialist Inter-African (IAS), established at Tunis in 1980[4] and informally linked to the Socialist International, all claim allegiance to democratic socialism, defined as a gradual transformation of the society within the framework of a pluralistic political system, an increased role of the state in economy and the redistribution of income, and cooperation with the internal and external capitalist groups, companies, and classes. The influence of Marxism over such parties is often minimal or nonexistent, and their policy is reformist — in both rhetoric and practice.

As Ethiopia and the Comoros between 1975 and 1978 demonstrated, a revolutionary Marxist regime does not necessarily depend on the existence of a revolutionary party, at least initially. All African revolutionary regimes and parties share the same acceptance of the Leninist theory of imperialism and the Marxist theory of class struggle. The first aspect is essential in perceiving the similarity of the foreign policy of these regimes, while the second is an important factor in the definition of the type of political party they have established. The fact that they accept the Leninist theory of imperialism much more uniformly than the tenets of class struggle helps explain the greater similarity among Marxist regimes' foreign policies, compared with wider differentiation among their party structures.

For the early African revolutionaries, like Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Sékou Touré in Guinea, Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, who were influenced by the theories of George Padmore and Aimé Cèsaire, the class struggle was applicable at the international level only. For Touré, "the analogy between the proletarian class of the modern world and the *proletarian peoples* [emphasis in text] is not fortuitous ...,"[5] while for the president of Madagascar, Didier Ratsiraka, *the people* of the Third World

[4] IAS was established at the initiative of former Senegalese president Leopold Sedar Senghor and Tunisian president Habib Burguiba. The Tunis Charter was signed by the Senegalese Socialist Party, the Socialist Destourian Party of Tunisia, the People's Progressive Party of The Gambia, The Social-Democratic and the Labor Party of Mauritius, the People's Assembly for Progress of Djibouti, the People's National Party of Ghana, the Moroccan Istiqlal, and the Revolutionary Socialist Party of Somalia.

[5] See, for comparison, A. Cournanel, "Ideologie et Developpement en Guinee," *Africa Development*, February 1977, p. 75.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

must unite against the enemy: Western imperialism; the people are alienated and fragmented, the people are transformed into objects through alienation, in another example of revision of the Marxist definition of class as a social and not a national group.[6] For Nyerere, who rejects the label "Marxist," the approach to the question of class is largely similar to that of Touré or Ratsiraka—Africans are poor because of Western "exploitation," and the West is wealthy because Africa is poor. The African people, not classes, have been exploited, and the people, not the exploited classes, should unite against imperialism.

The Malagasy example was mentioned because in many respects it is a traditional type of African revolutionary socialism between the older "African socialism" and the "scientific socialism" of the 1970s. For the African socialists, the traditional African society was classless because it was communalistic, and traditional communalism was deemed compatible with socialism. Since antagonistic classes were not supposed to exist at the national level, the theory of class struggle was limited in scope to the international aspect. Even at that level, the class-struggle theory was "Africanized," as was the Leninist interpretation of internationalism. The concept of proletarian internationalism thus "Africanized" became the conceptual and political ground of the revolutionaries' approach to Pan-Africanism, seen as a natural form of class solidarity among the peoples/classes of Africa. It was thus natural that the most active and aggressive proponents of Pan-Africanism were precisely the most radical leaders and groups on the continent: Nkrumah, Touré, Modibo Keita in Mali, the communist-dominated All-African Trade Union Federation, and the most radical of the "liberation" movements, particularly those in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau, linked together in the Conferencia das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colonias Portuguesas (CONCP), itself under the leadership of Amilcar Cabral, Agostinho Neto, and Marcelino dos Santos, all of whom had close ties to the Portuguese Communist party.[7]

For the post-1974 revolutionary regimes, as well as for the Congo, which was the first sub-Saharan state to be proclaimed a "people's republic" and to be endowed with a "vanguard" party guided by scientific socialism in 1969, the concepts of class struggle, proletarian internationalism, and democratic centralism were "purified" of African specificity. These newer regimes stressed class struggle at both the internal and external levels; Pan-Africanism, still accepted as a goal, was included in the larger framework of "proletarian internationalism," and African

[6] Interview with *Afrique-Asie*, December 12, 1977, p. 24.

[7] See John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare (1962-1976)* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), pp. 62-99.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

socialism as a whole was discarded as pseudo-Marxism and revisionism. In the opinion of Marien Ngouabi, the founder of the Congolese Party of Labor (PCT), "*One can speak of African ways to socialism, but certainly not of an African socialism* [emphasis in text]."[8] Samora Machel, the leader of FRELIMO in Mozambique, said, "It is, however, necessary for us to be always on guard against the chauvinistic deviations of 'specific socialisms.' We reject the idea that there can be an 'African socialism' or a 'Mozambican socialism.' We consciously affirm that there can be no socialism other than scientific socialism."[9] FRELIMO ideologues, as Ngouabi before them, did accept a role for national circumstances in the application of Marxism-Leninism: "There is only one socialism, but the methods and forms of building it may be different, depending on the concrete conditions in individual countries and even in one country."[10] Much has been made out of these and similar statements from African Marxists; the conclusion, more often than not, has been that they are an indication of independence from Moscow, of "nationalism" or "Afro-communism." Such statements are nothing new, however, and even the CPSU has long recognized the legitimacy of national circumstances as factors to be considered by Marxist-Leninists, as well as the autonomy of parties in adapting to such circumstances.

The rejection of African socialism by the "new wave"[11] of Marxist-Leninists of the 1970s is closely related to the question of class struggle as a matter of domestic policy. The Marxist-Leninists are much more consistent in linking the international and domestic aspects of the issue, with good reason. Indeed, unlike Nkrumah, Nyerere, or Touré, leaders like Machel, Neto, Ngouabi, or Mathieu Kérekou in Benin came into power by force, some of them without even the legitimacy associated with the struggle for independence, and they took or retained power with a much more extensive use of external support than the first group. For Ngouabi, the main "contradictions" in the Congo are between the "revolutionary forces"—the workers and their ally, the peasantry—and the "still vacillating" strata of students, petty bourgeoisie, youth, and "reactionary forces," including international (particularly French) imperialism, and its Congolese allies "the compradore and bureaucratic bourgeoisie

[8] Marien Ngouabi, "Scientific Socialism in Africa: Congo Problems," *World Marxist Review*, May 1975, p. 111.

[9] Samora Machel, *Report of the Standing Political Committee to the 4th Meeting of the Central Committee of FRELIMO*, August 7, 1978, Agência de Informação de Mosambique, p. 6.

[10] Sergio Vieira, "A Luta Continua: The Mozambican Revolution Today," *Political Affairs*, August 1981, p. 30.

[11] Under the generic name of "new wave," one may include the revolutionary regimes coming into power after 1970 in Mozambique, Angola, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Principe, Guinea Bissau, Madagascar, Seychelles, Ethiopia, Benin; countries like Uganda and Chad are under the de facto control of their radical neighbors and may develop along similar lines; Comoros between 1977-1978 was a member of the group as well, and the chances that Zimbabwe may follow a similar development cannot be underestimated.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the feudal element."[12] A similar approach is that of the Beninese People's Revolutionary Party (PRPB),[13] while for FRELIMO, "Imperialism and its allies in our country-internal reactionaries and the remnants of the colonial bourgeoisie" are the enemies of the people.[14] Party leaders in the Seychelles, São Tomé and Principe, Cape Verde, Angola, Madagascar, Guinea Bissau, and Ethiopia consistently make virtually identical statements.

These pronounced differences between the African socialists and the Marxist-Leninists should not be overestimated, however, because the former have themselves reassessed their positions regarding class struggle, converging toward the more orthodox approach. By 1960 the then-ruling Union Soudanaise in Mali had already emphasized the need to apply scientific socialism to African realities, as opposed to "Africanizing" socialism. Two years later its leader, Modibo Keita, was warning against the ideological impurity of African socialism, while Nkrumah went even further by claiming that African socialism was introducing concepts alien to Marxism-Leninism in order to defeat scientific socialism.[15] By 1967 Sékou Touré himself had reassessed his approach to class struggle, proclaimed his allegiance to scientific socialism, and recognized the existence of internal class enemies.[16] Nyerere, though he still rejects some Marxist policies such as hostility toward religion, continues to believe that African communalism is basically compatible with socialism. He clings to the myth of the mass character of his party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Swahili for Revolutionary Party), but he also uses a sort of class analysis in formulating Tanzania's foreign policy and, at least since 1973, demonstrated that he is quite willing to use force against the *kulaks*—in this case the huge majority of the peasants. Indeed, after years of failing to convince the peasants to move into collective villages, *ujamaa*, collectivization became "an ORDER of the Party," and the collectivization process was speeded up by force: "Some lives were lost, houses were destroyed, and police, militia, and army personnel were involved."[17] Moreover, the party itself, as defined at Arusha in 1967, already limited its membership: "Every TANU and Government leader

[12] Ngouabi, "Scientific Socialism in Africa," p. 110.

[13] Mathieu Kérekou, interview, *Afrique-Asie*, February 29, 1977, p. 15.

[14] Machel, *Report of the Standing Political Committee*, p. 34.

[15] Compare Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa: The Politics of Unity* (New York: Vintage, 1967), pp. 231-234.

[16] For a comprehensive description of the development of Guinea's ideology, see Ladipo Adamolekun, "The Socialist Experience in Guinea," in Rosberg and Callaghy, *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa*, pp. 61-82.

[17] See, also, Dean E. McHenry, Jr., "The Struggle for Rural Socialism in Tanzania," ibid., pp. 46-47.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

must be either a peasant or a worker, and should in no way be associated with the practices of capitalism and feudalism."[18] Similarly, the ruling Parti Démocratique de Guinée (Guinea Democratic Party-PDG), while accepting traders, bourgeoisie, or businessmen as members, does not allow them to become leaders.

Nyerere and Touré, the only surviving former African socialists, are both considered members of the "progressive" group by all the Marxist-Leninists of the later generation. Their foreign policies have many more similarities with than differences from the "new wave" concerning Africa, the nonaligned movement, and the West. Their acceptance by the new wave is a recognition that, internally and externally, they have indeed shifted to more radical approaches. The reasons for the change have included increasing domestic discontent, and thus the need for coercion, and the reformist character of the Senghor-type of African socialism that, in the eyes of the radicals, has compromised the very concept. The old enmity between reformist and revolutionary African socialists still exists, now increasingly formalized by the creation of the basically anti-Marxist IAS and the growing cohesion of the "progressive" group, accusing IAS of being Western puppets.

The previous analysis has been based upon the premise that the statements and ideological claims of the "progressives" should be taken seriously, as expressions of an articulate and strongly held set of political and social beliefs. The extent to which such a premise can be verified is the extent to which such statements bear a relationship with the public policy of such regimes as Angola's, Benin's, or Mozambique's. On the other hand, it is immaterial whether Touré, Kérekou, or Machel personally have faith in Marxism—as it is immaterial with Brezhnev, Castro, or Honecker. Similarly, the question of orthodoxy is largely irrelevant since it is impossible to find any Marxist regime in the world that is orthodox in the sense of literally applying Marx's prescriptions. The attacks from the left against Nyerere or Neto have little to contribute, since they compare the reality of public policy with what a "true" Marxist should do—or what these critics would do. The criterion used here to establish the relevance of the Marxist claims of the "progressives" is the degree to which their policies, goals, and methods are related to those in contemporary communist societies. The role, character, and structure of the ruling party are the best criteria for a comparison with communist regimes elsewhere, and for separating the Marxist African regimes from other one-party systems on the continent.

[18] The Arusha Declaration, reproduced in Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 36.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Parties and Ideology

Theoretically, the postindependence phenomenon of de-institutionalizing public-policy debate through the creation of one-party systems, common to most African states, facilitated the establishment of Marxist-type parties. This similarity regarding the role of the party is superficial, however, since, with the possible exception of the PDG in Guinea, no postindependence ruling party of the 1950s or 1960s evolved in the direction of the Leninist vanguard party. On the contrary, the existing vanguard parties were created along Leninist structures—including "democratic centralism" as the basic decision-making principle—from the very beginning.

The viability of the vanguard party in sub-Saharan Africa was often questioned, mostly on the grounds that, contrary to their proclaimed intentions, parties like the PDG, TANU (now the CCM) in Tanzania, the Ghanaian Convention People's Party, or the Union Soudanaise in Mali were, because of the general underdevelopment of their countries, unable to fulfill the extractive, systematically organized, and perhaps even coercive roles associated with Marxist-Leninist parties. Underdevelopment, it was said, so narrowly limited the capabilities of radical African parties that they were "thrown back on playing integrative and distributive roles and periodically coercive ones"[19] common to the postindependence mass parties throughout Africa. This perception was based on a great underestimation of the distributive role of the East European and Soviet parties, deemed to possess a very low distributive capacity and to permanently stress the coercive, extractive, and systematically organized roles of the party. Whatever truth such perceptions may have contained regarding the initial period of such parties, it is certainly contradicted by the present situation. Since almost 10 per cent of the population of Eastern European states are members of their ruling communist parties, it is obvious that such parties are no longer tight organizations of professional militants, but that their large membership is the result of social and economic opportunities available to the members—to the expanded patronage capability of the communist parties.

Although the problem of underdevelopment as a constraint on African revolutionary elitist parties is a very real one, such constraints are far from decisive in many cases. To begin with, underdevelopment, inasmuch as it entails a very small educated elite, as well as a small economy and therefore limited scope for the extractive role of the party,

[19] Henry Bienen, "Political Parties and Political Machines in Africa," in Michael F. Lofchie, ed., *The State of the Nations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 207.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

may actually facilitate the creation of Marxist-Leninist parties whose main roles are extractive, coercive, and systematically organized, and only partially distributive. The distributive role is indeed particularly difficult in Africa, which is one reason why it is played mostly by parties in the wealthiest countries, like the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Cameroun, and Senegal, because the poorer a country, the fewer the spoils to distribute. On the other hand, the smaller the party membership, the larger the share in the spoils—hence one of the attractions of vanguard parties. The integrative role of mass parties actually requires more resources than the extractive one of elitist parties, because the integrative role requires more human resources—activists, propaganda specialists—and takes longer to implement the overall goal, if that goal is voluntary mobilization for revolutionary change. In addition, resources for such an integrative role must be internal—the more so as the integrative and distributive roles of a party are often closely linked. Resources for the fulfillment of the coercive, extractive, and systematically organized roles of a vanguard party, on the other hand, need not be internally raised for the most part—at least not in the initial stage of takeover by Marxist-Leninist regimes. The admittedly extreme, though by no means isolated, case of Angola, where there are more Soviet-bloc civilian advisers, including ideological ones, than there are members of the ruling party, is a good example. In circumstances such as those prevailing throughout most of sub-Saharan Africa, where the politically mobilized and active group is only a small minority of the population, and where the modern economic sector is uniformly small in absolute terms, the resources needed for a party of militants to fulfill its extractive, coercive, and, to a lesser extent, systematically organized roles are small indeed, and, more importantly still, a large part of those resources could be imported. This input of external ideological, security, military, and technical resources enables many of the African "progressive" parties to consolidate their power and to function as vanguard parties.

One common characteristic of all Marxist regimes in Africa is their attempt to prevent, freeze, or reverse the social changes brought by late colonialism and the immediate postindependence period, particularly the appearance of a middle class, whose main strength is in the state apparatus, the public sector, and the small private enterprises. The "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" is uniformly vilified by the Marxist-Leninist parties as the main internal class enemy and is seen as an increasing threat to the "revolution" after independence—hence the widespread claim that the class struggle actually intensifies after independence, and its corollary: the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat. As Machel described it, "Inside the country the enemy has been acting through its agents and lackeys to prevent the implementation of the objectives laid

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

down by the third congress and to destroy the people's achievements and to destroy the internationalist solidarity which unites us with socialist countries. Their prime target inside the country is the state apparatus. . . ."[20] The same theme is present in the statements of all Marxist African regimes, and its main thrust is basically the same: between party and state apparatus exists an adversary relationship, the internal difficulties of the regime are the price paid for its anti-imperialist stand, and in the struggle against imperialism and its internal stooges the communist countries are the natural allies of the "progressives."

The adversary relationship between the party and the state apparatus resolves in favor of the former if the party possesses the coercive means to suppress and the administrative capabilities to control or supplant the existing bureaucracy with one loyal to the party. The stability of the regime becomes totally dependent on the party control of the military and police at least until a new administrative structure is created. The problems of both administrative weakness and bureaucratic unreliability are "solved" through permanent application of force, as is the problem of popular discontent with the regime's economic failures. The party concentrates all decisionmaking into its own hands, and a system of direct control over the state apparatus is developed through the appointment of party members in all sensitive positions in government. Since most of these parties have a small membership—and intentionally so—their inability to supervise the administration's implementation of party decisions is minimized by the elimination of all or most parallel structures: the party becomes the government because it cannot control it, and the party becomes the officer corps for the same reason.

The top party leadership, usually Politburo members and always Central Committee members, fill all important ministerial positions in Angola, Benin, the Congo, Mozambique, as well as in Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, and Saõ Tomé and Principe—defense, interior, foreign affairs, internal security, planning, agriculture. They are responsible to the Politburo, and not to the chief of government unless he is also the leader of the party, and they are subject to party discipline in the framework of democratic centralism. In the technical ministries, many important decisions are taken in close consultation with expatriate cadres filling intermediate positions—Western leftists or Soviet-bloc experts. The national banks in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique are run by East German and Cuban experts, and local cadres are trained by them; currency changes in Saõ Tomé and Principe, Angola, and Mozambique were undertaken with Cuban and East German advice, and with the clear aim of destroying the

[20] Machel, address to mass rally in Maputo, March 18, 1980, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (Middle East & Africa), March 19, 1980, p. E3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

remnants of the indigenous middle class by practically confiscating its assets and savings—a procedure widely used in Eastern Europe after World War II, with the same aims and results. The planning in most of the "progressive" regimes is undertaken with similar Soviet-bloc advice and participation and, in some cases, a degree of coordination is reached with neighboring "progressives," as in the cases of Mozambique and Tanzania or Angola and the Congo.

At the level of party structure and organization, advice is required and received from Soviet-bloc parties or other "progressives"—the PRPB congress of 1976 and the MPLA congress of 1977 were organized with East German advice, the 1979 PCT congress was organized in consultation with the MPLA, whose main ideologue, Lucio Lara, played a significant role. Party schools are created with advice, lecturers, funding, and manuals provided by the Soviet bloc—mostly Cuba, East Germany, and the USSR. Collectivization techniques are learned from and applied with the help of Bulgarian, East German, North Korean, and Cuban advisers. Similarly, joint seminars with communist countries are organized in the fields of industrial management, planning, census taking, and statistical techniques. One of the most obvious results of such cooperation between the African "progressives" and the communist regimes is the close similarity in the structure of the parties and other institutions of all the "progressives."

The Supreme organ of all African vanguard parties is the congress, irregularly convened by the leadership, whose members are selected from among party members proposed by the leadership. At the proposal of the same leadership, the congress selects the Central Committee, which in turn chooses the Politburo. Between congresses, the supreme executive organ is supposed to be the Central Committee—but it is convened only few times a year by the Politburo and simply translates the latter's decisions into laws to be implemented by the government. It is ultimately the Politburo that is the center of the entire power in the Marxist regimes—and its membership is limited to between ten and twenty mostly military men. As a rule, the Politburo includes the chiefs of the army, general staff, official unions, secret police, and the party secretary-general is always the chief of state, commander of the armed forces, and chief of government. The application of democratic centralism strictly limits any significant political debate among various party factions to the Politburo, and its small membership makes fragmentation somewhat less likely, though by no means impossible.

With the exceptions of Tanzania and Guinea, all "progressive" regimes in Africa came to power through violence and are dominated by military men—but not by the army as an institution. The army, the most dangerous institutional threat to the ruling party through-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

out sub-Saharan Africa, presents no similar threat to the Marxist regimes. Although basically military in their origin, such regimes were largely successful in eliminating the two characteristics of the military that make them such an important political force in other African countries: their strong corporate identity and their monopoly of the means of coercion. Once in power, the "progressive" leadership swiftly and almost completely transferred their loyalty from the military to the party—by becoming the party's main force. People like Samora Machel, Denis Sassou Nguesso in the Congo, Mathieu Kérekou, and Didier Ratsiraka renounced their identification with the military by legitimating their rule on ideological grounds and through a new institution: the party. Once this transfer of loyalties is completed, the army becomes an instrument of the party, similar to the government, unions, or other organizations. This phenomenon is virtually the opposite of the "civilianization" of the military ruler, which occurred in Zaire, Upper Volta, and Togo.[21] There, the newly formed mass parties remain basically an instrument of the military, and the latter retains its corporate identity. The traditional government by military junta is often an answer to the extreme politicization of the society, and one of its primary aims is to stop that process before it threatens the corporate identity of the military. In the case of the new-wave Marxist regimes, however, the aim of the party is to increase politicization, to politicize all institutions, including the army. The military's corporate identity is thus seen as an obstacle to the party's complete control—and in many cases the army was already deeply politicized at the moment of taking power. Once the party is established and its control mechanisms set in place, the military is treated as all other institutions are; they become victims of purges and are kept under surveillance by the political commissars answerable to the party leadership. The senior officers are all members of the party, subject to both military and party discipline within the framework of democratic centralism. In a persistent attack against the military's corporate identity as a professional body in control of the means of violence, the national armies become "people's armies" with their professional character diluted by numerical expansion, political surveillance, and involvement in domestic repression, public works and loyalty oaths to the party—and not to the government or the constitution. The Beninese constitution defined the army as "the armed forces of the people of Benin. They are led by the People's Revolutionary Party of Benin and owe loyalty to it."[22] For FRELIMO, the

[21] The best account of these countries' political development is Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976).

[22] The Beninese Constitution, article 10. Text in *Afrique Contemporaine*, September-October 1977, p. 24.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

armed forces are "—led by FRELIMO . . . being one of the essential elements of the state power. . . . At the same time, they are a force of production and political mobilization of the popular masses."[23] The army's monopoly of force is limited by the creation of "people's militias" and the steady growth of the secret police, whose loyalty is to the party only and whose command is completely separate from the regular army. In all cases, the paramilitary, the militias, and the secret police are trained by Soviet-bloc advisers—Soviet, East German, Czech, and Cuban—or by experts from other "progressive" states.

Nevertheless, the weakening or complete elimination of the military's corporate identity in the "progressive" regimes does not signify that they have no influence left. The fact that the party leadership is largely military men, and that the army is politicized allows the military to retain influence by providing support for various factions within the party itself. Some of the most serious challenges to the party leadership came from factions supported by segments of the military; the failed coup led by Nito Alves in Angola in May 1977 was spearheaded by elite army units, while the successful coup in Guinea Bissau in November 1980 was led by the highly popular Politburo member, premier, and army commander Bernardo "Nino" Vieira. In the Congo, army-based radicals were a constant threat to the party leader, and in 1979 they succeeded in controlling a majority in the Politburo, allowing them to overthrow the leader. It is highly significant, however, that they did so through the skillful use of the party apparatus—learned in Guinea—and not by staging a military coup, a clear indication that they recognized the party as the only legitimate source of power. The struggle was for the leadership of the party and not for its replacement by the military as an institution. In the former Portuguese colonies, the problem of the party's eliminating the corporate identity of the military did not even appear, since even before independence the problem had been solved. Amilcar Cabral described the party-military relationship: "The political and military leadership of the struggle is one: the political leadership. In our struggle we have avoided the creation of anything military. . . . Our fighters are defined as armed activists."[24]

As a result of the consolidation of party control over the military and the top levels of the administration, no institution is left in Africa's Marxist regimes to challenge the leading role of the party. Nonetheless, the party's success in largely eliminating institutional alternatives to its

---

[23] The 1975 Mozambican Constitution, article 5. Text in *Mozambican Revolution,* June 1976. See, also, *Afrique Contemporaine,* August-September 1975, p. 38.

[24] Amilcar Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea: Selected Texts* (New York: Monthly Review, 1970), p. 146.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rule and in superficially legitimating Marxism-Leninism among the political elite was accomplished only at the cost of transferring political and institutional conflict from without to within the party itself. Personal, economic, or ethnic conflicts are now focused within the party, and factionalism has replaced all other forms of political conflict. Moreover, the stronger the party control over the society as a whole, the higher the stakes in controlling the party leadership positions—and the more likely purges are to take violent forms.

The vanguard parties' structural trend toward increased control over the society is consistently reinforced by the economic decline of all "progressive" African countries. As the state sector grows as a result of the "socialization of the means of production," productivity declines, and the parasitic growth of the party and state-sector bureaucracy raises the number of those claiming a share of the spoils. The party has to increase its extractive capacity commensurate to the growing gap between the cost of maintaining its control and the decline in economic growth that the control itself produces. The lack of qualified cadres in the economy is made worse by the priority given to ideological loyalty at the expense of ability and professional qualification. Sékou Touré, Samora Machel, and the Congolese leaders repeatedly stressed the need for ideologically loyal cadres, even at the expense of well-qualified personnel. The long-term ambition of the "progressives" is the creation of a "new man," whose loyalty to the party is absolute. Once again, they pursue this aim through a heavy reliance upon external support in the field of education. Teachers are trained in Soviet-bloc countries, manuals are written there, and many Cuban or other communist personnel are involved in the educational process, from the ministries of education to the classroom.

What the creation of the "new man" signifies is demonstrated by the role played by Cuba in training the future elites of the African "progressive" regimes. Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia have each sent more than 2,000 students between eight and sixteen years of age to Cuba, where there are also 1,500 Congolese youths, and hundreds from Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Benin, the Seychelles, and Guinea. Once on the Island of Pines in Cuba, these youths are subject to Marxist teaching half the time, while socialization with other nationals, through work in the fields, occupies the rest of the day.[25] The officially recognized aim of this program is to create a new elite, characterized by loyalty to Marxism and internationalism. Meanwhile, the indoctrination of the present elite

[25] Carollee Bengelsdorf, "Cuba's Africa Aid and Education for Development," *Southern Africa*, July-August 1979, pp. 10-11, offers an apologetic but interesting description of the activities on the Island of Pines ("Isla de Juventud"). An opposite interpretation of those activities can be found in "Cuba: l'endoctrinement à l'école," *Etudes Politiques*, December 1980, pp. 10-11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

also proceeds apace, reinforced by sheer necessity, professional and political ambitions, and government incentives. The entire Congolese officer corps is trained in the Soviet bloc and armed with weapons of the same origin; the Mozambican, Angolan, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, and São Tomé military personnel are also trained in Soviet-bloc countries, North Korea, China, or Algeria. The importance of this training for the ideological orientation of the military was made abundantly clear by the role played by the Afghan army in the 1978 communist coup.

The combination of all these factors indicates that the Marxist regimes in sub-Saharan Africa are probably more stable than those of other countries in the area, and thus the basic structure and ideological allegiance of the present is likely to continue for years to come. Stability in this context refers to those elements only, however, since change in the leadership is always possible, and shifts in the relative influence of various factions will always occur. The pace and direction of political change, however, are already limited, both ideologically and structurally.

Party Politics and Ideological Escalation

In 1977 both FRELIMO in Mozambique and MPLA in Angola held party congresses and declared themselves "vanguard parties of the proletariat." Until then they had both maintained the label of "liberation" movements, claiming to represent broad sections of the population in an anticolonial coalition. With the proclamation of the vanguard parties, they renounced any pretension of sharing power with other groups. It has become clear that whether or not a "united front" existed at the time of independence, the two groups in control considered the use of coalition tactics obsolete. The process was similar to what occurred in Eastern Europe in the late 1940s and in Cuba in 1960-1961: a Marxist-Leninist core, strong because of better organization, foreign connections, and control over the means of violence, eliminated its temporary allies. The 1977 congresses, however, were symbols of this process rather than its actual final stage; FRELIMO had ceased to be a coalition of disparate elements by 1969, when the faction of Uriah Simango was eliminated and the hard-line group of Machel, Dos Santos, and Joaquim Chissano took complete control of the movement, while Neto's faction of the MPLA was in a dominant position by 1974, following the purging of the Andrade brothers on its left and of Daniel Chipenda on its right.[26] FRELIMO retained its unity more successfully than MPLA, however, since the post-1969 leadership was able to retain immediate control over the guerrillas,

[26] Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, pp. 185-240.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unlike Neto's faction of the MPLA. After 1974 Neto and his group of largely Portuguese-speaking and educated urban mulattos were forced into a coalition with the remnants of the MPLA guerrillas left inside Angola after the successful Portuguese anti-insurgency campaigns of the early 1970s. The latter group, led by Nito Alves, José van Dunem, and Jacobo Caetano, comprised mostly ethnic Kimbundu blacks and was instrumental in eliminating Luanda's extreme left in 1975.[27] As interior minister in the first MPLA government after independence, Alves succeeded in establishing his control over large segments of the party organization, unions, and student groups. Consistently attacking Neto's associates from the left, he appeared also to be the favorite of the Soviet Union and was perhaps encouraged to take over the leadership of the party. Alves's own ineptitude, Neto's control over the secret police, and particularly the "fraternal" help of the Cubans in Luanda resulted in the brutal suppression of the May 1977 coup and the elimination of the last serious challenge to Neto's leadership. The 1977 MPLA congress simply formalized the end of the factional struggle within the party and the victory of its most orthodox faction. It appeared that the mulattos' dominance of the party was safe, and that the clash between those who fought the Portuguese from the forests of the Dembos Mountains and those who did so from Moscow, Brazzaville, Lusaka, or Western Euopre was permanently solved in favor of the latter. The reality, however, was much more complex, and while the *apparatchiks* did eventually win over the militants, they had to pay a price, ideological as well as personal. Before his fall Alves was the most vocal supporter of the MPLA's transformation into a vanguard party imposing the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and accused the mulatto leadership of bureaucratic habits and lack of revolutionary zeal. On the other hand, before the coup's failure, Lucio Lara, the main ideologue of the party, was opposed to the transformation of the movement, while Neto himself vacillated. With Alves out of the way, however, the MPLA did become a vanguard party, with the defeated faction the main victim of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Today, Lara is practically the only mulatto among the truly influential leaders of the party. Thus, once the challenge from the left had been defeated, the victors assumed some of the most important demands of the leftists as their own. A very similar episode occurred in Benin in 1975, when the most radical faction of what was then only a radical military junta, led by the Interior Minister Michel Aikpe, was eliminated by the murder of its leader, but the very same year a vanguard party was created and a process of radicalization started, thus fulfilling most of the left's demands. The failed attempt by the ultraleftist

[27] Gabriel, *Angola: le tournant africain?*, pp. 311-337.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

group of Ange Diawara to overthrow Ngouabi in the Congo in 1972 was followed by the murder of Diawara—and by the beginning of a "revolutionarization" process, including purges of the more moderate elements from the party. Interestingly enough, the Congolese purges against the moderates occurred at the time of the country's involvement in the Angolan civil war and as a result of a dramatic increase in the influence of the MPLA, Cubans, and Guineans in the Congo. In all three cases, the victors, after violently suppressing the challenge from the left, assumed its ideological thrust. The tendency of factions in Marxist parties to shift leftward and of the strongest challenges to the leadership to come from the left produces a phenomenon that may be described as ideological escalation: following each factional conflict, the ideological center of the party moves leftward; the "moderate" faction usually wins but is forced to raise the ideological ante. At the level of policymaking and policy implementation, ideological escalation is manifested by growing radicalism in foreign affairs, closer cooperation with other "progressive" regimes and communist states, increasingly strident rhetoric, continuous purges, and growing militarization of the regime. If there is a discernible trend in intraparty politics in the Marxist regimes in Africa, it appears to be toward radicalization. The same trend may be seen in the evolution of Marxist politics at the continental level.

After Nkrumah was ousted by the army in 1966 and Modibo Keita in 1969, and after Nyerere was saved from his own soldiers by the British in 1964, African Marxists generally believed that the main cause of those failures was too much tolerance for the class enemy and insufficient awareness of the "imperialist" threat to revolution throughout the continent. Nkrumah and Keita were accused of not going far enough in destroying the economic base of the opposition through nationalization and confiscation, and of failing to "arm the people"—to eliminate the corporate autonomy of the military and to deny them the monopoly of force. In all fairness, however, it should be pointed out that both Nkrumah and Keita attempted to create alternate security forces loyal to them and thus provoked the military to react, tried their best to impose party control over the economy, the unions, and the judiciary, and adopted increasingly orthodox Marxist positions. As the fall of Allende convinced many Latin American radicals that violence was their only path to power, African Marxists became convinced that violence was the only means to gain and retain political power, and that economic development should be left for another time if pursuing it could in any way endanger the consolidation of political power.

Internally, the conclusions drawn by the African revolutionaries from the traumatic experiences of 1966 and 1969 were translated into a consistent policy of destroying the economic and political power of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the indigenous entrepreneurial groups, urban or rural, through confiscation, wholesale nationalization, excessive taxation, forced collectivization, and in some cases mass explusion of large segments of the "capitalist" groups. The explusion of the Nigerians, Senegalese, and Beninese from the Congo in 1977 and of the Asians and whites from Angola and Mozambique[28] indicates that Marxist regimes are not immune to chauvinism and racism, their claims to the contrary notwithstanding. Once again, some of these measures were possible only by resorting to external support: the nationalization of the Moatize coal fields in Mozambique occurred only after an agreement with East Germany ensured that at least part of the departing cadres would be replaced—as they were, by both East Germans and Rumanians; the large Sena Sugar Estates Company was nationalized by FRELIMO only after the Cubans reluctantly replaced the old management, while the oil refinery in Maputo was taken over and immediately put under Rumanian management, as was the new state oil company.

Although the staggering cost of the introduction of Marxist economic policies was known to the regimes adopting them, such policies were introduced because, regardless of their economic cost, they strengthened the party control. Policies whose obvious failure was made clear by previous experiences in Africa and elsewhere were consistently repeated because their political merits were deemed more important than their economic cost. For instance, the Guinean attempt to impose state control over the rural distribution network failed completely by 1968, as did the collectivization program of the same period;[29] in both cases, the results included peasant discontent, a dramatic increase in smuggling across the border into Ivory Coast, a flourishing black market, and a sharp decline in food production and state revenues. Nevertheless, Tanzania engaged in a similar program after 1967, with precisely the same results,[30] but that did not deter FRELIMO from using all conceivable means to collectivize agriculture and to nationalize the distribution network. Indeed, the Mozambican authorities took advantage of the existence of the Portuguese strategic villages, *aldeamentos,* and of the mass

[28] Contrary to some accounts, the Asians and Portuguese in Mozambique were actually forced out of the country by FRELIMO's confiscations, nationalizations, and accusations of collaboration with the Portuguese. It was a consistent and planned policy, reinforced by citizenship requirements and often by overtly racist attacks on whites and Asians by mobs in Maputo and other cities. After denying that a policy of forced expulsion of Asians and whites was implemented, Machel himself admitted the contrary when he advised Robert Mugabe not to do the same. In Angola, MPLA followed largely similar policies, although the civil war was probably the most important factor in the Portuguese exodus.

[29] Adamolekun, "The Socialist Experience in Guinea," p. 77.

[30] Descriptions of the catastrophic impact of collectivization in Tanzania are provided by Michael F. Lofchie, "Agrarian Socialism in the Third World: The Tanzanian Case," *Comparative Politics,* April 8, 1976, pp. 479-499, and Ken Adelman, "The Great Black Hope," *Harper's,* July 1981, pp. 14-19. Adelman also describes the poor condition of Tanzania's economy as a whole.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

displacement following the 1976 and 1977 floods, to concentrate the peasants into collective villages, *aldeias comunais*. Like Guinea after 1967 and Tanzania after 1975, Mozambique became a large importer of food after collectivization started and combined with FRELIMO's "internationalist" involvement in the Rhodesian civil war. The situation became so critical that Machel admitted the failure of the state-controlled distribution network and offered to denationalize it—with few takers. What all these examples indicate is that the Marxist regimes in Africa are quite willing to sacrifice economic development for the sake of party political control, to the extent to which economic growth is dependent on rational management, decentralization, private enterprise, and reduced state involvement in the economy—a phenomenon well known from Cuba, the USSR, Vietnam, and some Eastern European countries. Since the very price the party has to pay in order to retain and expand its control is economic mismanagement, and since this inevitably produces discontent, the only choices left are the widespread use of coercion at home and increasing dependence on external capital flows to compensate for the inability to raise capital internally. The first choice is implemented through the above-mentioned militarization of the regimes, as well as through tight controls over the unions, the banning of strikes, and the widespread use of "voluntary"—that is, forced and unpaid—labor, and the introduction of severe punishment for "economic crimes" such as black marketing, "speculation," and "economic sabotage."

The second option usually takes the form of cooperation with Western multinational companies, frequent demands for aid, "humanitarian" or otherwise, and heavy indebtedness to international lending institutions. The presence of Western companies in African Marxist countries is often interpreted as a demonstration of "pragmatism" and of a supposed gap between rhetoric and public policy. A closer examination of the issue, however, and a comparison with the experience of Eastern Europe suggest that neither is the case. The Western companies operating in such countries are doing so as narrowly limited islands of capitalism with no links to the local entrepreneurs—when those still exist—and are tolerated only because there is no alternative to their presence. The case of the oil companies in Angola and the Congo is typical: they provide the bulk of state revenues, and the Soviet bloc is patently unable to provide an alternative to their expertise, technology, and capital. Much as in the case of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) of the early 1920s, the Western companies' role in Africa's Marxist regimes is an attempt to harness capitalism's ability to produce toward the end of consolidating the revolution. In those few instances when cooperation with the West may become politically dangerous to the ruling party, it is simply rejected. Angola and Mozambique both refused to join the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lomé agreements largely because doing so would have implied a de facto recognition of the West German claims to West Berlin—and would have upset East Germany, one of the main providers of ideological, security, military, and technical aid to FRELIMO and the MPLA. The West is actually subsidizing Marxist revolutionary regimes in Africa—through aid and through the activities of the corporations—directly in the first case and indirectly in the second, by offsetting some of the costs of those regimes' economic policies. It is significant in this respect that some of the African revolutionary regimes are among the largest recipients of Western aid per capita in the world: Tanzania, the Seychelles, Saõ Tomé, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau. Since economic development and Marxist economic policies are largely incompatible, the stability of the present regimes is completely dependent on Western economic support and Soviet-bloc ideological, military, and security aid. In these circumstances, foreign policy becomes a matter of domestic political survival.

Ideology and Foreign Policy

Faithful to their perception of the international arena as the focus of class struggle, and of foreign policy as a weapon in that struggle, the African Marxists, like their colleagues elsewhere, see international relations as close to a zero-sum game, in which compromise is often tantamount to defeat and the policies of consensus are avoided. This set of perceptions implies that at least some of the rules of international conduct are replaced by different principles. Internationalism is foremost among those principles and it appears to have become increasingly important.

The significance of "proletarian internationalism" for the foreign policies of the "progressive" African regimes was made clear by Sergio Vieira, a former secret police director and now Mozambique's minister of agriculture and FRELIMO Central Committee member:

> The first people's democracies of orkers and peasants, led by parties that have adopted Marxism-Leninism as their ideology, have appeared in the southern part of Africa as a result of the victories of the peoples of Mozambique and Angola. The liberation struggle in this region now has its first-ever dependable rear consisting of states recognizing the *priority* of the principle of proletarian internationalism. *Here the boundary between independent Africa and an Africa tyrannized by racism and colonialism is also the boundary demarcating different roads of social development* [emphasis added].[31]

The corollary of this position is the statement by Angola's former defense minister: "This victory [MPLA's] has nothing extraordinary, because

[31] Sergio Vieira, "Viability of Scientific Socialism," *World Marxist Review*, March 1979, p. 61.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proletarian internationalism exists. We constitute, historically, its irrefutable proof."[32]

The use of "proletarian internationalism" to justify Soviet-bloc interventions in Africa was often mentioned, although its implications for the future, as preparing the ground for a possible de facto extension of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine to at least some African "progressive" regimes were often underestimated. What has gone largely unnoticed, however, is the emergence of a network of ties among the members of the "progressive" group, ties based on the principles of internationalism and operating in both ways mentioned above—as support for nonruling Marxist groups in their attempts to gain power, and as defense of the existing Marxist regimes. As a foreign policy principle, internationalism is applied by the "progressives" in various interrelated and mutually reinforcing ways.

1. Cooperation and consultation on continental issues, particularly within the framework of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and on issues of essential importance for the nonaligned movement and the UN. As a result, in most such issues, the "progressives" tend to adopt largely similar positions, even at the price of weakening the consensus prevailing in those organizations and of sharpening conflicts. What may appear as a double standard in the "progressive" group's position is most often a demonstration of its consistently ideological approach to international issues, and its ideological homogeneity. The "progressives" were among the earliest and most vocal supporters of POLISARIO in Western Sahara, opposed the Moroccan and Western interventions on behalf of the legal government of Zaire in 1977 and 1978, and also opposed the use of a multilateral African force in Shaba in 1978. On the other hand, with the exception of Tanzania in the first case, and with no exception in the second, the "progressives" either supported or refused to condemn the Soviet and Vietnamese respective occupations of Afghanistan and Kampuchea. Some of the "progressives" were among the few African states to openly support the Libyan attempt to annex Chad. Benin, the Congo, and Ethiopia were among those.

2. The formation, since the mid 1970s, of a formal and informal network of cooperation that now includes all Marxist regimes in Africa. The structure of this network is provided by a system of friendship and cooperation treaties and defense agreements among those regimes. Treaties of friendship and cooperation exist between Angola and the Congo, Mozambique, and Saõ Tomé and Principe; Congo and Benin, Guinea; Benin and Guinea; Ethiopia and Libya. Defense agreements,

[32] Henrique Teles "Iko" Carreira, interview, *Afrique-Asie*, May 3, 1976, p. 19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some including provisions for joint antiguerrilla operations, exist between Angola and the Congo (against the Cabindan guerrillas), Zambia (against UNITA and in support of SWAPO), and Saõ Tomé and Principe, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and Cape Verde; Mozambique and Tanzania (with the latter until recently providing support for antiguerrilla operations in northern Mozambique), Zimbabwe (joint operations against anti-FRELIMO guerrillas in central and southern Mozambique), and Zambia; Tanzania and Uganda, the Seychelles, and from 1975 to 1978 the Comoros; Guinea and Benin; Benin and Libya (probably). Four of the members of this network—the Congo, Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia—are known to have signed treaties of friendship and cooperation with at least one Soviet-bloc member, the latter three have defense agreements with at least one Soviet-bloc member, while Madagascar has a treaty of friendship and cooperation with North Korea. The military and particularly the deterrent value of such a network in case of conflict between one of the members and a non-Marxist African state is difficult to overestimate.

3. Intervention on behalf of other members of the group and in support of the existing Marxist regimes. Angola and Guinea Bissau intervened militarily in Saõ Tomé and Principe in 1978 in support of one faction of the ruling Movimento de Libertação de Sáõ Tomé and Principe (MLSTP) and Angolan units have remained there ever since; Tanzania provided military aid, including combat troops and security personnel in Mozambique, the Seychelles, Comoros before 1978, and Uganda; Guinea temporarily stationed troops in Benin and Sierra Leone; Mozambican "internationalist fighters" participated in guerrilla operations within Rhodesia from1977 to 1979. Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Congo, and Guinea, as well as Nigeria and Sierra Leone, provided token detachments on the MPLA side in the Angolan civil war of 1975-1976.

4. Support for Marxist groups operating against the governments of other African or non-African countries. For years, Tanzania and Mozambique provided support to the antigovernment LESOMA group in Malawi; Mozambique and Angola are the most vocal supporters of FRETILIN, a group still waging a declining guerrilla war against Indonesia in East Timor; until few years ago, Guinea was a consistent albeit unsuccessful supporter of subversive groups in Senegal and the Ivory Coast; similarly, throughout the 1960s Congo was a haven for radical groups attempting to overthrow the governments of Cameroun, Gabon, Central Africa, and Zaire. Tanzania was the most successful of the "progressives" in helping to install ideologically friendly regimes in Uganda and the Seychelles, though it failed to maintain the regime of Ali Soilih in the Comoros. It is necessary to underline the ideological background of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda, because it was much too often applauded as a beneficial action insofar as it eliminated the Amin regime. Tanazian troops, however, were also involved in the removal of two post-Amin Ugandan presidents, seen by Tanzania as too independent and too interested in close ties with capitalist Kenya. Finally, as in the Seychelles in 1979, the presence of Tanzanian troops in Uganda during the presidential elections was not unrelated to the victory of Nyerere's old friend Milton Obote. All Marxist regimes had long supported the Eritrean secessionists against the former imperial regime in Addis Ababa, but practically none does so now that a Marxist-Leninist regime is in power in Ethiopia. Similarly, all the "progressives" supported the revolutionary regime of Ali Soilih in the Comoros, and voted against the seating of the new government that succeeded it at the OAU, on the grounds that it acquired power with mercenary help. Nevertheless, none of the "progressives" protested when Soilih came into power with the help of the same mercenary who later overthrew and killed him.

5. Unlike the non-Marxist African states, the "progressives'" support for the "liberation" movements in southern Africa and elsewhere is ideologically motivated and includes intimate involvement in those groups' internal factional struggles, with the aim of shaping them into an increasingly orthodox Marxist-Leninist mold. FRELIMO used Tanzanian jails for years for the safekeeping of the defeated faction of Uriah Simango, and Nyerere was directly involved in the factional struggle to give Machel's group control of the movement; in turn, Machel was actively involved in the factional infighting of ZANU, supporting Mugabe's faction and jailing its opponents, while Nyerere kept his jails occupied by the SAWPO factions opposed to his protegé, Sam Nujoma. Neto tried hard from 1976 to 1978 to unite the anti-Mobutu factions in Zaire under the leadership of his old friend and ideological mentor Antoine Gizenga. It should be pointed out that both SWAPO in Namibia and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa have reached the same organizational and ideological stage as FRELIMO in 1969 and the MPLA in 1974—both SWAPO and ANC are now reduced to their Marxist-Leninist hard core, following the elimination of moderate elements and, in the latter case, the decisive role played by the South African Communist party, now practically merged with ANC, in the group's orientation.

6. Ideological cooperation, including exchanges of party and "mass organizations" delegations, participation in other parties' congresses, regional conferences like that of the Indian Ocean "progressive" parties in 1979, exchanges of journalists and propagandists become more regular, as does the cooperation between ruling "progressive" parties and radical groups in non-Marxist states. For instance, the opposition Parti

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Démocratique de Senegal has close ties with the MPLA in Angola, although Senegal is the only African country that did not recognize the government of Angola and provides quite open support to UNITA.

Assessment and Policy Implications

The African Marxist regimes have developed political structures that, while still not completely secure, are being steadily consolidated. An essential role in that consolidation is played by the continuous and intensive support they receive from the Soviet bloc. That support actually allowed Marxist regimes to gain power in certain countries, but most of the time, the support came as a result of a deliberate decision by the ruling group already radicalized. The first steps in such cases were rhetorical claims accompanied by extensive borrowing of communist techniques of political and economic control, complete with Soviet-bloc experts. In time, those claims and techniques acquired a dynamic of their own in many respects and increasingly imposed it upon the structures of African regimes.

Many, if not all, of the weaknesses of other African regimes in imposing effective control over the society, in political as well as economic terms, were overcome by the Marxist regimes, as was the threat from the military institution, and the ruling parties did succeed in imposing their domination. Marxism-Leninism or other varieties of Marxism have become accepted by the political elites as the sole source of legitimacy, internally and internationally, available to a party in whose supremacy they have a growing stake. The indigenous entrepreneurial groups were almost completely uprooted, making a future return to a free market or even a mixed economy increasingly unlikely, thus reinforcing Marxism as the only available option. All these developments took place largely at the expense of economic growth and development, while the declining ability of the growing state sector in the economy to raise productivity and domestic capital and to rationally allocate scarce resources was partially upset by infusions of Western capital through aid and private investments. As ideological escalation moves the ruling elites further leftward, it reinforces the inherently adversary relationship between increased party control and economic development. In addition, it continuously narrows the political base of support of the party, through purges, discontent with the economic situation, and the resulting increase in official violence. When faced with the necessity to choose between their dependence on the Soviet bloc for political survival and their dependence on the West for economic development, these regimes tend to opt for the former.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The foreign policies of the African Marxist regimes, then, are increasingly inconsistent with their proclaimed allegiance to nonalignment, as well as with the interests of the West. Internal militarization, the increasing level of cooperation among African revolutionary regimes and between them and the communist states, and the presence of foreign military and security personnel on their territory are all factors of regional and continental instability. On issues such as Afghanistan, Kampuchea, the situation in the Indian Ocean, and Chad, most of these regimes have consistently demonstrated that ideological solidarity with the Soviet bloc is more important for them than some of the most fundamental requirements of international law and security.

The Marxist character of the domestic political and economic structures of the African "progressives" is increasingly obvious, although they all retain their individual particularities, compared with the communist states of Europe or Asia, and significant differences persist among the members of the group themselves. The members of the group could be placed along a continuum between Nyerere's quasi-populist regime and Machel's quasi-Stalinist type of Marxism. Concerning foreign policy, however, the distinctions have blurred in recent years, as internationalism becomes an increasingly important factor.

The growing number of the African "progressives," and their destabilizing role, should inspire a complete reassessment of U.S. policy toward them and toward Africa in general. Their consistent hostility toward the West and its African friends should be recognized as rooted in their very political structure, and therefore as long lasting. Attempts to minimize that hostility through aid or through the refusal to treat it as anything more than rhetoric have failed in the past and will fail again. The fact that the activities of the "progressives" have produced an increasing polarization of African policies at a continental scale should become the basic premise of U.S. policies in the area, and encouragement should be given to those countries that are aware of this fact and perceive the need for the non-Marxists to close ranks against the "progressives."

Since the "progressives'" choice in favor of ties with the Soviet bloc externally and Marxist economic and social policies internally against economic development in a pluralistic and (relatively) free market environment was largely facilitated by their perception that Western aid would be forthcoming in any case, measures could be taken to increase the cost of such choices. Bilateral aid should be denied outright, and pressure should be put on international lending institutions to reconsider their policies along related lines. While countries like France, the Scandinavian states, or the Netherlands could be expected to continue to subsidize revolutionary regimes in Africa, there is no sensible reason for the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States to do the same. Moreover, since the present circumstances do not allow increases in foreign aid, a transfer of scarce aid resources from the "progressives" to the moderates would be significant.

Ideological considerations, as a result of their domestic power structure, are now dominating the foreign policy of a number of African states. Such considerations should also become part of Washington's answer to the challenges they raise. And the myth of an innocent Africa, preoccupied only with economic development, should finally be discarded.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AFRICA AND FOREIGN AID: USING SCARCE RESOURCES WISELY

by Frederick W. Stokeld

Since the great surge of independence began in Africa twenty-five years ago, U.S. policymakers have been forced to reappraise aid policies toward the continent. The emergent policy continues to seek previous goals—peaceful change in southern Africa and long-term economic growth throughout black Africa—but through different means from before. Because of the Reagan administration's perception that market forces are the most effective determinant of economic growth, economic performance increasingly is becoming the criterion for setting the amount of assistance a country will receive. In addition, U.S. and other foreign aid donors, all with economic troubles of their own, now invest with growing concern over guaranteed results. The administration sees Africa's economic hope in the private sector; it reinforced that belief at Cancún, asserting that any African country that shows a genuine interest in fostering private-sector activities in its economy will be assured of a tangible, positive U.S. response.

This article will examine African economic problems and prospects, focusing on the role of foreign assistance programs as a means of promoting African economic development. In addition, the question of why traditional aid programs have been inadequate will be addressed. Finally, I will discuss the administration's new approach to development in Africa, with particular emphasis on the promotion of private enterprise and open-market principles there.

Africa's Economic Problems: Symptoms of Malaise

Early in 1980, the African governors at the World Bank requested a bank analysis of their economic development prospects, together with recommendations for long-term corrective action. The bank responded with a highly critical draft report that was evidently too frank for some of its clients. Although it was held up for further review,[1] it was

[1] World Bank, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action*, September 1981.

Frederick W. Stokeld is Director of the International Economic Policy Section in the International Division of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. He is also Director of the International Division's African Affairs Section.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

later released as bank policy. When the World Bank abandons its traditional reserve and goes public with criticisms of developing countries' policies, it is clear that it views the situation in Africa with acute concern.

The urgency of the situation was expressed by a senior African official of the UN Economic Commission for Africa: "On the basis of all the economic projections we have seen so far, Africa in the year 2000 will not be in the ditch it is now. It will be in the bottom of a deep black hole."[2]

While "Africa" must here connote sub-Saharan black Africa, and further allowances must be made for small pockets of relative prosperity, the bleak prognosis is backed by facts. Africa now includes twenty-one of the world's thirty-one least developed countries. And virtually every measure projects it to fall even further behind the rest of the developing world.

The World Bank projects real per capita growth of less than 1 per cent in Africa during the 1980s. A debt service burden of almost 30 per cent of export earnings by 1990 is also predicted, far in excess of any other region.[3] Together with the effects of rapidly rising costs of energy, manufactured goods, and food grains, non–oil- or mineral-producing states will face severe balance-of-payment problems through the 1980s.

Sub-Saharan Africa is the only developing region of the world where per capita food production has declined over the past two decades. (It continues to decline by at least 1 per cent annually.) A food-grain deficit in Africa of twenty-three million tons is estimated by 1990, which means that fully 70 per cent of the population is not getting enough to eat.

The region is also plagued by rapid rates of desertification, far more than on any other continent. Accelerating deforestation is substantially sapping soil capacity. Although 80 per cent of African households depend on firewood for cooking, reforestation programs are lagging, along with the introduction of other renewable forms of energy.

Health care of even minimal world standards is unknown to more than 80 per cent of sub-Saharan Africans. Their life expectancy averages barely forty-five years, compared with fifty-seven in the rest of the developing world and seventy-three in the United States. The prevalence of disease reduces labor productivity, particularly in rural areas, and often precludes human habitation altogether in potentially more fertile valley areas. More than three-quarters of the population is functionally illiterate, with the lack of skilled manpower remaining a major impediment to effective development. Continuing this litany of Africa's woes, inadequate and high-cost transportation systems prevent agricultural,

[2] *OECD Observer*, January 1981, p. 23.
[3] *World Development Report*, 1981 (Washington: World Bank, 1981).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

health, and other public services from reaching outlying rural populations. They also limit the internal and external marketing of food and other goods.

To compound these difficulties, Africa has more refugees than any other part of the world. By UN estimates, some 2.2 million people there are refugees, more than in Southeast Asia and the Caribbean area combined. The enormous scale of this suffering calls for more than emergency life support. Massive efforts to incorporate refugees into the basic development programs of the countries of sanctuary are imperative.

Another negative trend is Africa's expanding growth (the world's highest) of urban areas. The sprawl of cities like Lagos and Ibadan in Nigeria must be seen to be believed. Twenty years ago, their combined population was barely one million: today, reliable estimates place it at more than nine million. Because most urban areas depend upon imported food and products, urbanization imposes a heavy drain on foreign exchange reserves for imports of wheat, rice, and other offshore foodstuffs.

As a melancholy counterpoint to waning agricultural production, Africa's population steadily increases. The annual rate of natural increase, at 2.7 per cent in 1978, is the world's highest. Even in the poorest countries, the death rates are declining faster than birthrates. Almost half of the region's 340 million-plus population is less than fifteen years of age.

The benefits that would follow with reduced fertility in sub-Saharan Africa are clear enough. Although few issues in Third World development have received so much attention as population control, no other region has such a dismal record. Widespread illiteracy accounts for only part of the problem; Kenya, one of the most literate nations in Africa, has the highest birthrate: 4.4 per cent. The fact is that in many parts of Africa values are so strongly pronatal that family-planning programs in Africa have been few and ineffective (also because of the dearth of health-care systems that could incorporate such programs). In addition, some African governments see Western proposals to curb African birthrates as hostile to Africa's integrity and emergence as a major world force. This suspicion, a legacy of the colonial experience, is pervasive and understandable.

A final factor in the catalogue of Africa's economic growth problems is the region's political fragmentation into forty-seven independent states. This legacy of colonialism means that economies of scale in government public services and market size are denied to most African countries. The political structure places a premium on transnational transportation and communication linkages; the dilemma of landlocked states like Zambia and Zimbabwe is especially irksome for their economic planners.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Unfortunately, foreign assistance efforts have tended to mirror and compound Africa's economic fragmentation. The United States has a range of bilateral assistance programs with almost every country in sub-Saharan Africa. Other industrial nations of the West and, to a lesser extent, many socialist states repeat the pattern. Consider the activities of the World Bank and other multilateral agencies and a kaleidoscope of vying, often conflicting, assistance programs emerges.

Foreign Assistance and Economic Development

Foreign assistance is clearly critical to Africa's economic life; from all sources, it provides a sizable share of the GNP of the majority of African countries. (See Table I.)

In terms of effective capital inflow, Official Development Assistance (ODA) is vastly more important than the table's figures indicate. For the poorest countries, those with a per capita GNP of $370 or less, ODA is virtually the only source of capital they can use to finance long-term economic expansion. They are too poor to borrow from the private sector and benefit little from the preferential trade policies of the developed countries. For these countries, foreign assistance accounts for an average of 14 per cent of net domestic investment.

Middle-income African states, those with a per capita income in the $380-$1,100 range, still receive funding from aid agencies but on more stringent terms. Because these states raise a greater share of their capital investment needs from the private sector, they stand to benefit more from preferential trade policies.

United States bilateral assistance constitutes about 7 per cent of total ODA to Africa, amounting to some $682 million for 1981. (See Table II.) Multilateral assistance to Africa through the World Bank was estimated at almost $1.5 billion for 1981, of which the U.S. share was just short of $240 million. Assistance from the bilateral programs of other developed countries brought the figure to more than $6 billion. (Over the past twenty years, total assistance to Africa has exceeded $80 billion.)

Major U.S. assistance programs to Africa began in the 1950s. While the objective has remained constant—the graduation of recipient states into economic self-sufficiency—the strategy has varied. It is difficult to think of another area that has spawned such a profusion of overlapping and often contradictory schools of theory and practice. Unfortunately, the sound and the fury of the so-called North-South debate have so far signified, if not exactly nothing, then very little.

The latest shift in U.S. aid strategy follows more than thirty years of seesawing between greater and lesser emphasis on Africa. The current aid program dates from the establishment of the Agency for Inter-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE I
BASIC INDICATORS (1980)

	Per Capita GNP ($)	*Population (million)*	*Official Development Assistance (ODA) (million $)*	*Per Capita ODA ($)*
Gabon	3580	0.5	36	7.2
Reunion	3060	0.5	39.3	78.6
Seychelles	1060	0.1	24	240
Ivory Coast	1040	8.2	162	20.7
Mauritius	830	0.9	32	35.5
Nigeria	670	82.6	26	0.3
Congo—Peoples Republic	630	1.5	82	54.6
Botswana	610	0.7	93	132.8
Swaziland	590	0.5	49	98
Cameroun	560	8.2	272	335
Zambia	500	5.6	270	50.9
Liberia	500	1.8	82	48.2
Saõ Tomé and Principe	490	0.1	3	36
Zimbabwe	470	7.1	12	1.7
Djibouti	450	0.3	23	76.6
Angola	440	6.9	43	6.4
Senegal	430	5.5	309	57.2
Ghana	400	11.3	171	15.5
Kenya	380	15.3	347	22.8
Sudan	370	17.9	563	32.3
Togo	350	2.4	112	46.6
Equatorial Guinea	340	0.3	1	3.3
Lesotho	340	1.3	63	48.4
Mauritania	320	1.6	165	110
Uganda	290	12.8	37	2.9
Madagascar	290	8.5	125	15
Central African Republic	290	2	88	46.3
Guinea	280	5.3	57	11.1
Niger	270	5.2	172	34.4
Zaire	260	27.5	403	15.2
Tanzania	260	18	580	34.3
Sierra Leone	250	3.4	52	15.7
Mozambique	250	10.2	154	15.5
Benin	250	3.4	81	24.5
Gambia	230	0.6	36	60
Guinea-Bissau	200	0.8	53	88.3
Malawi	200	5.8	139	23.9
Rwanda	200	4.9	146	32.4
Comoros	180	0.4	14	35
Upper Volta	180	5.6	199	36.1
Burundi	180	4	92	21.3
Cape Verde	160	0.3	34	113
Mali	140	6.8	190	30.2
Somalia	130	3.8	181	48.9
Ethiopia	130	30.9	175	5.6
Chad	110	4.4	87	20.2

SOURCE: *World Development Report*, 1981, World Bank.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE II
U.S. ECONOMIC AID TO AFRICA
($ millions)

Bilateral Aid	*1977*	*1978*	*1979*	*1980*	*1981*
DA	165	231	248	268	303
PL-480					
Title I	25	62	83	87	118
Title II	48	49	87	105	105
ESF	54	100	53	133	144
Refugees			15	14	12
Total	292	442	486	607	682
Percentage Increase		51	10	25	12
Multilateral Aid					
IBRD total	571	466	583	788	788
(U.S. Share)	144	119	139	197	197
IDA total	394	604	619	794	794
(U.S. Share)	147	172	188	238	238
AF Dev. Fund	142	163	228	280	
(U.S. Share)	11	15	21	25	
Total U.S. Share of Multilateral Aid	302	306	348	460	
Ex-Im Loans	157	551			

SOURCE: Agency for International Development.

national Development (AID) in 1961. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the U.S. policy was to extend bilateral assistance programs to virtually all developing countries, including the newly independent sovereignties of Africa.

The 1963 Clay Report recommended limiting economic assistance programs directed toward Africa.[4] This trend solidified in 1966, when an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act restricted development grants to forty countries and development loans to twenty countries—a net reduction in bilateral assistance to Africa.

The aid programs in the 1960s and early 1970s concentrated on building "infrastructure," such as dams, roads, and power plants. Concerned with the uneven distribution of development benefits, Congress passed the "new directions" legislation in 1973 requiring that U.S. development assistance be aimed at the poorest peoples of the world and at countries attempting to satisfy basic human needs.

[4] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, *Historical Evolution of African Programs*, unclassified briefing report.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Interpreting this new legislation has been difficult. In order to ensure that the poorest countries and the poorest people benefit from an AID project, AID has tended to play it safe. Projects with visible short-term effects have been favored over projects with long-term promise for real economic growth but with less immediately visible impact on local living standards.

New Approaches to African Aid Policy

The basic human needs policy in practice has had sparse results, suggesting that a fresh approach is needed. Development is a complex process. "Its ingredients are familiar—capital, education, technical and managerial skills, favorable culture, availability of natural resources—but their permutations and combinations are always different. Why for example, did Spanish America, founded on an immense gold treasure, lag behind British North America, which developed out of an inhospitable wilderness? The artificial infusion of any single ingredient cannot guarantee an accelerated rate of development."[5]

Thus, resource-rich Zaire lags hopelessly behind resource-poor Singapore. With relatively little in the way of development assistance, Hong Kong is an economic giant compared with Tanzania, one of the major recipients of aid for two decades. How can we account for such discrepancies? The critical factor appears to be mental attitude rather than material input.

Ken Adelman, deputy UN representative, has expressed this view regarding Tanzania: "Over the past few decades Nyerere has carefully designed Tanzania's industry for the 'meeting of peoples' needs,' not for the making of profits. He has done quite well on the latter. Nearly half the 330 companies he has nationalized were bankrupt by 1975. Almost a third of those that are left lose money despite a monopoly in their respective markets. The government taxed incomes as low as $30,000 as high as 95 percent. Wages are set, strikes prohibited, human rights abused, incentives to work non-existent."[6] The new perspective does not simply polarize left versus right; Kenya, with one of the most stalwart free-market systems in Africa, is also attracting negative appraisal.

Consideration of the so-called North-South Dialogue also suggests why a harder line on development assistance is emerging in the West. The genesis and purpose of the dialogue tell a familiar tale. The Third World collectively has articulated a demand for foreign assistance and preferential trade and financial arrangements to help close the gap

[5] Robert Lubar, "Reaganizing the Third World," *Fortune*, November 16, 1981.
[6] Ken Adelman, "The Great Black Hope," *Harpers*, July 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

between rich and poor. This demand has escalated to the point of insisting upon adjustments within the world economic system. Much of the original thrust of the Third World side of the dialogue reinforced a predominantly statist approach to economic development. The debate is typically on a government-to-government basis, with the governments in turn grouped according to blocs representing the developing, the developed, and the socialist states. For the developing bloc, the "Group of 77" (now numbering more than 100) has become the widely recognized synonym. Utilizing its numerical superiority, the group has made the UN a vehicle for its development hopes. Through various related initiatives, from the UN Conference on Trade and Development to the Brandt Commission Report, five major demands have emerged: (1) increased official development assistance; (2) trade preferences and commodity price improvement; (3) ensured access to technology for development; (4) readier financing of developing countries' monetary needs; and (5) increased decisionmaking power in the international economic system.

The magnitude of these demands and the widely divergent methods for dealing with them have produced inevitable confrontations and stalemates. Nevertheless, there has been accommodation in the form of new commodity agreements, an agreement on a common fund, a fruitful Tokyo Round of Trade Negotiations, the creation of new financial facilities in the International Monetary Fund, and a substantial increase in both bilateral and multilateral flows of assistance.

The problem is that the Group of 77's rhetoric has begun to grate on the donor nations, who increasingly resent being cast in the role of rich nations who owe their privileged status to exploitation of the poor. Even the Brandt Commission Report tended to promote this oversimplification, which in turn has become politicized over the years; the Group of 77 has adopted the language of the Eastern socialist bloc, if not the latter's pragmatic approach to economic dealings with the West.

Further, the substance of the Group of 77's argument for a new international economic order is being questioned. The emphasis on transferring resources to the poor and developing nations conflicts with the predominant Western experience in effective economic development: market forces combined with incentives to invest and produce are the most reliable agents of real economic growth. These factors are also perceived to have been decisive in the dramatic economic success of Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore. In black Africa, the Ivory Coast leads in many economic and quality-of-life indicators; the causal link with its low taxation and free-market policies is not lost on observers pondering the lack of progress elsewhere in the region.[7]

[7] *World Development Report*, 1981, Tables 21-23.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Harbingers of a U.S. initiative to promote a new development strategy appeared early in the Reagan administration, indicating far less willingness to accommodate the Group of 77. The abrupt decision to review the law-of-the-sea negotiations, the abandonment of the Carter administration's World Bank energy facility, even the vote against the World Health Organization resolution on the marketing of breast-milk substitutes, are all signs of a more calculated and pragmatic U.S. approach to development issues.

In a speech to the UN General Assembly, Secretary of State Alexander Haig reiterated both the U.S. commitment to development assistance and the new, more pragmatic, approach.[8] The United States has given more than $130 billion over the past three decades in commercial assistance. In 1980 the total commitment was $7.1 billion, almost twice that of any other donor. Many of the poorer nations will have to rely heavily on concessional assistance for years to come because their economic environments do not attract private capital. Haig acknowledged other factors as well: the importance of regional cooperatives; the importance of incentives for individual economic performance; the importance of security and political stability as a condition for development.

Based on these principles, the United States plans to implement a new strategy of development in which three areas would receive immediate attention: (1) a global expansion of trade in which the developing countries would participate fully; (2) an increase in worldwide domestic and international private investment; and (3) closer international cooperation in food and energy. The soundest benefit the industrial nations can provide is not assistance but rather the ability to become economically stronger.

The rumblings in the Reagan administration do not appear at first to be overwhelmingly significant to sub-Saharan Africa. Out of a total 1979 worldwide foreign assistance commitment of $8.8 billion to all of developing Africa, the U.S. share in bilateral programs was only $486 million. Comparative figures for France and the Nordic nations were $1.7 billion and $1.4 billion respectively. Multilateral development banks and other international organizations contributed $1.3 billion.

Nevertheless, if the United States reduced its commitments to Africa, other countries might follow suit. This would be damaging, as virtually every dollar of assistance to Africa is eagerly received and certainly needed. On the other hand, the bilateral aid programs of countries other than the United States are generally tied to projects and arrangements that materially and intentionally benefit their domestic industries.

[8] Alexander M. Haig, Jr., speech to UN General Assembly, September 21, 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Consequently, there would probably be a lag between cutback in U.S. bilateral programs and what might follow from other donors.

Of more immediate concern is the re-evaluation that is beginning at the World Bank and similar institutions. The concessional, soft-loan programs of the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank affiliate, are critically important to the poorest countries. More than 80 per cent of IDA loans, technically called "credits" to distinguish them from World Bank loans, go to countries with a per capita income of $360 or less. Yet it is over the IDA that the Reagan administration, with powerful support from the Congress, is wielding a sharp ax. Again, much of the administration's ire is directed at countries like Mexico and India, which have, in its opinion, the means to rely more on the private market—or certainly to move away from the soft-loan windows to the hard-loan windows of the lending agencies.

Of further concern to sub-Saharan African nations is the new push in the World Bank establishment for tougher criteria for loans. The World Bank report mentioned earlier cites three widespread problems that must be redressed if the countries concerned are to achieve real economic growth. First, overvalued currencies and severe trade restrictions, invoked to preserve foreign exchange, have discouraged local production. Second, government pricing and tax policies have often inhibited agriculture by keeping the cost of imported machinery and fertilizer high while holding payments to farmers low. Third, overreliance on government to provide both the industrial base and key services for the economy has overextended the public sector in many African countries so that it is unable to perform effectively, straining both the budget and skilled manpower resources.

A clearer focus on Africa is also evident in the United States bilateral aid program. Within AID are two programs of concern to Africa. Development Assistance (DA) funds totaling $303 million (26 per cent of the worldwide total) were set out for fiscal 1981. Under the new-directions legislation of 1973, these funds have gone to projects primarily in the agricultural, rural development, and nutrition sectors; family planning is also growing in importance. The second AID program, the Economic Support Fund (ESF), included $144 million for black Africa in fiscal year 1981 (only 6.7 per cent of the worldwide ESF total). These funds are intended for the promotion of economic or political stability in countries of concern to the United States. The lion's share goes to Egypt and Israel. In sub-Saharan Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia, Sudan, and Botswana are currently the leading recipients.

A third category of assistance, jointly administered by AID and the United States Department of Agriculture is the Food for Peace program (PL 480). Food aid of over $200 million has been proposed for fiscal 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Because Congress has been reluctant to appropriate the funds authorized for the program, foreign aid funds have been appropriated under continuing resolutions for three of the past four years. This procedure clearly is psychologically inhibiting, both to the donor and recipient. Foreign aid holds scant political appeal; its promotion in Congress has usually depended on the good will of individual members. With the recession a reality in many congressional districts, members are reluctant to appear to be "giving it away" abroad while cutting back at home.

Another worry is that when the federal budget-cutting exercise enters its next stage, the DA program at AID will bear the full brunt. The ESF can be defended on the grounds of national security, and given the Reagan administration's emphasis on national security it could even grow larger. But the DA program has only the flimsiest of political constituencies. It is appallingly vulnerable to cuts that could have serious repercussions for Africa.

In the meantime, the State Department's Africa Bureau and AID are reviewing programs in order to promote the policies of the Reagan administration. Their basic premise is that sub-Saharan Africa is of vital long-term strategic and economic importance to the United States. They also recognize that the Africa program is going to be limited by budgetary restraints. Emphasis on countries of strategic, economic, and political importance to the United States can be expected. Southern Africa and the Horn are cases in point. A $225 million ESF commitment to Zimbabwe over three years has already been pledged. Progress so far has been limited only by Zimbabwe's inability to identify the projects needing the assistance.

As mentioned earlier, the economic problems facing many African countries have been ascribed in large part to their economic policies. The United States can best influence African states by capitalizing on their increasing interest in trying new policy formulas by promoting policy dialogues. (This is already under way in Sudan, Senegal, Kenya, and Zambia.) AID's role in the policy dialogues has been helped by the confidence of African government leaders in the knowledge, experience, and objectivity of the agency's resident staffs. In addition, U.S. ambassadors play a particularly vital role in fostering economic reform initiatives. And one of the brightest features of the prevailing state of relations with Africa is the high degree of commitment and expertise on the part of individual American ambassadors to African nations.

The crucial question of dealing with Africa's food problem may well emerge as a major focus. The solution of the food problem requires investing in alternative energy sources, to arrest desertification and to correct deficiencies in transportation and storage facilities. To provide indigenous management and research capabilities to handle

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

crucial projects and to strengthen local institutions needed to deal with food and related health and family-planning objectives require a massive commitment to human resource development. In addition, endemic diseases such as onchocersiasis and trypanosomiasis must be eradicated before vast new areas of potentially rich farm land will be habitable. New technologies and cropping systems must be adapted to African conditions, raising the potential returns to farming and slowing the flow of labor to urban areas and outside national territories.

A related object of U.S. bilateral aid policy is to continue the establishment of educational institutions throughout Africa. One of AID's successes is the Pan-African Institute for Development (PAID) in Cameroun and Upper Volta, which provides management training in English and French on a regionwide basis.

All of these programs hold promise for a refocusing of U.S. bilateral programs in Africa. Nevertheless, the congressional appropriations are diminishing. At the same time, World Bank strategies are undergoing reappraisal and other major donors of bilateral aid are experiencing economic constraints, factors that further dim the prospects for reversing Africa's downward trend. In spite of all this, Africa's fortunes could still improve. The possibility exists for a new, coordinated international approach to African development assistance policies. The Cancún summit meeting launched this endeavor. Also encouraging is the burgeoning effort to stimulate private-sector activity in Africa.

The Rationale for Private-Sector Involvement

If the economies of sub-Saharan Africa are to have a serious chance of developing, the administration's argument goes, they must look to the private sector, both domestic and foreign, to provide the required capital and technology. Where economic growth is most evident—Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and Cameroun, to name a few—the role of private enterprise is clearly pronounced. It is also the vital element in the success of Taiwan, South Korea, and similar emergent economies. Nevertheless, it would be futile to pretend that most poorer African countries, beginning national life with the barest minimum of economic organization, have had an option besides placing their resources under state control. If all African needs for capital and technology could be combined (allowing for the varying capacities of African countries to absorb these resources), the sum total of all international concessional assistance realistically available would fall far short. As much concessional and other forms of institutional aid as possible will go to investment in infrastructure. For the rest, the business environment must attract the highest degree of private investment, both domestic and foreign. Sub-Saharan Africa ac-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

counts for a minuscule 2 per cent of total U.S. direct investment abroad ($3.7 billion out of $192 billion in 1979). Sixty per cent of this is in oil, and only 9 per cent is in manufacturing. Because the determining factor for investment is the degree of risk, African and Western states must work to limit risk so that economic growth may thrive.

The Premiums for Private Investment

Private investment will not take place without the expectation of a profit. A substantial "risk premium" must be added to that baseline sum if capital, technology, and management are to be forthcoming. Within host countries, the political element of risk concerns essentially the stability of a regime and in turn the life expectancy of commitments and arrangements that have been negotiated. Economic risk includes the effects of politically overvalued exchange rates, price and credit controls, and import and export licenses. The net effect of these risk factors is to boost the risk premium for investments in many African countries to astronomical levels. The magnitude of these premiums can be an open invitation to charges of exploitation, which in turn would only drive the premium higher.

To the risk premium must be added a premium for market efficiency. Small market size, inefficient distribution and high transportation costs, administration delays, cultural disparities—all entail considerable premiums to justify investment. These risks are decidedly over and above typical business risks. Consequently, few markets in Africa provide investment opportunities that cover all the costs and premiums, ensuring a net profit outside the national boundaries.

To attract private-sector activity, then, the host country must create an environment conducive to it. As the experience of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea proves, the presence or absence of raw materials is not the critical determinant; rather, a convincing public policy must be put forth to foster and support actively the private sector. And, as those societies have demonstrated, it is possible to achieve this end without sacrificing humanitarian and social objectives.

One useful activity that AID could undertake would be to identify and package joint venture opportunities. Many American firms are reluctant to initiate investigations of joint venture possibilities in higher-risk markets. By identifying domestic partners and developing proposals that U.S. management could evaluate, AID would be performing a useful service. The Trade and Development Program, set up to finance feasibility studies and other planning services for major development projects, could be adapted to this role. The firms that decide to invest in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

joint ventures thus identified could pay for preparation costs plus a fee for a revolving fund that could be used for more investigations of a similar nature.

The most important element in improving the environment for private investment concerns the government's commitment to perceiving its assistance program as an integral part of national economic policy. Other donor governments, principally members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), use their aid budgets to pursue short- and long-term trade, investment, and financial objectives in Third World markets. They recognize that governments and multilateral institutions, not corporations, are the leading players in almost all major economic transactions in developing countries. They understand the potential of Third World markets, which have grown at a 7 per cent annual rate over the past decade. These other donors see nothing inconsistent in designing development programs that also advance the economic interests of their domestic industries. Despite these examples, Washington's response has been very low-keyed. Simple coordination among departments and agencies operating in developing countries has left much to be desired. More concretely, the administration has been cutting back the programs of the Export-Import Bank. Export credit and finance programs are a major resource of OECD economies in reducing the risk premiums for their industries. For the United States to be trimming back this program amounts to what some have termed "unilateral disarmament" in a real economic war. As is the case with consumer credit, financing is often a more important factor than price in international markets. While less than 6 per cent of U.S. exports are financed in part by Eximbank, the proportion is 29 per cent for France and 35 per cent for Japan. An even greater disparity exists in the use of "mixed" and "parallel" credits to support exports. Mixing credits is an export financing technique developed by France in the late 1950s that mixes or blends commercial or official export credits with concessional foreign assistance credits. The object is to "sweeten" a financing sufficiently to ensure the sale for the country's exporters. Mixed credit usage by OECD nations increased from $212 million in 1975 to $2.6 billion in 1980. The United States, however, with the exception of some marginal activity in Egypt and Zimbabwe, traditionally has opposed mixed credits on the grounds that support for exports should be kept separate from concessional foreign assistance.

A comparison of the breakdowns of Japanese and United States bilateral assistance programs (see Tables III and IV) illuminates the practical approach to aid programs of our competition. By concentrating upon upgrading the skills of the poor, emphasis on the basic human needs has helped direct untold volumes of project development, with all

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE III
U.S. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, 1979–1980
(percentage allocation by category)

Category	*Percent of Total* *1979*	*1980*
Food and Nutrition	50	51
Population	15	15
Education and Human Resources	8	8
Health	11	10
Sahel Program	6	6
Other Activities	10	10

SOURCE: Agency for International Development, OECD.

the associated trade and investment, to the competition. For instance, in the area of technical training, which after food production is perhaps the most important objective of African governments, the United States appears to be slipping behind its competitors. As a rule, technicians tend to promote purchasing from the countries in which they received their technical training. In 1978, there were 3,160 AID-sponsored Third World technical students in the United States against 9,258 for Britain, 4,509 for Germany, and 8,135 for France. Even Belgium and Austria outgained the United States, with 4,405 and 3,923 students respectively. Similarly, the 3,030 technical trainees in the United States were outpaced by 4,959 in Britain, 26,113 in Germany, and 7,669 in France.

Still, it is in the use of mixed and parallel credits to promote national exports through the use of aid funds that the United States has the most serious disadvantage. In 1976 the United States had international construction and engineering contracts valued at $8.6 billion, or 16 per cent of the world market. By 1979 that had declined to $1.9 billion, or 5 per cent of the world market. A large part of this loss is the result of mixed credit financing, which in turn is a simple manifestation of the desire of

TABLE IV
CATEGORIES OF JAPANESE BILATERAL ODA
(per cent of total)

	1977	*1978*	*1979*
Capital Projects	74	67	74
Technical Cooperation	9	11	11
Nonproject Aid	17	22	15

SOURCE: Agency for International Development, OECD.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some governments aggressively to support their industries in Third World markets.

France, Britain, and other industrial states are committed to increasing the already high proportion of their aid budgets earmarked for bilateral programs. While a similar shift should prove productive for the United States, it would not necessarily imply abandoning efforts to improve small-scale agriculture or other programs addressing basic human needs. Rather, this new emphasis should suggest that such programs are more effectively administered by the World Bank and other multilateral institutions.

Conclusion

The United States must demonstrate its credibility as a dependable and positive force for African development. This will require continuing support for the multilateral development banks and institutions. Although the United States presently absorbs the lion's share of Third World exports, administration credibility would be boosted further by providing greater market access for the exports of developing countries.

The Reagan administration also plans to emphasize better coordination of the various foreign aid and economic programs abroad. The activities of the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the various Agency for International Development (AID) programs, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, and others all contribute to Third World development and further U.S. economic and commercial interests. Yet their coordination is minimal, reflecting the absence of a master plan for development.

The United States and developing countries must initiate a truly open dialogue on the issue of economic reform. The administration will focus on the mutuality of benefits that would follow from policies designed to encourage foreign and private investment and the fostering of open trade policies. Efforts will be made to strengthen the staffs or AID missions to permit more initiative at the program levels. It is imperative that recipient states realize what they can do to reduce risk premiums associated with foreign and domestic investment. In particular, they can address the taxation and regulatory requirements and bureaucratic hindrances that overly inhibit business activity.

The administration is committed to providing adequate program support to business in Third World markets. Washington is finally realizing that it should defend markets that would be its own if the related transactions occurred on a purely commercial basis. Thus, on October 15, 1981, Reagan announced the administration's intent to increase cofinancing with the multilateral development banks. Initiatives in this direction

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are imperative, together with continued and coordinated support for the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Unfortunately, budget constraints will probably delay strengthening the Trade and Development Program. Nevertheless, with statutory guidance from Congress, there will be initiatives to introduce more flexibility into programs financed under the Development Assistance Program of AID. One reason the Economic Support Fund is so popular is the freedom it gives its administrators to tackle projects on a case-by-case basis. If similar methods could be incorporated in other major program areas, effectiveness would be dramatically enhanced.

To encourage private-sector development, the Bureau of Private Enterprise within AID plans to send special "reconnaissance" missions to selected developing countries to investigate opportunities for financing projects that would become prototypes for future U.S. bilateral assistance. Significantly, private-enterprise-oriented Kenya, Ivory Coast, and Zimbabwe are the only countries in Africa to be included. Peter McPherson, AID administrator, reiterated the administration's intention to leave the large-scale public sector infrastructure projects to the multilateral agencies and to focus bilateral programming on specific "seed capital, job-generating projects aimed at helping the Third World private sector help itself." The emphasis will be on "the transfer of private expertise and capital rather than taxpayers' dollars."

The administration's message to developing countries is clear: it will provide decisive material assistance if those countries show themselves to be committed to private-sector expansion. For as in past success stories of developed countries, it has been the free play of market forces that has determined real, long-term economic growth. This was the point emphasized by the president at Cancún. Properly understood in Africa, it may play a similar part there.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Comparative Strategy

AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

RICHARD B. FOSTER
Editor-in-Chief

Comparative Strategy addresses itself to America's primary problem of formulating a comprehensive strategy that molds political, economic, and military factors into one integrated structure—a "grand strategy" for the conduct of its international affairs. The journal offers articles of high quality and great timeliness from outstanding authorities in their respective fields.

Some articles from Volume 2:

SALT II and American Strategic Considerations
Paul Nitze

The Soviet Theater Threat—Today and Tomorrow
Brigadier Kenneth Hunt

The Middle East Power Balance in Transition
Joseph Churba

African Security: Facts and Fantasies
Kenneth L. Adelman

The Soviet Navy in Theory and Practice
George M. Connell

Issued quarterly: Volume 3 $36.00

Personal subscriptions (payable by personal check only) may be obtained at half-price. For subscriptions outside North America, add $8.00 for postage and handling.

Published for—
The Strategic Studies Center,
SRI International

Crane, Russak & Company
3 East 44th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017
(212) 867-1490

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA: AT AMERICA'S SERVICE?

by W. Scott Thompson

Africa holds a peculiar fascination for American policymakers. Last of the major world regions to gain independence and a place in the considerations of the world's chanceries, it has suffered the abuse of attempted indifference as elites tried to relegate it to lower orders of import. Yet the attempts ultimately fail. The continent maintains a healthy proportion of the industrial world's attention, for better or worse.

An inquiry into Africa's importance to the U.S. in itself requires answers to two important questions. Firstly, what do we mean by "Africa"? Do we include Egypt, indisputably the key Arab state in Washington's ambitious desire to achieve peace in the Middle East; and do we include Libya with its worldwide threat to stability, diverting from other chores everything from U.S. policymakers to AWACS?[1] What about the Maghreb with its war — and its substantial supply of gas to customers in New England? And South Africa, about whose strategically important minerals we hear so much? Is the east coast, including the Horn, included in the same discussion, insofar as we think of it today as the Indian Ocean's vital Western sea line of communication; or the west coast, insofar as it figures in calculations in South Atlantic stability, along with Brazil and Argentina?

Africa is increasingly like Asia: large, diverse, its differing areas relating to different regions, arcs, and zones of interest for U.S. foreign policy. What the Carter administration first conceptualized as Africa was merely one dimension — the black-white confrontation — of one part of the continent, the south, reinforced at times by the sometimes radical and always voluble states in West and East Africa like Nigeria and Tanzania, which have been at the forefront of African diplomacy on southern African issues. Certainly the venerable leaders of Francophone Africa wanted as little as possible to do with the "Africa" that Carter reconstituted from his own image of the earlier civil rights struggle in the American South, from which he had been largely absent. So to try to rank Africa in the hierarchy of U.S. interests is no longer simple or even,

[1] American AWACS stationed in Saudi Arabia in 1981 were used to protect President Sadat on his summer trip to the Sudan, a time when Libya was threatening his security.

W. Scott Thompson is Associate Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

perhaps, possible; it is too bound up with related interests of all the continents.

Secondly, the question of where Africa fits in America's hierarchy is complicated by the moral question that has accompanied Africa policy from the start. Precisely because of the continent's historic backwardness, its purported abuse by external powers, and the repugnance moreover attached to South Africa's policy of apartheid, Africa policy has resisted formulation in the strategic context of America's broad national interests. True, policy faithful to American traditions will always be infused by ideals and moral concern; the question is of the mix, but with respect to Africa it has been difficult to build a national consensus that accommodates both moral concern and more concrete U.S. interests — like trade and trade routes, investments, and, most importantly, the need to counter Soviet interventions wherever they occur.[2]

At issue is a legitimate disagreement. One school of thought, which reached its zenith during the Carter administration, argues that resisting Soviet advances in Africa is best done by ending apartheid and otherwise accommodating black African concerns. In this schema, the natural nationalism of all African states is the best antidote to Soviet assertiveness. Where it has not been, as in Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, and elsewhere, either patience is called for or the regimes are praised as the best available alternatives.

The other school, while acknowledging the repugnance of apartheid, sees at least equally obscene human rights abuses in black Africa (from genocide in Uganda to slavery in Mauritania) and wishes to secure South Africa's cooperation in settling dangerous conflicts in southern Africa — and would like to confront Soviet imperialism in Africa directly. This perspective argues that the price paid to secure South African cooperation would be well worth it if Pretoria then helped reduce the communist threat in the region and improved the lot of its nonwhites. The question for the Reagan administration, which embodies this school, is: What is a reasonable price?

Africa's Emergence

President Kennedy ushered a far simpler Africa into American consciousness by making the assistant secretary for African affairs his first major appointment in foreign affairs. Until Kennedy's death, Africa was an important card in his foreign policy, one that gave his entire foreign policy

[2] The distinction between idealism and pragmatism becomes flimsiest here precisely because the motive behind countering Soviet moves is surely as idealistic — probably more so — than countering apartheid. Apartheid does not threaten the freedom of men and women in America, Europe, or elsewhere; it has not built a military machine greater in almost every dimension than America's.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a burnish of idealism.[3] President Johnson's administration, preoccupied with Vietnam, tried putting Africa on the back burner, but persistent attempts of the Soviets and Chinese to outmaneuver each other and to gain important footholds in strategically important countries, plus civil wars, genocide, and coups d'état, kept the continent in the headlines and, according to numerous participants, in policy discussions.

Nixon tried more systematically to downgrade the continent—by in effect subordinating black African interests to what then seemed like increasingly important ties in southern Africa. Nor did that work either; a growing internal constituency with an interest in African affairs, reinforced by the general growth of radical sentiment in the land, caused the attempt to boomerang; the presidential design paper, NSSM-39, became a war cry for administration opponents.[4] Unanticipated by Washington, the Lisbon coup d'état of 1974 changed southern African realities more than any event since the Boer War, but worked contrary to administration purposes. Even Henry Kissinger, whose memoirs of his first years in power barely mention African matters,[5] was finally forced to take heed of the continent, when, in 1975, the persisting war in Rhodesia and the "north-south" clamor for a new deal, took him to southern Africa with promises of a new U.S. dispensation—but not to Nigeria, which thrice rebuffed his request for an invitation.[6]

In fact, the stage was already set for Jimmy Carter's Africa policy, in which Africa was to become a major—and sometimes the only—preoccupation of U.S. policy. It was a status Africa could not sustain, since larger issues engaging substantive U.S. interests were bound eventually to weigh heavier in the struggle for Washington's attention.

Flights of Idealism

The problem for the Carter administration was at least twofold. In the first place, the administration tended to promise abroad more than it could deliver. One senior official, present during discussions between Ambassador Andrew Young and Nigerian leaders in the heydey of the administration, noted shortly thereafter that Young had committed Carter—and the United States—to do "within six months far more than would ever be possible, raising hopes which [would] then have to be

[3] See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), chap. 21.

[4] For a discussion and reprint of NSSM 39; see Anthony Lake, *The Tar Baby Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).

[5] See Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), index and references passim.

[6] See Donald B. Easum, "Nigerian-American Relations," *Africa Report*, July-August 1981, p. 53. At the material time, Easum was U.S. ambassador in Lagos.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dashed."[7] The implication from the context—that promises regarding *military* options for "solving" the South African "problem" had been offered—casts doubt about whether a sense of reality embued the new administration. To be sure, these promises were made in the style of much Africa diplomacy wherein reality and ideals are intermeshed, but this only sustains the argument that such verbal "commitments" furthered Africa's, rather than Washington's, end: to permit black African aspirations to determine the content of U.S. policy.[8]

The air of unreality pervading Washington's discussions of Africa was at times astonishing; a group of prominent Africanists and senior Carter administration policymakers once informally observed that, since a decision to "settle" the Panama Canal issue had been made at the White House that particular day in 1977, a decision to "settle" the South African "issue" could be made the next. The incredulity in European and other chanceries from such attitudes, as well as the unrealistic hopes raised in Africa, contributed in neither case to America's global position.[9]

Another difficulty was that the policy collided with another set of realities that would increasingly preoccupy the Carter administration: the Soviet strategic threat to U.S. interests. Considering the Carter administration's growing preoccupation with the Soviet Union in 1979 and 1980, it is arguable that the Reagan administration's subsequent reorientation of U.S. policy toward Soviet expansionism was in some ways less significant than the grudging reorientation that took place about three-quarters of the way through the Carter administration.

"Carter I" vs. "Carter II"

How much ideological ground the Carter administration was forced by reality and events to traverse becomes clear when one recalls Young's famous 1977 statement, agreed to by the president himself, that Cuban troops were "stabilizing" Angola.[10] But when Soviet antisub-

[7] Interview in Washington, May 1977, with a senior Foreign Service officer. Charles William Maynes, assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs in the Carter administration, has written that the administration "was too careless in its use of symbolism. It was in trouble almost immediately on whether the South African government was legitimate and on what one man/one vote meant in South African terms." See the *Los Angeles Times*, September 20, 1981; Maynes cites only the public issues.

[8] It is interesting to compare President Kennedy's attitude toward similar pressures from the opposite side. Theodore C. Sorensen notes that Kennedy, rather than permit Portugal to "dictate his African policy," was prepared to "forego" the Portuguese bases under consideration entirely. *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 538.

[9] Another example—though in this case from a discussion in which the present author did not participate—comes from German sources. In his meeting with South African Premier Vorster, Vice President Mondale told Chancellor Schmidt that "America proposed to lean on South Africa until apartheid collapsed." "And what will you put in its place if it collapses?" Schmidt is quoted as asking. "We will worry about that when it happens," Mondale supposedly replied.

[10] *Washington Post*, April 17, 1977.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

marine-warfare missions began flying out of Luanda later in 1977, and when a Soviet general arrived in Addis Ababa to command Cuban, Soviet, and Ethiopian forces in 1978 for a dramatic reconquest of the Somali-occupied Ogaden, the Carter administration had to begin to notice the shifting balance of power in the region and its effect on the world. It seemed that whenever policymakers balked at taking the strategic map into account the Soviets made more moves, such as occupying the island of Dahlac just off the Eritrean coast, which posed a strategic threat to Saudi Arabia on the other side of the Red Sea.[11] And policymakers were forced more and more to note that conflicts throughout the continent were being fought with Soviet arms. Moscow's friend Idi Amin was overthrown by Tanzanian forces increasingly armed by Moscow. POLISARIO fought Morocco with Algerian-supplied Soviet arms, while Libya spread its Moscow-supplied arsenal in literally every direction.

Still, the Carter administration was never comfortable looking at Africa geopolitically. The old dichotomy between ideals and substantive interests began to be seen as a conflict between siding with "Africa" and assuming a "globalist" position that, by implication and without any necessary connection, was associated with a benign approach to South Africa. David Ottaway, a journalist sympathetic to the Carter policy, expressed this point of view well when he asked whether the architects of the Carter Africa policy "were losing out to the 'globalists' . . . who emphasized the centrality of U.S.-Soviet competition in regional affairs." "Since mid 1978," he went on, "the State Department 'Africanists,' and even President Carter himself, had found themselves fighting on the defensive in their effort to align American interests more closely with black Africa than with the 'pro-Western,' white-dominated regimes of Southern Africa. Since the administration's Africa policy had explicitly rejected a cold-war competition in Africa, and took majority rule as its central tenet, a return to the globalist approach would represent a fundamental shift, with possibly widespread negative repercussions in black Africa."[12] The question, of course, was whether it was ever appropriate for America to conceptualize its interests in terms of how another group of states envisaged theirs, and whether it was reasonable for Washington to reject by intellectual fiat a "cold-war competition in Africa," as if such were a product of American machinations and desires, rather than the real-world result of U.S. attempts to counter Soviet moves (or even the reverse). The process was like Humpty Dumpty's use of words.[13]

---

[11] For background to the strategic importance of the Red Sea, see Nimrod Novik, *On the Shores of Bab Al-Mandab: Soviet Diplomacy and Regional Dynamics*" (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1979).

[12] David Ottaway, "Africa: U.S. Policy Eclipse," *Foreign Affairs* vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 637-638.

[13] "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Still, for all the reluctance that the Carter administration's foreign policy elite felt after Afghanistan in aligning U.S. policy toward Africa with its global interests — a reluctance that was seen in the continuing policy struggle on every major issue involving Africa — what had to be done was finally begun in this second period of their rule. Thus Washington was heavily pressed to supply the king of Morocco with badly needed arms for fighting his war against POLISARIO in the former Spanish Sahara. And if the United States were to expect naval-basing privileges from Somalia and Kenya to counter the growing Soviet naval strength in the Indian Ocean, it knew it would have to look favorably on Mogadishu's and Nairobi's arms requests also, even if that entailed risking involvement in issues extraneous to U.S. interests.[14] If this was "globalism," it was also realism, especially in an age of interdependence, where policy toward a great continent like Africa could hardly be cordoned off, especially given its strategic location relative to the West's oil lines of communication. But the Africanists could not themselves bridge the gap between their policy of sentiment and the necessary globalist perspective. And so they were replaced, like Andrew Young, or rendered harmless at higher levels. By spring 1980, when Secretary of State Vance resigned over an ideologically related issue, the idealists had lost their sting.

Realism Ascendant: The Case of Namibia

Thus, when the Reagan administration came to Washington, a national consensus on the need to stop Soviet advances in Africa already existed. True, there was substantial backsliding from within the professional foreign affairs bureaucracy, but such was predictable, even if difficult to overcome.[15] The principal question for the new administration's Africanists was instead where in Africa to put their modest political capital — modest because of the decline in aid budgets and resulting decline in leverage, and modest because the attention span of senior policymakers on any one area is necessarily limited.

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master — that's all." (Lewis Carroll, *Through the Looking Glass*, chap. 6.)

"Cold-war competition in Africa" had thus become a contorted code for American policy that took into account the real world of Soviet action, and thus was considered bad policy.

[14] Discussing basing options with the author in spring 1980, a Carter administration official observed that the Somalis sought American arms "largely for their own purposes" and that if the United States had a base in Somalia, it might not only get involved in Somalia's interests, but "*American blood* might be shed as well!" The emotional observations, intended to show the unreason in American aid to Somalia, were uttered as if they constituted breakthrough in the study of geopolitics and strategy.

[15] And, in fairness, such backsliding was in some measure the result of the slow pace at which the new administration produced the kind of bureaucratic papers — as opposed to high policy speeches — to which the professional bureaucracy was accustomed to respond. Interviews, U.S. Department of State, January-June 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It was wisely concluded that both the greatest problem and opportunity for U.S. diplomacy lay in southern Africa. This meant that within a few years, the aid tables would show declines in programs among old friends to the north whose problems had not abated, and sharp rises of disbursements where the hour was critical. It meant that, as a starter, Pretoria's involvement would have to be secured if the U.S. were to succeed; Carter had shown the limits of how successfully Washington could batter Pretoria, and how much useful capital could be consumed in the effort. The Carter administration had used rhetoric and got nowhere. The question for the new government was how to restore Pretoria's willingness to deal with the West: by verbal encouragement, of which white South Africa had long been deprived, or by deeds, which sophisticated students of realpolitik would surely prefer. Now that Zimbabwe was independent (and ostensibly friendly), this policy dilemma revolved around Namibia–Southwest Africa.

From Pretoria's point of view, any settlement in Namibia was suspect from the start since, at least in the short term, even the most favorable terms would mean a diminution of South African control in the territory, thus worsening its strategic dilemma. After all, defense planners there, in the most matter-of-fact way, consider their country already "at war" against Marxist forces, something they have no trouble defining: forces coterminous with (but not identical to) their black-ruled neighbors, encouraged and armed directly or indirectly by Moscow and its surrogates, and dedicated to the overthrow of the South African republic. The capture of Soviet advisers in Angola during the South African intervention of August 1981 did not assuage Pretoria's fears—despite U.S. liberal opinion discounting it.[16] An independent Namibia at the very least gives these forces greater scope and range. UN sponsorship of the attempts to settle the Namibian question must also be suspect from South Africa's vantage point given the proportion of General Assembly time dedicated to antiapartheid resolutions in general and the financial support and diplomatic recognition extended to SWAPO in particular.

The pertinent mechanism of influence was the so-called Contact Group, consisting of five Western powers, then all members of the UN Security Council (the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, and Canada). They constituted themselves as honest brokers in 1976 to break the deadlock between Pretoria and the United Nations on Namibia after the passage of UN Resolution 385, which called for free elections under UN supervision in the territory. Using transparent delaying tactics,

[16] "So what else is new?," the *New York Times* asked editorially on September 3, 1981. The customary manner of discounting new evidence of Soviet forward military moves was, in such circles, to act as if it was long since known anyway; or if it looked imminent (as with a Soviet invasion of Poland) to discount it by being first to accept its "inevitability."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

South Africa bought time during which it sought to reduce permanently the threat from its principal opponent there — SWAPO, the Soviet-armed South West Africa People's Organization. Pretoria then held "unilateral" elections in 1978 in the territory, won by the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, a political entity not unsusceptible to South African suasion.

Blame for the failure of the UN or the Contact Group to achieve their objective of elections respected on both sides does not fall wholly on Pretoria's side. It is too little appreciated in the West that the Contact Group has not itself always acted impartially in its attempts to achieve a settlement, that is, if one views the objective to be a settlement that not only gives Namibia juridical independence but also satisfies South African security concerns.[17] In fact, not a few of those involved in the Contact Group, one would gather, have viewed the group as having a completely different objective: to serve as the mechanism through which South Africa would be intimidated or tricked into accepting a settlement that would be a mere cover for an early unraveling of the situation in favor of SWAPO forces. That these forces could establish a radical Marxist state was deemed either irrelevant or desirable, and those who feared such an outcome were often seen as alarmist.

The existence of this bias stems from the milieu in which diplomacy operated during the late 1970s, even among the relatively conservative forces represented by the Contact Group — themselves changing because of the leftward trend in their own domestic political affairs. South Africa has often accused the group of partiality. Apart from these claims, I witnessed the group's spirit in the comment of one of its members. Before the Security Council had pronounced on Walvis Bay,[18] an enclave surrounded on land by Namibia but belonging to South Africa, this group member observed that "we have told Nujoma [SWAPO's leader] to go along with the agreement through which Walvis Bay remains for the moment in South African hands. After independence as we told him, SWAPO would of course take it."

The opposite concern, whether South Africa would abide by an agreement without interfering in the internal affairs of a postsettlement Namibia, is also pertinent. Regarding negotiability, however, the cards are stacked in Pretoria's favor: its forces have occupied the territory for more than sixty years. Many influential South Africans strongly oppose any

[17] To be sure, U.S. policymakers involved in the Contact Group during the Carter years would quibble with the notion that it was their responsibility to satisfy South African security concerns. But if so, then the point that they were not honest brokers is sustained. Pretoria had no interest in negotiating a withdrawal from Namibia–Southwest Africa unless it could contrive to improve its security in doing so.

[18] In 1978 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution S432, by which the integration of Walvis Bay with Namibia was required. The legal merit of the decision was, at best, problematic; the practical outcome could only have been gauged to harden the South African intent of maintaining its ownership of the enclave, given the intent of other powers to maintain similarily detached enclaves (Alaska, Gibralter, Ulster, Macao, among others).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

relinquishment of authority at a time when the absolute power of the far right is growing in the republic's white political circle.[19] From the point of view of most white South Africans, who perceive the international community's attitudes toward injustice in Africa as hypocritical,[20] the double standard of the rest of the world on Namibia can thus be seen as substantively, if not morally, more hypocritical than its own.

The South African pressures against relinquishment start with the conviction that—as one soldier put it—"I'd rather fight them [on the Angolan border] than on the Limpopo."[21] A more sophisticated strategic concern in the governing elite encompasses the whole configuration of white and black power in southern Africa. Control of Namibia brings with it control of the Caprivi strip, a critical panhandle between Zambia and Botswana and touching Zimbabwe, permitting reconnaissance of—and continued leverage against—all those black African states. Control of Namibia allows the continuation of support for Jonas Savimbi in Angola, whose prospects are by no means hopeless, controlling as he does so great a proportion of his country. And a SWAPO government in Namibia might occasion the collapse of UNITA[22]—barring a settlement including them in power in Luanda—and thus the possibility of (as South Africans see it) a third Cuban-Angolan invasion of Zaire's Shaba province. Were radical-sponsored forces able to splinter Zaire this time, the implications for Western mineral access alone would be enormous; a resulting shift in the internal balances of possibly a dozen neighboring states might also be expected, obviously affecting the balance of forces continentally and indeed worldwide.

Thus, the Reagan administration's assumption that South Africa needs to be convinced of the negotiators' good faith is not idle. Any hope of a peaceful solution would require evidence of a change of heart on the part of the West and a willingness to deal with South Africa realistically. In addition, South African officials remind Americans that once before—in 1975, under a Republican president—they thought they were following the thrust of U.S. policy in invading Angola, and were "abandoned" at the critical hour, as one put it. On the other hand, gambling on the good faith of a government like Angola's, trusting it to

---

[19] As Chester Crocker has written, "The Carter Administration helped the National Party ... achieve its most massive electoral victory ever," through "18 months of verbal flagellation and lectures from the American pulpit." "South Africa: Strategy for Change," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 59, no. 2, p. 326.

[20] Witness the absence of public outcry from the usual political circles when authenticated reports circulated internationally in August 1981 concerning the survival of the slave trade in Mauritania.

[21] Author's discussions with South African defense forces, South Africa, June 1980.

[22] Given the intricately intertwined relationship of UNITA and its backers on the one hand and that of SWAPO and MPLA forces on the other. On this point, I have benefited from reading the forthcoming Ph.D. thesis of Stephen Davis, "Insurgency in South Africa 1960-1980: The Making of an Explosion," Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1981. Davis's thesis, however, reaches different conclusions from those herein.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

relinquish Cuban troops upon the creation of a unity government in Luanda, as the Carter administration fervently believed, is to indulge an illusion. Or so Pretoria would see it. Since Angola's MPLA government depends on the Cubans for far more than just counterinsurgency for survival, the South Africans have a point.

It may well be the case that any agreement between the Reagan administration and the South African government will prove unacceptable to the mainstream of black Africa (though in fact Washington has by no means ruled out—it could not—a unitary SWAPO solution). The possibility of black Africa's negative response must be measured against the opposite scenario. No agreement envisaged during the Carter administration's tenure would have gained the support of the South African government. Since Pretoria was in control of Namibia, that meant no agreement at all. Nor is it likely that an agreement developed by a post-Reagan administration with the predispositions of the Carter administration would elicit South African adherence to an agreement.

On the other hand, a settlement of the Namibian issue under new conditions, however contrary to the received wisdom of black Africa, might dampen, if not wholly extinguish, the military dimension of the conflict in the territory. It is likely that a new government, were SWAPO excluded or forced to share power meaningfully (that is, in such a way that it could not establish a one-party, electionless, Marxist dictatorship), would be supported quietly by moderate and conservative African states, particularly regionally important states like wealthy Ivory Coast and Gabon, and strategically vital Zaire. If a coalition government spurred economic development and provided genuine openings for Namibian blacks, and if the South African guiding hand diminished as the regime took hold and the insurgent threat declined, support for an independent Namibia would widen substantially. That such an eventuality is possible may well be precisely what opponents of a negotiated solution fear: that SWAPO would be outmaneuvered and gradually worn down.

The Reagan Style

Despite the possibility of getting Namibian negotiations back on track, the Reagan administration has continued to arouse skepticism and suspicion concerning its intentions toward Namibia in particular and toward Africa in general in many Africans (and some Americans as well). These doubts derive more from matters of style than substance, as can be seen with respect to perceptions at three levels.

The first concern is the company the administration early on kept with respect to Africa. Senator Jesse Helms, certainly as far from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Carter's advisers as possible on the political spectrum, appeared to hold enormous power in the early days of the administration, thanks to his efforts in the Reagan campaign and his mastery of senatorial procedures.

Helms's early influence, however, particularly in slowing the confirmation process of presidential appointments, was a product of Washington infighting, not a sign of substantive influence on policy;[23] he failed to force the appointment of a secondary official in the Africa Bureau's ranks, and there has been no further sign of direct policy influence from his office or those of like-minded associates.

The problem, of course, goes deeper. People connected with the Reagan campaign, even before the political conventions, were making claims about the administration's future governmental intentions that dismayed not only the antiapartheid movement, but also those seeking consistency in U.S. policy. Thus, one member of the Reagan campaign foreign policy advisory panel told a South African television audience in June 1980 to await the advent of the Reagan administration before pressing further their strategy toward domestic blacks, since they could well assume that the new government in Washington would be better disposed to the white regime in Pretoria.[24] Although the Reagan campaign disavowed such prognostications and others tried to offset such advice,[25] the damage was done.

Secondly, there were the president's own statements. In his March 1981 interview with Walter Cronkite, he suggested that because South Africa had stood beside America in every war, because its minerals were of great importance, and because a serious effort was being made to remove apartheid, there was no reason for the United States not to be helpful to South Africa.[26]

No doubt the president believed what he said; possibly this was part of a strategy to reassure South Africa in order to obtain a Namibian settlement. On the other hand, Pretoria at that point had ample evidence of the new administration's better disposition, through its helpful deeds across the entire range of its Africa diplomacy — from Washington's willingness to stand up to Soviet adventurism to its willingness to help out

---

[23] Helms's actions were almost exclusively directed toward Haig's early appointments, few of whom had worked for the election of Reagan and none of whom was identified with conservative circles as such. Haig's early stealing of a march on his White House colleagues, as well as setting the stage for much further conflict, resulted in an absence of support from the White House for those nominees — a vacuum Helms filled, until the White House in fact pulled the rug out from under him. The White House could have forced Helms's objections aside at any point — had it not wished to make its own point to the State Department's leaders.

[24] See the *New York Times*, June 13, 1980, for commentary thereon.

[25] This author, a one-time member of a Reagan campaign advisory panel, and in South Africa at the material time, pointed out to senior South African officials that even in Britain upon the accession to power of Mrs. Thatcher, there was policy continuity toward Zimbabwe, and that, ultimately, the same would be true of Washington in a Reagan administration.

[26] *CBS-TV, March 3, 1981.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

old friends. What the president hoped to gain by such comments, then, is not clear; even a popular president can kick only so many sacred cows.

If, for example, Washington decided to support UNITA in southern Angola, such public candor on South Africa would make support for a new Angola policy more expensive. South Africa, with nowhere to go, needs no friendly public words — or so the strategic argument would go. "Words, being cheap," as Clausewitz wrote,[27] could have been saved for other purposes in Africa, where rhetoric on great issues is appreciated even where its relation to policy is strained at best. "La parole est creatrice," is an old Bembara saying. For that matter, votes — or abstentions — at the UN are also cheap, and the Reagan administration might have achieved more had it abstained, as Britain had, concerning the General Assembly's censure of South Africa's August 1981 intervention in Angola, despite the lack of "even-handedness" in the resolution.[28] In addition, U.S. opposition to apartheid is in any case deeply felt across the board among senior U.S. policymakers — a point that needs emphasis as Washington helps Pretoria make the transition from racist pariah to multiracial and powerful commonwealth.

The third difficulty lies especially in the strategic argument. The very notion of national strategy and strategic thinking is foreign to a great segment of America and to America's foreign policy elite, especially those, ironically, who grew up during the Vietnam War. The assumption that strategy is intrinsically hostile to humanitarian concerns is never far from the surface. Yet strategy is morally neutral. It connotes the effort to use the interrelationship of parts of a policy and of reality to accomplish goals efficaciously. But the American tradition involves a certain amount of high posture (which all too often deteriorates into posturing) to which the effort toward a conscious and ambitious strategy is antithetical in style.

The Strategic Perspective

In matters of strategy, America's Africa policy now has a comparative advantage. Indeed, it might be fair to say not only that the United States for the first time has a *strategy* with respect to Africa, but also that U.S. policy toward Africa is more strategic in conception than is U.S. policy toward any other region. This does not answer the question of whether the policy is good or bad for Africa — the criterion that is so often and mistakenly used by U.S. foreign policy writers to judge U.S. policy.

---

[27] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret ed. and trans. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 202.

[28] See the *New York Times*, September 4, 1981. State Department officials commented that they would not "choose between black and white" in dealing with South Africa, but given the near universal condemnation of white South African policy such neutrality was bound to appear as partisanship. See, also, the *Washington Post*, August 31, 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rather, in strategy, policy toward Africa is understood in its interrelatedness with U.S. policy toward the world. Thus, the question for U.S. strategists is not how does America fit into Africa's perspective, but rather how does Africa fit into ours. Africans can presumably define and pursue their own interests without American patronization.

Thus, U.S. leverage on a Namibian settlement is being used as leverage on Angola's ruling regime to rid itself of its Cuban guarantors and to make a deal with UNITA. But Washington has no illusions as to that possibility. The resulting U.S. leverage on Angola, such as it is, can be used on South Africa for concessions on its side in the next round of serious Namibian negotiations between the Contact Group and interested southern African parties.

At every level Africa's relation to the rest of the world has strategic impact. South Africa's desire to end its worldwide isolation gives Washington substantial influence in Pretoria, as we have seen, to achieve a settlement for Namibia or for other objectives. Policy toward the Horn likewise has to be broken out of its African context and dealt with strategically: in part, as a component of the Persian Gulf quadrant—to which the Horn countries have almost as much historic connection as to the rest of Africa, and in part, of course, as part of Africa. Building bases in Somalia makes sense at the bottom line, despite the liability to U.S. policy in black Africa.

In its substance, Reagan policy toward Africa is tending toward a middle-of-the-road Republicanism of long tradition. The people dealing with Africa emerge from that mainstream of American foreign policy that understands and considers both interests and ideals.[29] The *démarches* many conservatives sought—for example military assistance for Savimbi's UNITA forces in Angola—are not to be. In the fall of 1981, Savimbi was virtually cold-shouldered by official Washington on a visit there.

Reagan policy may be successful. By fall 1981 Namibian negotiations in fact resumed—because Pretoria was reassured by the "Bill of Rights" Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker had proposed for the territory, by which economic and political guarantees were offered to the 100,000 whites. Among the "new elements" effecting this new situation was, according to the Canadian minister of external affairs, "the good faith of the parties involved."[30] A "conservative" administration may be able to effectively implement policies that a more "liberal" one cannot. Robert Mugabe observed that Reagan is more likely to solve South African issues

[29] See, for example, Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker's analysis of South Africa written just before he assumed his position in the Reagan administration: "South Africa: Strategy for Change," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 59, no. 2.

[30] *New York Times*, September 27, 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than was his predecessor.[31] A liberal senator, Paul Tsongas, noted: "it took Richard Nixon to open up China, it is going to take a conservative administration to convince South Africa that a nonpeaceful evolution will end up with a Marxist government in both Namibia and South Africa."[32]

In line with this, the Reagan administration has already shown that it is prepared to conduct business as usual with Angola; it is, after all, more open than the Carter administration to the influence of the powerful multinational corporations doing business there, hence the $85 million loan approved by the Export-Import Bank for Angola. A $200 million aid commitment to Zimbabwe hardly connotes rigidity in matters of ideology, either. At the same time, however, the Reagan administration, even at the risk of creating discord with its allies, has sought to induce South Africa into concessions and negotiations through a policy of "neutrality" — a posture vastly more favorable to the republic than that of any other country's. But precisely because of these efforts to bring South Africa back to the negotiating table, Africa as a whole may be one of the areas where the Reagan administration will score early — if unanticipated — successes, especially if in matters of rhetoric and style Washington becomes more conscious of its effect.[33] Surely, in any case, Africa's place on the agenda of American foreign policy will remain high.

[31] *Boston Globe*, August 5, 1981.

[32] Senator Paul Tsongas, quoted in Richard Deutsch, "Africa from a Strategic Perspective," *Africa Report*, March-April 1981, p. 48.

[33] Interestingly, Charles William Maynes has made the opposite point for the same reason. While criticizing the Carter administration (see fn. 7, above), he scolds the Reagan administration for believing "that a distinction between action and rhetoric can long be maintained in Southern Africa." Yet rhetoric critical of South Africa's more obtuse actions, such as petty apartheid, and the Angolan invasion, is surely in line with the reality of policy (action). Maynes argues: "In most diplomatic situations, rhetoric is action. So is silence. By repeatedly forgetting this lesson and stimulating false hopes in the Afrikaner breast, the Administration is badly serving U.S. interests," which, in milder version, is what is argued herein. *Los Angeles Times*, September 10, 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ISSUES OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY IN THE 1980S

by I. William Zartman

As it enters its third decade of independence, Africa faces a troubled future. Its troubles are directly related to the growing pains associated with attempts to establish polities, economies, and societies under a second and third generation of leadership. In some cases these troubles even represent a second generation of problems as the resolution of the first challenges of independence gives rise to new challenges of growth. In this light, problems are not evidence of weakness and inadequacy but rather the testimony of success in overcoming initial obstacles to new states' existence. By the same token, the coming decade is an extremely delicate period.[1] African states are still in need of help with their troubles, yet their new and fragile independence makes it difficult for them to accept help lest assistance call their independence into question. The third decade is a time for diplomacy, with all the art and skill that the calling can carry.

Accomplishments of the Past

In their twenty years (using 1960 as the basic year of African independence), African societies have made some major accomplishments. They have attained statehood, created an interstate system of relations, participated in defining their place in cold-war relations, and at times they have made some progress in development.

First, Africa today is divided into legitimate, recognized, sovereign states with equal status in international law and organization. The magnitude of this accomplishment is even greater when one compares how readily it is accepted today with how little it was anticipated twenty years ago, when Africans proclaimed unity as the wave of the future and

[1] For other attempts to see the African future, see F. D. Arkhurst, ed., *Africa in the Seventies and the Eighties* (New York: Praeger, 1970); Hasu H. Patel and Ali Mazrui, eds., *Africa in World Affairs: The Next 30 Years* (Third World, 1973); Colin Legum, I. William Zartman, Lynn Mytelka, and Steven Langdon, *Africa in the 1980s* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980); Timothy Shaw, ed., *Alternative Futures for Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1981); Timothy Shaw, ed., *African Horizons* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, pending).

I. William Zartman is Professor of International Politics, Director of African Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University. His upcoming book *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*, for the Council on Foreign Relations, will be published by Yale University Press this year.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europeans raised readiness for independence as the big question. Partly because the glue has not yet dried, to be sure, tampering with the state is one of the strongest taboos of African politics, and those who have tried it in recent years—Ojukwu, Qaddafi, the Eritreans, Tshombe—have been considered to be doing something improper and illegitimate, and therefore dangerous. African states are strong in their legitimacy because the African nationalist forces joined with the colonial state structures to produce an organization engaging a large number of people in a common interest in self-preservation and serving the purposes of other similar organizations—i.e., states—in the world.

Like many other social conventions, the new state is protected in its early stages by the myth of its solidity until it is gradually able to give that myth some reality.[2] Reality comes in two forms and functions: the ability to defend the myth of political independence and territorial integrity against external attacks, and the ability to provide an internal political system that balances domestic supports and demands against supplies and controls. Thus, reality, or the reinforcement of the myth with evidence, comes not merely with unchallenged verbal assertion but with the defeat of challenges and attacks. Such challenges may even serve to strengthen the myth, since they often concern the state as a stake to be captured, not to be demolished. When Ojukwu was defeated in the Biafran War and when Qaddafi was forced to deny that his merger with Chad had actually taken place, the myth of the sovereign state was reinforced, as it was when the Shaba invaders were repelled, when Nkrumah was forced to admit the illegitimacy of subversion, when Ethiopian troops stopped at the Somali border, and so on.

Second, a number of African states have made considerable progress in development, however that term is defined.[3] This fact is remarkable because it stands against continuing predictions of a growing polarization between the increasing developed states and the depressingly underdeveloping states. There are some of the latter in Africa: at the growth rates for 1965-1975, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, CAR, Chad, Niger, Mali, Upper Volta, Sierra Leone, Benin, Guinea, and Guinea Bissau are unlikely to have a per capita income of more than $200 by the end of the 1980s, and some of these countries have corresponding problems with political and social development as well.

But many more have done far better. Although South Africa, Gabon, and Libya—with per capita incomes already of more than

[2] For similar conclusions, see Robert Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's States Persist: The Empirical vs. the Juridical in Statehood," paper presented to the American Political Science Association, 1981; see also Jackson and Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).

[3] The latest statement on African development, not always optimistic, is Elliot Berg, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington: World Bank, 1981), esp. pp. 14f.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

$3,000—can probably be considered aberrations, Algeria, Tunisia, and Ivory Coast are already at about $1,000, and Congo, Swaziland, Morocco, and possibly Nigeria and Zimbabwe can be expected to be close to that figure by the end of the decade. In political terms, one can consider development to mean the establishment of an institutionalized participatory system that is effective in resolving problems, a criterion against which such polities as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and possibly Kenya, Tanzania, and Ghana can stand up respectably.

In social terms, development can be taken to cover conditions of social promotion and mobility that are characteristic of a number of African societies operating under difficult conditions. The most cogent criticism against African development comes from dependency theorists and others who claim that even where growth exists, it is not associated with societal change but merely narrow sectorial improvement.[4] True as this may be at the moment, it ignores the fact that the modern sector is growing across the board, even if at rates varying by country, and that development in any meaning—whether in polity, economy, or society—cannot possibly take place at the same rate for every person or every sector, nor has it so taken place anywhere in the world. With these considerations in mind, one can appreciate real—even if as yet insufficient—progress in African states in terms of development.

Third, for nearly two decades African states have been organized in a concert system of international relations within an international organization defending certain international norms.[5] This too is a striking accomplishment when one realizes that never since its establishment in 1963 has the form of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) been called into question, despite strident calls and wistful dreams that have often appeared for an otherwise-defined African unity.[6] The OAU receives much criticism for its lack of accomplishments, often to the neglect of its real achievements, but as the organizational shape of African unity it is uncontested. Indeed, challenges to its norms are decried as abnormal, whatever their value in solving other problems, as Nyerere, Siad Barre,

---

[4] For a summary of writings, see Dennis Cohen and John Daniel, eds., *Political Economy of Africa* (New York: Longman, 1981). See also I. William Zartman, "Europe and Africa: Decolonization or Dependency," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1976, pp. 325-343.

[5] See Zartman, "Africa as a Subordinate State System," *International Organization*, vol. 21, no. 3, (1967), pp. 545-564; see also Kay Boals, "The Concept of 'Subordinate State System': A Critique," in Richard Falk and Saul Mendlovitz, eds., *Regional Politics and World Order* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1973); Patricia Wild, "Radicals and Moderates in the OAU," in Paul Tharp, ed., *Regional International Organization* (New York: St. Martin's, 1971).

[6] On the OAU, see Zdenek Cervenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU* (New York: Africana, 1977); G. Aforka Nweke, *Harmonization of African Foreign Policies 1955-1975* (Boston: Boston University African Studies Center, 1981); Yassin el-Ayouty and I. William Zartman, eds., *The OAU after 20 Years* (New York: Praeger, pending).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and Hassan II have learned. The OAU has been held in place by the fact that it serves its member states, consecrates the primacy of independence over unity as an African value, and protects above all the norms by which its members exist. Since there has been no effective force or entity to challenge the state, there is none to challenge its organization and system of relations.

Furthermore, from this established organizational base, the OAU members have made some serious, if still unconsummated, attempts at reinforcing the organization's particular form of unity to serve their independence. The extraordinary Lagos summit in 1980 faced the basic problems of economic underdevelopment and sought to establish goals and means of combining national economic development with continental economic integration. Since 1978 OAU members have studied with increased seriousness the problem of an Inter-African Force, one of the most delicate issues in the balance between unity and independence. What is striking in these developments is the fact that they are not seen as ways of amending the original notion of the OAU but of preserving the compromise that it represents as an international organization designed to protect the independence of its members.

Finally, Africa has occupied an accepted place in cold-war relations for most of the past two decades; if this understanding has undergone challenges and changes in a few places, it still covers most of the continent.[7] Africa is a nonaligned part of the Western world. Its background, values, dependencies, exchanges, and aspirations are primarily with the West, as it works out its own nature and concerns. The defining incident in Africa's cold-war status was the prolonged Congo crisis of the early 1960s, which established a set of rules of the game for great-power relations. It served notice that the Western powers would mobilize their resources to prevent the newly independent states of the continent from falling into communist hands (whether in fact the country would have fallen or remained in communist hands or not). Communist and Western powers alike agreed that they would no longer try to establish an African polity in their image, that Africa would be an autonomous part of the Western zone of influence free to pursue its own concerns as long as it did not bring in cold-war interference, that great powers could hope for good relations at best with African countries, and that Western economic relations would dominate in the absence of political control. African states alone did not establish this status, of course, but they accepted

[7] There is relatively little on Africa's place in the world. For two comprehensive attempts to relate to that subject from the American side, see Stephen Solarz, ed., *U.S. Interests in Africa*, U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Africa, 96th Congress, October-November 1979 (Washington: GPO, 1979); and Jennifer Seymour Whitaker, ed., *Africa and the United States* (New York: New York University Press, 1979).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and operated within it; no African state challenged it until the events of Angola and Ethiopia in the latter half of the 1970s. Even thereafter, these cases remain isolated exceptions, since the opportunities provided by the Ethiopian revolution and the Angolan national liberation are unlikely to be repeated elsewhere on the continent. Again, this cold-war status serves African and Western needs, and it met Soviet needs and capabilities as well until the changed circumstances of the mid 1970s.

Problems of the Present Decade

None of these accomplishments is without challenge, however. The African state is currently under attack, both from within and without. The basic norms of boundary intangibility and nonintervention have gradually, even subtly, come under challenge. Problems of succession, secession, and liberation are beginning to swarm. Basic problems of economy and society endemic to the process of development itself have undermined governments, and in extreme cases the structure of order and distribution that makes up the state itself has collapsed, requiring a hasty effort to put the state back together again. Such problems, combined with those of developing in a stagflating world, have led African states to seek new mixes of unity and independence, particularly in the economic field but on the subregional rather than the continental level. The accepted conventions governing Africa's place in the cold-war world have been called into question by African states and great powers alike. These challenges make up the issues of current and future OAU agendas, sometimes reflecting even more disturbing problems that do not appear on the formal agendas.

State Collapse and Other Challenges

A cluster of problems involves the inter-African impact of domestic crisis.[8] Africa's most serious challenge is state collapse. It is not merely a question of some accidental disruption of order or of the fall of a particular government, but rather the implosion of a political state of nature. This has already occurred in Uganda and Chad, two rather different instances in many ways, and it has hovered in the background of a few other states. In both Uganda and Chad, the government was unable to satisfy the majority of the population in its allocation of scarce resources, its authority collapsed, and security and order fell to small local groups warring for control of the center.

[8] For further discussion of some of these problems, see Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, pending).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The OAU has been totally powerless facing such an event, although to expect otherwise would require even more than supernational powers within the organization. In both cases, a neighboring state intervened, breaking OAU norms and embarrassing its members, and the state order that was restored has been artificial and more fragile. It is likely that similar events will occur in the 1980s, and it is equally likely that a more powerful neighbor in each case will take on the job of restoring order, increasing its own zone of influence as a result. State re-establishment generally has required two ingredients: a foreign army to keep the peace (often in the process inspiring national cohesion against its very intervention), and a good shot of money for the new authorities to allocate and to establish the material basis for that renewed cohesion. Both items are in short supply in the OAU as an institution, and are rather the weapons of individual states.

Such intervention across state borders not only provides a unilateral solution to a problem that strikes at the nature of every African state; it also constitutes an action that is banned by OAU norms. Current practice legitimates intervention, in Africa as elsewhere, by making it a response to an incumbent's invitation, but it then becomes only as legitimate as the incumbent—weak indeed when the incumbent has been put in power by the invitee, or when the incumbent has visibly lost his popularity at home (as shown by the fact that he has to call on outside intervention at all).

Intervention by one African state's army in another's problems made its appearance in the late 1970s and has since increased. The practice was strongly criticized in 1977 in Shaba I, when Morocco aided Zaire, even though the fellow Africans intervened in response to a beleaguered incumbent's invitation. In Shaba II, it was the French and Belgians who intervened; the Moroccans returned, along with Senegalese, Ivoriens, Gabonais, Central Africans, and Togolese, as an unofficial Inter-African Force instead of the one the OAU refused to provide. Guinea intervened in Sierra Leone in 1973 and 1979 and in Liberia in 1979, to help the police with race riots. Senegal intervened in Gambia in consecutive years, in 1980 and 1981, amid growing discussion over the possible need to make intervention permanent through confederation. Tanzania intervened most illegitimately in Uganda in 1979 and was roundly criticized for it within the OAU, but the African community was generally content to register criticism in principle alone, since Nyerere saved the continent from an egregious aberration that the system as a collectivity could not handle, bound as it was by its own negative norms against any interference in internal affairs. The same happened in Chad, the other case of state collapse. First Nigeria, then Libya, intervened, in 1979 and 1980 respectively, although the first was the instrument of a collective

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

decision and was sent home by the intervened state, and the second was the invitee of the government it helped to power. By the time of the Libyan intervention, the OAU norm was in a shambles, and the eighteenth OAU summit in 1981 did not even bother to repeat its request that Libya leave. Libya left—probably not completely—only when replaced in late 1981 by an Inter-African force of Zairois, Nigerian, and Guinean troops.

The next step after intervention as a response to state collapse is absorption. The Libyan-Chadian merger of January 6, 1981, was the first case of unification since Zanzibar asked to join Tanganyika in 1964 to save its revolution. The Chadian circumstances, however, were quite different in that Chad was already occupied by Libya. Despite the hostile African reaction that caused Libya to deny and delay the legal fact of merger, Senegalese and Gambian leaders went ahead with plans for a Sene-Gambian confederation in early 1982. Although it is difficult to predict where the next case will be, other occasions for unification will most likely follow in the 1980s.

The touchstone of African state mergers is a self-determination referendum of approval, which has been mentioned in the Libyan-Chad (and the abortive Libyan-Tunisian) case and would be required if the intensified Sene-Gambian cooperation reached the final point of single sovereignty. The only precedents for merger are unclear, coming from the era of decolonization. Unification of different colonial territories occurred in a number of cases—French and Spanish Morocco, British and Italian Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia, British Gold Coast and Togoland, Northern Cameroun and Nigeria, British Southern Cameroun and French Cameroun—although only the last three had referendums. In the other cases, less formal means of self-determination were used, including colonial assemblies, informal polls, and nationalist movements. These two types of unification have been joined together in the current case of the Spanish Sahara, where less formal means of self-determination are being verified by a formal referendum, which the OAU has taken on the delicate task of organizing. The success of this task will not only gauge the effectiveness of African diplomacy in handling new challenges but will also influence the process of further attempts at unification.

Finally, another form of state challenges concerns subtle changes in the OAU boundary norm of *uti possidetis*.[9] As had been foreseen, the extension of African states' control over their territories exacerbates conflict over the territorial limits of that control, and unde-

[9] See Saadia Touval, *The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972); Carl G. Widstrand, ed., *African Boundary Problems* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1969); Ian Brownlie, *African Boundaries* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Boundary Series, The Geographer, Department of State, Washington; and Omolade Adejuvigbe, "Readjustment of Superimposed Boundaries in Africa," *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1976), pp. 68-85.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

marcated or, *a fortiori*, undelimited boundaries (including the extension of boundaries into areas such as territorial waters) only raises problems in new forms. Africa's two major cases remain, after having been proclaimed exceptions to the OAU norm as early as 1963-1964. The Moroccan-Algerian border has finally been established, in the Rabat Treaty of 1972. Although not yet formally ratified (if that is necessary) by Morocco, its impact has been reduced by the outbreak since 1975 of the conflict in a new form, over the Western Sahara. The dispute over the contested Ethiopian-Somali border remains; Siad Barre made a formal renunciation of claims over Kenyan territory at the 1981 OAU summit at Nairobi and has recognized Djibouti since its independence in 1977, but the Ogaden still remains an open sore. Old issues have also been revived by border incidents, which have occurred since 1980 on the Mali-Voltaic, Nigerian-Camerounian, Nigerian-Benin, Ghana-Togolese, Libyan-Algerian, and Libyan-Tunisian borders, all minor in detail (though involving fatalities and arrest in some cases) but serious enough to raise disruptive political issues.

More important yet are the two cases that challenge the notion of *uti possidetis* itself: the temporary annexation of the Kagera salient by Idi Amin in 1979 and the permanent annexation of the Aouzou strip of Chad by Qaddafi since 1974. Both raise competing *utis* as a basis for *possidetis*—in Kagera a river was claimed to be more natural and hence more African than a geometric line, and in Aouzou a 1935 treaty between colonial powers that was never ratified stands as the basis of Libyan claims over parts of Niger and Algeria as well. The importance of these cases, the first of which was successfully denied only by the norm-breaking intervention of Tanzania, is that they pose different criteria for the establishment of boundaries and thus gradually begin the process of unlocking a Pandora's box throughout the continent.

Pressures in Southern Africa

Another cluster of challenges for the African agenda of the 1980s centers on relations in southern Africa. The beginnings and ends of eras are always hard to define precisely, but the Era of Colonization or Decolonization will be even more difficult to date than most. The end of European colonialism in Africa came in 1977 with the independence of Djibouti. Nevertheless, the Spanish presidios on the Moroccan shores and the French and Spanish islands of Reunion and the Canaries still remain. So too does Namibia, the South West Africa whose colonizer is South Africa, not Europe, and whose decolonization in 1966 was in name only. Thereafter lies the problem of South Africa itself, no longer a matter of independence from distant, foreign rule but the subject of an internal

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

struggle for social change and political equality. It takes no particular predictive capacity to see that African diplomacy will be focused on this issue during the coming decade. The nature of that focus, however, is less obvious and is likely to be as complex as the components of changing relations in the southern region.

Because of its material powerlessness, Africa's prime role in the southern conflict—as in the past—is to keep the goals of liberation and equality prominent.[10] This role is important, since no other actor can do it as well, but it opens Africa to charges of idealism and extremism—charges that are ironic since they blame African diplomacy for the very role it is forced to play. If African states were powerful enough in political or military terms to grapple with and influence South Africa, they would be faced with opportunities for compromise and bargaining. As it is, they have had nothing to give or take away that South Africa values, and so their role is limited to being standard-bearer. This situation is self-reinforcing, since the role of standard-bearer itself precludes compromise and removes the possibility of offering anything to South Africa until it "shapes up."

A second, more operational, role goes along with the first. Since other African states cannot confront South Africa directly, they seek to isolate it, and isolate themselves from it by the same token. This role is particularly appropriate for the present front-line states, notably Angola, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique, which after a long struggle need a time of consolidation to build their internal polities and economies. The 1980s must offer a time of turning inward and building a just society, in all three cases according to some degree of socialist principles; external conflict is disruptive and wasteful of scarce resources that are needed to rebuild war-torn societies.

Nevertheless, such rebuilding also means disengagement from the economic and logistic grip that South Africa holds over its neighbors. The activities of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) express the need to coordinate national consolidation along the front line and to construct infrastructural and training substitutes for the South African connection.[11] SADCC was proposed by Nyerere in a different form at the Arusha Conference of June 1979, established at the Lusaka Conference in April 1980, and attracted funding pledges at its second plenary session in Maputo on November 27-28, 1980. Its third meeting is scheduled for Lilongwe in November 1981, and a permanent

---

[10] See Richard Bissell and Chester Crocker, eds., *South Africa into the 1980s* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1979); John Seiler, ed., *Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980).

[11] See papers on SADCC presented to the African Studies Association, 1981, by Carol B. Thompson and by Richard F. Weisfelder.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

coordinating secretariat has been established in Maputo for its nine members (Mozambique, Botswana, Malawi, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Lesotho, and Tanzania, with Zaire as an observer).

The other side of this African strategy is the constant effort to enforce pariah status upon South Africa, isolating it from international contacts and institutions. International isolation in turn reinforces the standard-bearer role, since it too precludes bargaining contacts. African states have been successful in removing South Africa from most international organizations and even from General Assembly debates, although they have not yet been able to exclude it from UN membership.

This strategy, so appropriate for the 1980s, is at the same time under pressure to change. On one hand, Africa has already begun to negotiate over the problem of Namibia.[12] Negotiations are not face to face but rather "proximity talks" in which the Western Five shuttle back and forth among South Africa and SWAPO, front-line states, and Nigeria. In the abortive Pre-Implementation Meeting (PIM) in Geneva in early January 1981, SWAPO and South Africa with its Namibian partners faced one another, but the sovereign African states stayed out of the meeting. During the Carter administration, African states gave little to South Africa, although they admitted to a formula of paired South African and UN administration of one-man–one-vote elections and then granted several details such as monitored SWAPO camps.

South Africa made much more basic concessions but reached no final agreement. During the Reagan administration, the African side has been called on to give somewhat more, by linking the Cuban and Namibian issues and by providing minority guarantees in Namibia. Whether or not these concessions, along with Western inducements, will lead to an agreement is still questionable, depending first on whether South Africa will make its commitment and then on whether the African side will meet that commitment. Agreement on minority guarantees was obtained from both sides in November 1981; agreement on the election formula is on the agenda for 1982. If this round produces results, the conditions already outlined will be reinforced, as another new front-line state will require time for internal consolidation. If this round does not work, a considerable embitterment of relations across the battleline will result. In either case, however, the Namibian experience is no precedent for the South African problem, for the issue there is still internal sociopolitical change, not decolonization.

On the other hand, new African forces are already challenging front-line needs for both introspection and rebuilding. 1981 has seen a

[12] See Robert Rotberg, *Suffer the Future* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution;* Erich Leistner, Pieter Esterhuysen, Theo Malan, *Namibia / SWA Prospectus* (Africa Institute of South Africa, 1980).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

higher incidence of urban sabotage, claimed by the African National Congress (ANC), than has any previous year, and the South African army has struck at alleged ANC bases in Mozambique in addition to its repeated forays into SWAPO territory in Angola and Zambia. The guerrilla aspect of the South African struggle for change poses new questions of tactics to African states. Even if front-line states wanted to retire to a period of domestic consolidation, the South African army responding to ANC attacks would probably force them to increase arms supplies and political support from external sources. Communist states are only too willing to respond; Western countries will have to make new policy decisions if they are to compete. Previous possibilities of bargaining for change in South Africa fall victim to this new level of conflict, since bargaining concerns tradeoffs between African sanctuary and South African raids, not internal South African change; if, as noted, it is difficult for outsiders to bargain over domestic change, it is quite unlikely that there can be any meaningful negotiation over conflict across the battleline. As a result, pressures are gradually rising in southern Africa, against other natural tendencies to the contrary, with no clear outlet and no probable productive outcomes. More than ever, the answers are in the hands of South African society, and the Africans are left in the unhealthy situation of being required to focus more and more attention on the problem without being able to do anything about it.

Economic Integration

Another group of issues concerns the poor state of many African economies and particularly the inter-African implications of economic cooperation. Deep structural problems plague many African economies and are the direct causes of much political instability. It has been frequently noted that African countries have been "trained" to orient their agriculture for export and to neglect the production of crops for home consumption; agricultural export prices, however, are low and unstable. Beyond this imbalance, though, is the additional problem of food prices, which are kept artificially low by many African countries in order to keep urban populations quiet with cheap food; as a result, the incentive for domestic food production is further removed, and African states have to beg or buy food from abroad.[13] Another problem concerns the economics of education. In order to respond to the need for trained cadres and the desire for modern education, African countries have guaranteed government jobs to secondary and higher education

[13] See Berg, *Accelerated Development;* see also Robert Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

graduates; the result is a bloated bureaucracy, saturated and lethargic. Attempts to pare it or to restrict the guarantee lead to teacher and student insurrections. Burdens like this have left certain African economies on the verge of bankruptcy, posing a challenge for new types of solutions to international donor countries and institutions. The standard International Monetary Fund (IMF) answer is a budget of austerity, which only increases the danger of political instability.

In Africa, the list of governments that have fallen over economic distributional issues is almost as long as the list of military coups. Ethiopia, Upper Volta, Chad, Mali, Niger, Liberia, Ghana, and Nigeria have seen their governments change, in some cases several times, over the inability to distribute economic benefits and meet popular demands to the satisfaction of crucial sectors of society. In addition, Morocco, Egypt, Sierra Leone, Zaire, Mali, Tunisia, Tanzania, and Gambia have overcome serious challenges from organized labor or street riots only with great difficulty, on issues related to either food prices or absorption of school dropouts into society.

The global response to this situation involves complex negotiations among African states and the IMF, the Paris Club of creditor governments, and the private bank lenders over debt rescheduling and economic restructuring. In the position of demanding in these encounters, African states are relatively weak and have had little beyond rhetoric with which to consolidate their positions. The inter-African answer to many aspects of economic weakness is to pool resources, trade off strengths, and open larger markets through international economic cooperation. On the continental level, African states established a plan for such cooperation at the extraordinary summit of the OAU at Lagos at the end of April 1980. Although the resolution was rather vague, it did provide for the gradual elimination of trade barriers, the increase of industrial production, self-sufficiency in food production, and the development of transportation.

On the subregional level, the most interesting new venture into economic cooperation is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), founded in 1975 by the sixteen West African countries of French-, English- and Portuguese-speaking background. In addition to its latest proposal of a common defense protocol for the original treaty, ECOWAS aims at cooperation for trade promotion and liberalization, increased freedom of movement for its populations, transportation development and coordination, coordination of telecommunications, and industrial and agricultural growth. Within ECOWAS is the Economic Community of West Africa (CEAO), established in 1970 among six French-speaking states that provide the hinterland for the ports of Dakar and Abidjan as a successor to the West African Customs Union (UDEAO);

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it, too, added a nonaggression and defense treaty in 1980. Also within ECOWAS are cooperation projects around common watercourses, of which the Senegal and Mano river bodies offer the best examples of joint activities. In southern Africa, the SADCC may be growing into a similar institution, although it was established primarily to coordinate the delinkage of front-line states' economies from South Africa, as described above. SADCC replaces the defunct East African Community (EAC) for Tanzania, and efforts in early 1981 to revive the EAC since the overthrow of Idi Amin have lacked enthusiasm.

The past decade was one of establishment for such institutions as SADCC, ECOWAS, and CEAO; the coming decade will provide the test of implementation. The Lagos summit set the end of the 1980s as the deadline for the elimination of trade barriers among African states and the increase of industrial production to 1.4 per cent of the world total (and 2 per cent by the end of the 1990s). For ECOWAS members, all tariffs and trade barriers are to be eliminated by the end of the 1980s; free movement of peoples is to take place in three five-year stages and to be completed by 1995, the same year as the 1990 free trade area is to become a customs union (and a common market by the end of the 1990s). These horizons are extremely ambitious, not only because of the coordination they presuppose but also because of the domestic development and economic control they require. In addition, the interests and impetus created by the two sets of preconditions often run in opposite directions, for and against economic integration.

An example is already at hand that shows the domestic, inter-African, and international ramifications of such coordination. Mali has asked for re-entry into the West African Monetary Union (UMOA) after a disastrous series of experiments with state capitalism, monetary independence, and face-saving halfway stations.[14] During 1981, first under Giscard and then again under Mitterrand, France supported the request, although late into 1981 there was still the question of the $200 million Malian debt to France, in addition to the $600 million external debt to be covered by UMOA. With Mali demanding total debt forgiveness and France holding out for debt carryover, it appeared that a compromise involving a percentage of each would evolve. But within the UMOA, Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Upper Volta have at times expressed opposition, in some cases for economic reasons as struggling and successful states shy from taking on a new burden, and in some cases for political reasons such as unsettled boundary relations. Furthermore, on its side, Mali demands parity for its franc when the long-standing rate has been 2 to 1. It is likely that the re-entry will take place in 1982, but the entry

[14] See *Jeune Afrique*, September 23, 1981, p. 23 passim.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of a weak economy into a group that for the first time in twenty-five years has a deficit with the franc zone underlies the problems facing African economic integration.

Africa and the Superpowers

On the level of global relations, Africa's place is already in flux. For the great powers, as often happens, the very measures that permitted an attenuation of a bilateral balance of terror also induced greater possibilities for conflict in the field. The development of conventions about direct superpower conflict reduces their risk, and the stabilization of cold-war relations at the point of direct contact in Western Europe has moved the conflict to other areas. The irony is that, instead of capitalist saturation of the home market pushing the West to colonization, as Marxism-Leninism would have it, one finds cold-war saturation of the core area of conflict pushing the protagonists—but first of all the Soviet Union—into recolonial adventures in the Third World.

Soviet policy has changed under the new challenges.[15] Just when the weapons of foreign policy available to the Soviet Union in an earlier period were showing their limited effectiveness, new weapons came into hand. In the 1960s, after the Congo affair, Moscow relied principally on diplomatic means to feed its friendly relations. Not only were close political or military relations excluded by the lessons of Congo, but also the Soviet intervention capability were limited. Transport, logistics, overflight rights, strike forces, and legitimate allies were all lacking in the first decade of African independence. By the mid 1970s, however, all these elements had been developed, providing an impressive intervention capability. The shipment of Soviet troops to Angola and, in even more rapid delivery, to Ethiopia, and the supply of Cuban troops in much larger numbers to the same two locations were possible only because of logistic and transport developments and because of some crucial refueling and overflight premissions, in Brazzaville and Aden, which the Soviet Union had not had fifteen years before. The willingness of Cuban troops to join in the adventure was also crucial, since it softened Soviet intervention with a leading "nonaligned" presence. Sovietologists may debate whether this capability was developed with specific targets in mind, or whether it arose through a general evolution of military technology that then required a new strategy to be useful. But whatever the

[15] See three recent works: Mohammed Ayoob, ed., *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World* (New York: St. Martin's, 1980); Robert Donaldson, ed., *The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1981); and Raymond Duncan, ed., *Soviet Policy in the Third World* (New York: Pergamon, 1980).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

outcome of this chicken-and-egg argument, capabilities and strategies were both different by the mid 1970s.

Similarily, just at the moment when the opportunities of foreign policy that were available to the Soviet Union in an earlier period had shown themselves to be of limited attractiveness, new opportunities came into view. In the 1960s, Soviet ideologists argued whether Guinea, Ghana, and Mali were to be considered as truly socialist; the Soviets generally decided that the African socialists were not successful yet but were headed in the right direction, a conclusion that fit the type of friendly but not dominant relations that the post-Congolese era permitted. When Nkrumah fell, the Soviets were truly surprised, and when the socialism of other African states seemed no more rigorous than it was effective, the policy of friendly but not close relations seemed only appropriate.

But after the fall of the Portuguese colonial regime, Marxist-Leninist parties that came to power in Angola and Mozambique were closer to the orthodoxy of the founding fathers of communism than any others in Africa. As the liberation struggle moved closer to the South African core, it moved toward the first African population that could be called proletariat, again increasing the ideological attractiveness of the "action area" of the continent. Perhaps the most important event, however, was the Ethiopian revolution, which, if not proletarian, so much resembled the Russian revolution against a feudal autocrat that it was hailed as a major event in Marxist terms. In the space of a relatively short time, the opportunities in the continent seemed to warrant more than simply friendly relations. They were worth a major effort of intervention, if the opportunity appeared.

The end of the 1970s thus saw Africa divided along cold-war dimensions as it had never been before. Of the three new Afro-Marxist states, two have even refused accession to the Lomé Convention, which associates the rest of the continent south of the Sahara with the European Communities, and instead have requested COMECON membership; each of two of them also contain more communist troops than there are French troops in the entire continent; in all three states the Soviet Union has a position of predominance, if not of dominance. The questions for the 1980s concern first the durability of this arrangement, and second its extensibility to other countries. These questions require fuller answers than can be given here, although some parameters and limitations can be set.

It is doubtless unrealistic to look for the kind of *renversement des alliances* that Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia carried out in the 1970s (or that Ethiopia itself performed in the opposite direction). In Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique a gradual cooling of relations with the predominant external power will probably occur during the 1980s, as the African

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

states discover that the Soviet Union cannot supply all their needs. But this process will be gradual and will depend on the degree of assistance toward development that alternate sources from the West will provide, as well as the reduction of military threat that the West will be able to extract from the south. The new French government and to some extent the Germans have been working to provide alternative support in Angola and Ethiopia, and the U.S. proposals to Angola may be seen in the same light if they are not presented in the expectation of a total change of allies. In addition to considerations of economic support, matters of subregional structure and conflict will also be crucial in determining the degree of access the communist states can maintain to their African footholds.

A related determinant is the degree of extensibility of those footholds. Extension depends on repeated opportunities or on possibilities of gradual expansion from the current footholds. But in general the rivalries of relatively new African states working out ranks and relations with neighbors and beyond militate against any gradual expansion of Afro-Marxist regimes into neighboring territory. If there is to be a socialist commonwealth in the Horn of Africa, it will involve Ethiopia and Yemen, but not Somalia or Sudan or Kenya. Similarly, Namibia will have sympathetic relations with Angola, and Zimbabwe with Mozambique, but those countries are unlikely to form an axis simply because of shared ideological sympathies, to the extent that these exist, and certainly will not extend their system of government to Zambia or Zaire even if regimes shift in these countries.

Therefore, the remaining question is: Do new targets of opportunity exist for the Soviet Union, such as those presented by the Ethiopian revolution or the Angolan liberation? Namibia is certainly one if given the chance, although the depth of attraction that both Angola and Ethiopia provided the Soviets is not present. But thereafter, except for the distant opportunities in South Africa itself, which may present a target of a very different magnitude by the end of the decade, no liberation opportunities like Angola appear and no societies are ripe for revolution as was Ethiopia. This does not mean that radical liberation movements and radical military coups are over. National liberation movements fighting for the "second independence" (to use the phrase of the Zairois opposition, which seeks to end the incumbent "neocolonialist oligarchy") may be expected to arise, as have the FroLiNats in Chad, the Western Somali Liberation Front and the several similar Oromo movements in Ethiopia, and the other Libyan-supported liberation movements of the western (POLISARIO) and southern (FLSM) Sahara. Military coups against the narrowly based *évolué* oligarchies can be expected to bring in radical redistributionist policies, as have Kérekou in Benin, Doe in Liberia, and as Kukoi tried in Gambia. But neither of these categories constitutes an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Afro-Marxist regime. One might even see such a regime extend port or airfield rights to the USSR, and one would certainly expect radical political language, even as the lingua franca of a continent of weak states in a world of giants. But much suggests that the latter half of the 1970s represented a high-water mark for Soviet penetration into Africa, at least until the South African target opens up in the 1990s.

Implications for the Future

What do these issues imply for Africa's role in international relations, or for the cohesion and identity of the African system? Indeed, can one still talk of a continental system, with the Horn being pulled into an arc of crisis from Iran to the Red Sea, with North Africa returning to the conflicts of the Arab Mediterranean, with front-line states focusing exclusively on the south and pulling few others with them, with West Africa preoccupied with regional organization and extraregional attack, and with the rest busily fighting off the IMF on their own? It is hard to provide conclusive answers to these questions, particularly since the measures of community and interaction are either lacking (content analysis, communications data) or misleading (trade and capital flows). Yet a more subjective appreciation of African diplomatic rhetoric shows that the identity function of Africa is still as strong as ever, the OAU is still the forum for African concerns (and has even handled potential issues for other regional organizations as in the case of the Saharan conflict among Arab Africans), and the African caucusing group in the UN is a powerful force—if only for conformity—among its members and in interregional horse trading.

The other fact is that all four of the issue clusters for the 1980s are profoundly divisive. The cold-war issues are divisive by nature, although the present Soviet "friendship" treaties with four African states—Angola (1976), Mozambique (1971), Ethiopia (1978), and Congo (1981)—have not destroyed the legitimacy of these states' participation in African forums and activities (unlike the effect of the Soviet association on Cuba's position in the inter-American system). Nor have the French associations of the six states with common defense agreements with their former metropole—Ivory Coast, Gabon, Upper Volta, CAR, Senegal, and Djibouti—destroyed their membership in the African system. The South African issues also set aside the front-line states and create new divisions over tactics into African debates. Too strong and active a campaign against South Africa is likely to leave some African states uninterested bystanders and others strong critics of the first group's lack of interest. Nonetheless, for the entire decade of the 1970s African states were unanimous over the rejection of dialogue with South Africa (even if certain states tolerated more or less hidden commercial relations). The issues of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economic cooperation primarily have a subregional dimension, although there are also continental projects.

Probably the most serious challenge to effective African unity, even at the low common denominator of the OAU compromise, is found in the cluster of state issues. Since these issues are political (and even military), they create political divisions and have the potential for tearing apart the system. Ironically, African unity has operated most effectively on these issues on the procedural level, avoiding disruption of the façade of unity on even symbolic issues like the acceptance of Libyan presidency of the OAU in 1982, thereby removing any effective sanction over Libya's disruptive activities. Yet the irony may only be apparent: acceptance for good behavior has appeared to be a better sanction on Libyan interference than placing Qaddafi beyond the pale and rejecting his claim to normal treatment.

Since the end of the 1970s, Africa has begun to see mutual defense agreements, although most of them are specific and nonideological (such as the Senegal-Gambia treaty of 1964, the Egyptian-Sudanese treaty of 1977, the Guinea-Liberian treaty of 1979, the Kenya-Ethiopia treaty of 1963 and 1979, and the Mozambique-Zimbabwe treaty of 1981) or general and nonideological (such as the 1980 mutual defense agreements of CEAO and ECOWAS); only the Libyan-Algerian treaty of Hassi Messaoud of 1975 or the Libyan-Ethiopian-South Yemeni agreement of 1981 could be called ideological as well. Thus the ad hoc factions of the OAU have not yet been turned into alliances that either dominate or divide the workings of the OAU or replace it as an active international organization. The moderate "axis" of Morocco-Senegal-Ivory Coast-Gabon-Zaire, which the radicals recognize, or the radical "bloc" of Madagascar-Angola-Mozambique-Congo-Benin-Algeria-Libya, which the moderates fear, turns out to be ragged, ad hoc, and subject to notable defections or "paired" neutralizations. Although it may not be cohesive, Africa has not fallen apart.

To outline an American response to this situation would be too skeletal to be useful. But a general approach and spirit are evident. Africa is still part of the West, with shared aspirations and inspirations. Even the north-south issues are by definition exclusively Western, involving the West's richer and poorer parts. Therefore, the West shares a responsibility for problems and solutions there; because of this responsibility, Africa is important to the northern part of the West and to its American component. Attention to Africa's problems is crucial at this point: neglected, these troubles could get out of hand and attract cold-war interference that threatens Western ties. It is far better to help Africa treat the source of its difficulties of growth than to have to deal with the symptoms and results of the troubles at times and under conditions outside Western control.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Namibia and food production, inter-African forces and economic co-operation are items that indicate the range of opportunities for cooperation and assistance facing U.S. African policy. The troubled decade before us is a challenge to Western creativity.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

READ A GREAT ARTICLE?

Did one of the articles in this issue of Orbis really hit the mark? Would you like to have copies to send to your colleagues, or to assign for classroom reading? If so, you should know that reprints of articles and reviews published in Orbis are available, so long as our stock lasts, for $1.00 each. And if you are thinking of ordering in bulk (20 copies or more), please inquire. We will provide multiple copies at a special rate.

Send orders and inquiries to Ms. Julie Johnson, Circulation Manager, at the following address:

Foreign Policy Research Institute,
3508 Market Street, Suite 350
Philadelphia, PA 19104

Or telephone: (215) 382-2054 or 382-0685

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

review essays

WINNING THE WAR FOR ZIMBABWE

The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush. By Lewis H. Gann and Thomas H. Henriksen. New York: Praeger, 1981. 378 pp. $19.95.

The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War. By David Martin and Phyllis Johnson. London: Faber & Faber (distributor: Merrimack Book Service, Salem, N.H.), 1981. 374 pp. $25.00.

ROBERT I. ROTBERG
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

"There is one thing in the world you cannot run away from — reality." In 1974, said Rowan Cronje, a former Rhodesian cabinet minister, a mere handful of sixteen guerrillas were attacking a small corner of the colony's northeast. In 1979, he told a South African audience, "not a square kilometre of territory was without an enemy presence."[1]

From Cronje's point of view, Rhodesia should have negotiated much earlier than it did. Rhodesia had consistently offered too little, too late. It sought solace in stooges, temporized when it should have strengthened moderate forces among the guerrillas, rejected opportunities in the mid 1970s that would have preserved white power well into the 1980s, helped weaken a surprisingly strong economy, and failed repeatedly to realize (as did South Africa, and many Britons and Americans) that Africans have never compromised on legitimacy in the transition from colonial rule to independence.

One of the prime tasks of the new history of Zimbabwe is to present a coherent picture of the period characterized by the triumph of nationalism. Since the modern phase of nationalism in Zimbabwe began in 1957 with the formation of the local African National Congress — and was encouraged by, or at least coincided with, the ending of the Federa-

[1] *The Star* (Johannesburg), July 16, 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the shift within Southern Rhodesia (later Rhodesia) from conservative to reactionary white supremacy — this period conveniently covers the twenty-five-year span that ended with the accession to power of the government of Robert Mugabe.

It is a period about which there will for many years be severe contention. Open sores still run. Bitterness will remain. Secrets, especially about the conduct of the war, and about the ways in which sanctions were evaded, will be closely guarded by survivors and perpetrators alike. No one, least of all the muse of history, will be satisfied by accounts of the period that are consciously or unconsciously partisan, exculpatory, romantic, or distorted, or that lay bare only part of the complete record.

Clearly, if the canons of scholarship are too rigorous, very little will prove acceptable. As Gann and Henriksen acknowledge, "neither side gave out much revealing information about itself." (p. xiii.) The evidentiary problem is immense, for even some of the decisive events of the 1960s remain covered by a veil of discretion. So is the conduct of the war during the 1970s, the organization of the guerrilla struggle, the battles (which ought not to be forgotten) within and between the several guerrilla movements, and such crucial but now largely forgotten episodes as the organization of the African National Council in 1971 and its role in thwarting the Anglo-Rhodesian compromise of that year. Researchers in Great Britain have uncovered the scandal of fake oil sanctions, but the quarters from which Prime Minister Harold Wilson received his ill-considered advice and the motives of those giving the advice are still unexplored. The great set pieces (like the negotiations on HMS *Tiger* and HMS *Fearless*) have been well covered by journalists. But the intricacies of the negotiations and the reasons for the behavior of the various parties (Premier Ian Smith, in particular) can only be surmised. Internationally, too, we want to know how Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Prime Minister John Vorster tried, but only partially succeeded, to alter the nature of the combat. What about the role of the Soviets and their allies? Why and how did the USSR choose such an unpromising ally as Joshua Nkomo and his Sindebele-speaking retinue? Why did the Cubans help Mugabe's army, and then without enthusiasm? Why was Yugoslav, Rumanian, and Chinese aid so decisive? What about the African dimension, and about Nigeria's abortive 1978 attempt to install Nkomo in power?

The fragile nature of the evidence will remain a severe problem for many years to come. But neither of the books under review — nor another recent one[2] that, from the vantage point of an adviser of Sir Alec Douglas-Home, purports to tell the story of the 1960s and 1970s — even begins to gather the strands of the recent past into a coherent and indisput-

[2] Miles Hudson, *Triumph or Tragedy? Rhodesia to Zimbabwe* (North Pomfret, Vt.: Hamilton, 1981).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ably objective skein. From the press (particularly the southern African press), from the collection of oral testimony, from debates in the House of Commons, from a few of the unpublished accounts that Africans have been writing during their enforced stay in universities overseas, and from assiduous and skeptical interviews of choice black and white Zimbabweans, South Africans, Britons, and Americans it should be possible to begin to write that undistorted, non-Whig history that will do justice to the tumult and the triumph of the 1960s and 1970s in Central Africa.

Since it was not inevitable that the whites should fail and the blacks succeed, why was the victory so complete? Why did the gentle Roman Catholic schoolteacher and not the first leader of modern nationalism sweep the board in 1980? Why does his regime promise to last and to lead Zimbabwe out of the cauldron of war toward a prosperous future? Why were sanctions such a failure internationally, and so successful for Zimbabwe? What are the lessons for Africa and, in particular, for the evolution of South Africa? Any good history of the triumph of nationalism should at least try to answer such questions.

David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, the former a seasoned and controversial correspondent for The London *Observer*, set out the answers much more credibly than Gann and Henriksen. *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War* is a blow-by-blow account of the triumph of African nationalism from a committed guerrilla perspective. In that sense, it is as Whig in its recent history as almost any fresh account could be. Moreover, it is replete with fascinating inside information, much of which, however, is derived from a rather small collection of important, though potentially one-sided, interviews with but some of the participants. The interviews are supplemented by a few key documents, leaked or captured, and by the authors' own observations of the guerrilla effort, which they covered from Tanzania, Zambia, and Mozambique. The resulting collage constitutes a readable and plausible (hence seductive) account that is superior to anything written thus far on the Rhodesian conflict of the 1970s.

Martin and Johnson are much more complete in their reportage of the period from 1972 to 1976 than they are for the later, crucial years of victory. They are very antagonistic to Zambia and the ways in which President Kenneth Kaunda attempted to negotiate with Prime Ministers John Vorster of South Africa and Ian Smith of Rhodesia to orchestrate the political ascendancy of Joshua Nkomo, and to hamper the guerrilla effort of the troops loyal to Josiah Tongogara and Robert Mugabe. They are very supportive of the efforts on behalf of the guerrillas of President Samora Machel of Mozambique. Embedded in their splendid narrative are revealing accounts of a guerrilla rebellion, of what principals (including world leaders) said to other principals behind locked doors,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and of who undercut whom. Most of the story is believable even if the evidence is always circumstantial. The whole must be regarded as good journalism, devoid in this case of analysis or the judicious control of evidence that must be demanded of historical reconstruction.

If Martin and Johnson are suspect because they are undoubtedly partisans, Gann and Henriksen's effort suffers particularly from a noticeable lack of understanding of and sympathy for the guerrillas. This is not a political, but a methodological, criticism. Of the six chapters in their slim book, only two address the subject suggested by the title: the war. The first three follow a furrow already plowed by Gann, summarizing Rhodesia's colonial past with feeling and regard for the striking contributions of a smallish outpost of Europe in "darkest Africa." The whites "dwelled in lonely farms or in small townships along the railway lines" and became "used to the bush, and accordingly the men made excellent infantry." (p. 13.) They mined gold and other minerals, grew tobacco and corn, eventually built big cities, and (depending upon one's point of view) coerced or enticed Africans to provide the necessary labor. (Martin and Johnson show how cheaply that labor was obtained.) Yet, Gann and Henriksen say little about the settlers' political resourcefulness or their ability over the decades to gain virtual autonomy from Britain and to ignore the liberalizing tendencies of British colonial policy during the 1930s and 1940s.

Gann and Henriksen reject the notion that the white settlers of Rhodesia were Philistines: "Many an outlying farm could boast of an excellent library." (p. 27.) In the early 1960s, however, when the strength of African nationalism was gathering force and there was a hardening of attitudes among local whites, the leaders of Rhodesia (Ian Smith, for one) were drawn from a group of men "with a sound education but no understanding, or even knowledge, of the values of the metropolitan intelligentsia." They were "inner-directed, pragmatic, devoid of any cultural guilt feelings, without much taste for abstract speculation or exuberant symbolism." (p. 28.) These people were tough, capable of economic and technological initiative, and generally able to outwit Britain and the international community. It was this group (about whom Gann and Henriksen write admiringly, Martin and Johnson scathingly and with contempt) that unilaterally took their independence from Britain in 1965, defied sanctions (with much greater ease than was supposed possible at the time), developed a surprisingly resilient military machine, and, Canute-like, refused to let the tide of African nationalism overrun Rhodesia until 1980.

We need to know how it was done. Gann and Henriksen say little that is not superficial. Their chapter "The White Counterrevolution" consists largely of a few character sketches, a few paragraphs about the organization of the police and the army, and only some five paragraphs

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on the entire, enormously formative, experience with the economy of sanctions. About the armed forces we learn simply that they "did not have to contend seriously with problems of indiscipline, corruption, or the use of hallucinogens. In this respect the army, the administration, and the police mirrored the values of a white provincial society where there was a high degree of cohesion ... where men would get drunk rather than drugged." (p. 31.) Or, "Sanctions forced Rhodesian merchants to find recourse in all manner of subterfuge; costs rose, as middlemen garnered profits. The sanction-busters improved their techniques, learned how to avoid the crowd of crooks that was attempting to prey on the country just after UDI [Unilateral Declaration of Independence], and by 1969 Rhodesia just managed to achieve a surplus in its balance of payments." (p. 35.) And so on.

This lack of sophistication about matters as serious and important as the strategic base of the Rhodesian Front, sanctions-evading, and Rhodesia's crucial relationships with Portugal and South Africa during these hard years extends to the parallel rise of an African nationalism that was, in time, to erode the whites' power base and, after considerable loss of life and economic attrition, to oust Smith's government. Except to admit that Africans were not as "happy" as Ian Smith was wont to declare, Gann and Henriksen say little about why it was that Africans turned to nationalism—first in the 1950s and again, with more and more bitterness and determination, in the 1960s. They dismiss the crucial split between Rhodesia's main African political groups as being originally over personalities and tactics, and then, later, over "assumed" ethnic and ideological differences. They hardly hint at the structural differences between the two groups, the very deep ethnic cleavages (Martin and Johnson also underplay this factor), and the generational and class distinctions. A central element, too, was a fundamental strategic disagreement. The younger, educated, more modern followers of Nkomo were doubtless upset by his personality. But they also understood how his attempt to overcome white power in the early 1960s was flawed. The running battle between the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) was largely a dispute over how, and with whose support, the whites were to be defeated. They also fought over who was to control the eventual polity.

How did ZANU and ZAPU successfully elicit and organize African support internally? How did they (the former with greater success) organize a guerrilla fighting force and sustain a seven-year war? How did they overcome determined whites and an efficient defensive apparatus? How did they muster international support? How did they fight? Why did the African victory take so long? Alternatively, why did victory come about at all?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Although Gann and Henriksen do not seriously attempt to develop full answers to these and other obvious questions, Martin and Johnson are, properly, preoccupied by them, excluding, however, much that might also be relevant. Gann and Henriksen minimize atrocities perpetrated by whites; Martin and Johnson detail them and say little about those that may have been committed by guerrillas. Gann and Henriksen, perhaps meaning to imply that the whites lost the war because they were insufficiently coercive, inform their readers that Rhodesia's prison camps were less oppressive than Dachau or Belsen: "There was no starvation." (p. 45.) Martin and Johnson implicitly counter the intent behind such assertions with their account of the massacre at the Nyadzonia camp in Mozambique. (p. 242.) Gann and Henriksen complain that the Rhodesians resettled villagers (usually by force) but failed to use the relocated areas as "cornerstones of a counterrevolution to win over rural support." (p. 75.) Government troops faced the almost impossible task of "sealing off huge borders over difficult terrain." (p. 78.) Security forces failed to prevent the guerrillas from moving freely between countryside and town; their pre-emptive strikes into Mozambique and Zambia hampered, curtailed, but did not eliminate the guerrilla threat. The guerrillas, say Gann and Henriksen, took advantage of the Rhodesian government's overconfidence and, others might wish to add, its arrogance toward the ability of Africans to win a war.

"I am sure that I do not have to inform you how easy it is to mislead these simple, gullible people who still believe in witchcraft and the throwing of bones." (Martin and Johnson, p. 74.) Thus Ian Smith explained away in 1973 the ability of the guerrillas to infiltrate Rhodesia, obtain food and shelter from local villages, and attack white farms without being apprehended. In truth, as Martin and Johnson show, the ZANU guerrillas deliberately transformed combat on a tiny scale into an all-out, devastating war—despite Smith's counterattacks; debilitating, internecine conflict among ZANU factions and between ZANU and ZAPU; long-standing suspicion of ZANU by Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and even Nigeria; and a shortage of heavy weapons (which the Soviets refused to supply). If Martin and Johnson are to be believed, only Machel's insistence and the perseverance of a few ZANU leaders (interviews with whom Martin and Johnson report) prevented fulfillment of the white Rhodesian prophecies.

But even as the guerrillas bled Rhodesia white, and made the combat more and more costly for white Rhodesia, the determining actions were on the home front. The white minority could not indefinitely fight a war and run an economy. Rhodesia's reduction to an impoverished satrapy of South Africa was hardly desirable. Ultimately, the strategy of the ZANU-affiliated guerrillas proved sound: costs escalated, psychic returns became few, and the future for whites looked bleak, even if the African

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

attack could be forestalled. Western and South African pressure eventually compelled Smith to concentrate his mind on these and other realities. Smith's tactical retreat led to the decisive and, from his point of view, fatal maneuver to stave off defeat by creating a black client clone. Superficially, the tactic was sound. Who could complain about an elected black government? Who would deny the legitimacy of Bishop Abel Muzorewa's government, even if Smith and company continued to hold firmly to most of the real levers of power?

Alas for Muzorewa, many could; and clientage came too late in Rhodesia's day. The war had by 1979 become unwinnable. The African masses appraised Muzorewa's status cynically. World order was not less threatened by Smith's transfer to Muzorewa, and, critically, Muzorewa was unable (by Smith's definition) to assert himself as a credible alternative to his patron. The only thing that might have sustained Muzorewa's regime was a vigorous avowal of support for the guerrillas, and a public aligning of the transition regime with the near prospect of full majority rule.

About this period of transition neither Gann and Henriksen nor Martin and Johnson say much that is instructive. They do little to illuminate how Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher intervened so constructively to end the negotiating impasse. Lord Carrington is credited with a successful meeting at Lancaster House, but nothing is added to the newspaper accounts of the day. In their conclusion, Gann and Henriksen misleadingly imply that had South Africa been willing to go on subsidizing the war, had President Reagan's election occurred earlier, had the whites tried harder to win over the African masses, then the old Rhodesia might have been saved — if not for the status quo, at least for a non-Marxist future.

Central to the reasons why Gann and Henriksen have so little of significance to say about Rhodesia and Zimbabwe is that they ignore the ultimate lessons of legitimacy and illegitimacy. Smith's regime forfeited the possibility of black backing by its coercive tactics and fundamental racism. Its defensive actions contributed mightily to the guerrillas' credibility. Africans, in other words, might have remained at least ambivalent if it had seemed that the whites were capable of winning the struggle and if it had appeared that white rule would have transferred, even if slowly, a modicum of power to the majority. But this was hardly Smith's intention. Certainly it was not his intention when the government arranged for Muzorewa's accession and election. Gann and Henriksen find it hard to appreciate how Mugabe's overwhelming victory in 1980 was not only predictable but also, from an African point of view, the only fully legitimate response to the fifteen years of politicization that began in 1965. Without Smith, Mugabe — or at least the forces that Mugabe leads and represents — might not have triumphed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This is not an apologia for historical determinism. On the contrary, at any time in the 1960s and early 1970s, white Rhodesians could have orchestrated events that, personalities aside, almost certainly would have been more favorable to themselves than the actual outcome, at least in the short and medium terms. The long-term result (which now appears very promising) might, however, have proved identical. Cynically, Smith and company sacrificed white and black lives for a few difficult and exciting years. Nothing more. South Africa was not prepared to be dragged down by a minor outpost; for it, the main battle was too important. World order could not be sacrificed for so little. Nor could the commonwealth. Nor, ultimately, could legitimacy be denied.

Are there parallels with South Africa? For Gann and Henriksen the answer is no. South Africa is too densely settled by whites; a bush war would be impossible. South Africa is too rich and industrially successful, too important as an exporter of minerals, too much a military power, and too much the center of a putative southern African economic constellation.

Gann and Henriksen apparently think that any guerrilla assault on South Africa will be undermined because the surrounding black states too much need South Africa—its airfields, harbors, "know how," and economic influence. That the black states will draw back, however, is debatable. Gann and Henriksen also believe that because South Africa "commands" the route around the Cape of Good Hope it has "considerable leverage" in international affairs. But that supposition is both unproven and probably erroneous. So, no matter how true it may be that "strikes, riots, demonstrations, and industrial sabotage" are "weapons of limited utility" (p. 127), the lessons of Zimbabwe will require careful study by South Africans. Those lessons are fundamental:

(1) There is a time for negotiation and a time when negotiation is too late.

(2) Africans cannot easily be dissuaded from seeking the franchise; they see how effectively whites use it.

(3) Military might is an answer to overwhelming numbers only so long as the masses harbor doubts about who will ultimately win.

(4) Stooges and clients serve only short-term and dubious purposes; they cannot achieve anything more than local legitimacy.

(5) World order demands the absence of conflict, not necessarily the triumph that conforms to ideological preference.

(6) Victory in guerrilla warfare goes to the side that can best absorb the monetary and psychological costs of the protracted struggle.

(7) The legitimacy of a mass-supported revolution is difficult to erode. Clever propaganda fails. Coercion or economic growth succeeds no better. Africans know who or what is or is not legitimate.

As successful as Martin and Johnson are in laying out the details of the Rhodesian war, it is a signal deficiency that they nowhere

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

try to explain why these propositions prevailed. They nowhere tease out the lessons of Zimbabwe for southern Africa or the rest of Africa. They nowhere show how the eventual outcome was the result as much of chance as of design. Their book, in fact, is held together as a narrative mostly by chronology, not by any profundity of analysis. Mugabe, the architect of today's Zimbabwe, is barely mentioned; nor are more than a handful of the members of today's central committee. Still, whoever writes the definitive study of the struggle for Zimbabwe will use Martin and Johnson as a starting point. When it comes to constructing an argument for the essential contribution of guerrilla war to the quality of government and society in the new Zimbabwe, however, he or she will need to plunge deeper behind the lines and range more broadly in home affairs.

SOVIET DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA

The USSR and Africa: Foreign Policy Under Khrushchev. By Dan C. Heldman. New York: Praeger, 1981. 187 pp. $21.95.

Afrocommunism. By David and Marina Ottaway. New York: Africana, 1981. 237 pp. $24.50 ($12.50, paper).

CRAWFORD YOUNG
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN–MADISON

"There has been no change in Soviet policy in Africa since the 1950s," Anatoly Gromyko, director of the Africa Institute of the USSR, told a group of Western political scientists in August 1979. "Only opportunities have changed." Indeed, history—if viewed through appropriate lenses—can provide some support for this startling assertion.

There have been two periods when unexpected patterns of events did provide sudden new openings for Soviet diplomacy in Africa. The first of these, which largely coincided with the turbulent reign of Nikita Khrushchev, came with the accelerating decolonization of the late 1950s. Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali became independent under leaders with radical ideological projects. The nationalist revolution under Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt lurched leftward, partly provoked by a series of maladroit Western initiatives (such as Dulles's cancellation of the Aswan Dam offer and the Anglo-French-Israeli Suez invasion). The precarious Belgian formula for power transfer in Zaire (Congo) dissolved in disorder.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The second era of opportunity opened in 1974, triggered by two unrelated and unanticipated events: the collapse of the authoritarian *Estado Novo* in Portugal, with the corollary demise of the lusotropical world empire; and the creeping military coup in Ethiopia, which transformed power configurations in the Horn of Africa. The occasion was rendered the more auspicious by a coincident nadir in U.S.-African relations, product of years of neglect, and the Nixon-Kissinger "tilt" toward the white bastions of southern Africa. New vistas thus appeared for Soviet policymakers in the two most attractive strategic zones: southern and northeastern Africa.

Indeed, Soviet diplomacy did respond to the opportunities. With the rigidity of Stalinism loosened, a phase of active engagement gathered momentum from 1955 on. The Czech arms deal with Egypt in 1955 and the ensuing Soviet pledge to construct the Aswan Dam were the opening salvos. The epic conflict of wills between the imperious President Charles de Gaulle and the mercurial Sékou Touré of Guinea brought rupture with France in fall 1958; the *marxisant* nationalism of Toure sweetened Soviet opportunity with a taste of ideological fellowship. When Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana veered to the left in 1961, and Mali and Algeria entered the radical fold, the Soviets committed substantial diplomatic and political resources to the support of these experiments. While the Aswan venture remained the major economic undertaking, significant aid was supplied to public-sector projects in Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. From 1962 to 1966, Soviet Ambassador Georgi Rodionov was the most influential diplomat in Accra.[1] By the early 1960s, the Egyptian relationship had blossomed into a multifaceted pattern of cooperation, with a growing military dimension. The 1960 political breakdown in Zaire seemed to offer a momentary opening; in late August the Soviets began to supply some military equipment to the embattled Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, though this tentative and half-hearted gesture was quickly thwarted by the American-backed ouster of Lumumba in early September 1960.

Response to opportunity percolated into the ideological realm as well, with the elaboration of the "national democracy" theory. This doctrine, which was reinforced by the remarkable transformations in Cuba, argued the possibility of a noncapitalist pathway to socialist development in Third World countries. The social void created by the absence of a proletarian class could be filled by "revolutionary democrats," whose petty bourgeois antecedents could be transcended by their lack of ties to capitalism. With resolute support from the increasingly powerful camp of

[1] W. Scott Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 46-48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

socialism, the preconditions for socialist construction could be created without recourse to capitalism.[2]

By the mid 1960s, the first visions of Africa as a continent of opportunity were fading. The Zaire venture had failed, revealing in the process the sharp limitations of Soviet military capability to project its power into distant theaters. "Revolutionary democrats" such as Ben Bella in Algeria, Nkrumah, and Modibo Keita of Mali had been effortlessly swept aside by military coups in 1965, 1966, and 1968, respectively, raising troubling questions about the viability of "national democracies." The poor performance of the public sector, including the Soviet projects, reinforced doubts about the noncapitalist pathway.

The result was a decade of reduced Soviet activity, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. The chief exception was the robust support provided to the Nigerian federal government in the 1967-1970 civil war, during which Western response was ambivalent. Capitalist Nigeria was not by any stretch of the imagination a national democracy; well-calculated Soviet state interests best explain the decision to become a major arms supplier and diplomatic patron of the Nigerian struggle to suppress the Biafran secession.[3]

The second era of opportunity opened with the Portuguese collapse and the fall of imperial Ethiopia. The dramatic increase in the visibility of Soviet diplomacy in Africa was above all a product of the muscular involvement in Angola in 1975-1976, and in Ethiopia from 1977. The failure of a coalition formula for power sharing in Angola by the three main liberation movements was evident by early 1975; Soviets and Americans moved toward equipping their favored movements for the looming civil war. When the conflict reached its paroxysm in late 1975, with South African and Zairian troops directly engaged, the Soviet Union had supplied in quick order more than $300 million in military equipment and had provided the logistical support for the decisive intervention of its Cuban allies.

It is true that the superior political and military effectiveness of the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA), played a large part. But there can be no doubt that the Soviet-Cuban backing was crucial to the MPLA triumph. Further, the intervention had been largely legitimated in African eyes by the direct involvement of South African military forces on the other side, as well as the ill-conceived U.S. diplomatic and

[2] Careful treatments of this theme may be found in Robert Legvold, *Soviet Policy in West Africa* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970); Christopher Stevens, *The Soviet Union and Black Africa* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1976); Roger E. Kanet, ed., *The Soviet Union and the Developing Countries* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).

[3] Oye Ogunbadejo, "Ideology and Pragmatism: The Soviet Role in Nigeria, 1960-1977," ORBIS, Winter 1978, pp. 803-830; John Stremlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

intelligence operations. A distinctly new capability for global projection of power had been demonstrated, one that had been so visibly lacking in the 1960 Zaire crisis. From a Soviet perspective, this was indeed a spectacular triumph; the diplomatic costs were higher for the adversaries (the United States, South Africa, and Zaire), while the political and military victory seemed nearly complete.[4]

In Ethiopia, the gradual radicalization of a revolution that begn over corporate grievances in the military garrisons nurtured a more favorable ideological climate for the Soviets and loosened Ethiopian bonds to the United States that under the *ancien régime* were close and comprehensive. A truly revolutionary land reform in March 1975 and an escalating intensity in ideological discourse—culminating in a formal declaration for Marxism-Leninism in 1976—profoundly altered the political atmosphere in Addis Ababa. At the same time, a bitter power struggle within the new elite, and the inevitable dislocations produced by the overturning of rural social hierarchies, provided an historic opportunity for regional and ethnolinguistic dissidents on the periphery of the Amharic-dominated state to lunge for separation. When the Somali insurgents in the Ogaden were joined by regular units of the Somali army, ideological predisposition fused with desperate necessity. Addis Ababa's long-standing military connection with Washington was severed; in remarkably short order, Moscow supplied more than one billion dollars' worth of military equipment to Ethiopia, along with 1,200 advisers and 16,000 Cuban troops. These contributions indisputably altered the course of history; without them, Ethiopia surely would have lost the Ogaden to Somalia, and Eritrean independence would have been consolidated. Further fragmentation of the empire might well have followed.

While this Soviet backing did not bring about the Bulgarianization of Ethiopia, it did provide a valuable diplomatic base for the Soviets proximate to the Middle Eastern oil fields. From the Soviet perspective, it also eliminated what had been seen as a "bastion of imperialism." The costs of seizing this opportunity, however, were higher than in Angola. The Soviets had to abandon a political-military relationship with Somalia, one that had been patiently nurtured from the early 1960s and had been sustained from 1965 to 1974, years of relatively passive Soviet diplomacy in Africa. Further, African opinion about the Soviet-Cuban military involvement was less favorable than that concerning Angola. Even though

[4] The inability to consolidate this triumph by elimination of one rival guerrilla movement, the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA), somewhat dulled its luster over time. On the Angolan crisis, see, especially, John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969, 1978); John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978); Charles K. Ebinger, "External Intervention in Internal War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan Civil War," ORBIS, Fall 1976, pp. 667-700; Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union, China, and the West in Southern Africa," Foreign Affairs, July 1976, pp. 745-762; Nathaniel Davis, "The Angolan Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1978, pp. 109-124.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Somali border crossing was a clear transgression of African continental mores (which accorded unchallengeable sanctity to existing state borders), and the intervention had been duly requested by an incumbent regime whose international legitimacy was unquestioned, its magnitude was nonetheless jarring.

If we now return to the lapidary explication of Soviet African policy by Gromyko, we may well agree that changing perceptions of opportunity have been one critical influence on Soviet policy. At one level of understanding, the surges of Soviet diplomatic activism in Africa do coincide with sudden and far-reaching African political changes that owed nothing to Soviet stimulus. In this sense, both "moments of enthusiasm" in Soviet African diplomacy were reactions to uniquely favorable circumstances, rather than products of purposive reformulations of Soviet foreign policy objectives.

Nevertheless, the matter cannot simply rest there. The texture of Soviet action in the second phase was qualitatively different from the first. The military dimension was far more important; conversely, economic aid offered to those states asserting a common Marxist-Leninist ideological commitment was astonishingly small. The Soviet perspective emphasized consolidation of what might be termed the "Leninist core" of those states with ideological affinities: a vanguard party, a reliable internal security apparatus, agitprop mechanisms.[5] One can easily discern a half-dozen factors that differentiate the second phase of activism from the first.

First, Soviet action could be undertaken in the second phase in coordination with two invaluable junior partners, East Germany and Cuba.[6] While COMECON states such as Czechoslovakia had played some supporting role in the first phase, they were very subsidiary. The East Germans and Cubans, however, later supplied skills and capabilities the Soviets alone did not possess. The East Germans specialized in the security area; in this field, they had ample reservoirs of skilled personnel with language competency in English and French. The Cubans supplied above all combat troops, who were far more acceptable politically than Soviet units would have been. Each had their own reasons, independent of pure subservience to Soviet interests, for performing these services. The East Germans, whose African interest gathered momentum from the early 1970s, sought full international recognition. In addition, East Germany had particular incentive to demonstrate its value as a loyal, reliable, and

[5] This concept is well analyzed by Kenneth Jowitt, "Scientific Socialist Regimes in Africa: Political Differentiation, Avoidance, and Unawareness," in Carl G. Rosberg and Thomas M. Callaghy, eds., *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment* (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1979), pp. 133-173.

[6] On the East German side, see Melvin Croan, "East Germany and Africa," in David Albright and Jiri Valenta, eds., *The Communist States and Africa* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, forthcoming); for the best treatment on Cuba, see Jorge I. Dominguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1978, pp. 83-108.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

competent member of the "camp of socialism"; just under the surface lingered the haunting fear that at some point German unification might be placed on the European bargaining table by Moscow as part of some transaction to neutralize Germany, with the East German regime sacrificed for broader Soviet strategic interests.

The Cubans aspired to a leading role within a radical anti-imperial Third World constellation of states. Until the political deterioration in Central America of the late 1970s, Latin America had seemed foreclosed to Cuban diplomacy. The cultural mystique of Afro-Cuban relationships and the political-ideological fluidity in Africa offered a creative scope for action. Both in language and temperament, Cuban cadres easily achieved a camaraderie with African radicals and revolutionaries that Soviet personnel rarely attained. Cuban interests and perceptions diverged more from those of the Soviet Union than was the case for the East Germans; nonetheless, among all three groups there was enough unity of aim and purpose to permit concerted action. Soviet logistical and economic support was indispensable to Cuban deployment in Africa; Cuban engagement enormously enlarged the range of alternatives open to Soviet diplomacy.

Second, by the late 1970s the Soviet Union was a global power in military reality as well as in diplomatic aspiration. The scale, speed, and efficiency of the massive deployments of men and materiel in Angola and Ethiopia were dramatic confirmation of this. These capabilities fundamentally altered the strategic calculus; what was impossible in Zaire in 1960 was accomplished without undue exertion in Angola in 1975.

Third, in the second phase of activism Soviet diplomacy was far more explicitly preoccupied with countering Chinese action in Africa, as well as weakening Western positions. While the Sino-Soviet split had become publicly visible during the first phase, Chinese involvement in Africa was still limited. By the second phase, Chinese economic aid to Africa had substantially exceeded that of the Soviets, and Peking had developed close linkages with various liberation movements. Legum persuasively argues that the Soviet decision for large-scale intervention in the Angolan civil war was motivated not only by a sense of opportunity (and fear that, absent their involvement, movements beholden to Western powers would triumph militarily), but also by the substantial military assistance the Chinese had provided to the *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (FNLA), which in 1974 had the largest and best-equipped guerrilla army.[7]

Fourth, the nature of ideological discourse in Africa had

[7] See Legum, "The Soviet Union, China, and the West in Southern Africa."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

changed. In the first phase, regimes claiming to adhere to socialism were insisting on its African specificity. Even while endorsing the "noncapitalist" pathway of the "national democracies," Soviet commentators could only lament the eclecticism of the ideological perspectives of the "revolutionary democrats." Some, especially Sékou Touré, used lexical expressions of Marxist derivation. Most of these regimes filled influential positions with advisers and intellectuals of more rigorously scientific socialist orientation. But the socialism of the first wave was predominantly heterodox.

Beginning in 1969, with Congo-Brazzaville, a series of regimes proclaimed "Marxism-Leninism" to be state doctrine. Somalia followed in 1970, Benin and Madagascar in 1975, and Ethiopia in 1976. In all of these cases, the ideological declaration was made some time after a military ruler not previously known as a "scientific socialist" had seized power. Out of the debris of the Portuguese empire, three more self-avowed Marxist-Leninist states appeared: Angola, Mozambique, and Saõ Tomé and Principe. In each case, the liberation movements made their doctrinal declarations only after independence.

Soviet analysts never took these self-declarations at face value. The "national democracy" theory was exhumed and again applied to these states; often, now, the term "socialist orientation" was employed as a descriptor—including not only countries formally espousing Marxism-Leninism, but also other states such as Tanzania and Libya. But the transitional nature of such regimes was stressed. They were seen as only preparing the ground for eventual construction of socialism; "it is impossible," wrote one Soviet scholar, "to build a socialist society in countries with age-old backwardness in the shortest period of time."[8]

Fifth, major changes had occurred in the nature of the world communist movement. Until the 1950s, adoption of Marxism-Leninism inescapably implied a Stalinist model of political and economic development. However indigenous the roots of Yugoslav, Chinese, and Vietnamese communism, all three began their postrevolutionary life by replicating the Soviet experience (even if the first two were later to diverge sharply). Since that time, there has been a progressive erosion of the premise that the Soviet model is an obligatory source of policy inspiration. If one examines the actual policy inferences deduced from Marxism-Leninism as regime doctrine by the Afro-Marxist states of the 1970s, they prove remarkably diverse. A keen Soviet appreciation of the heterodoxy of Afro-Marxism is evident in the clear distinction Soviet analysts draw between the COMECON members and the Afro-Marxists. Regime

[8] Nikolai Kosukhin, "Revolutionary Democracy: Its Ideology and Politics," *Social Sciences*, 4 (1979), p. 51.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Marxism-Leninism, remarks Jowitt, has become a "soft option" rather than a comprehensive policy statement.[9]

Finally, Soviet policy in the first phase had rested upon a very narrow informational base. By the second phase, Moscow had a far more realistic appreciation of the African political environment. The weaknesses of African states were more clearly recognized, and the shortcomings of a hypertrophic and poorly managed public sector as a basis for socialist construction were better understood. The limited potential for large-scale Soviet economic aid programs or trade expansion had become clearer; in this setting one may understand the increasing concentration on military and political relationships. Further, the ultimate evanescence of power was appreciated. Kosukhin notes the possibility of "a political degeneration of revolutionary democrats who have actually become bourgeois nationalists."[10] An East German commentary adds a further gloss, in observing that "because of the weaker social base, the inconsistencies . . . in the thinking and behavior of predominantly petty bourgeois-peasant forces of leadership, the lack of experience and cadres, and not least of all on account of the strong economic positions and the ideological influence over which imperialism continues to dispose in these countries, the development of the countries with a socialist orientation is by no means irreversible. Changes—conceivably of a precipitous nature—are possible."[11]

The two books under consideration address respectively the first (Heldman) and second (the Ottaways) phases of active Soviet diplomacy in Africa. Their focus is quite different. Heldman is primarily concerned with Soviet foreign policy, viewing Africa simply as a regional case study. The Ottaways take the African domestic political scene as their point of departure, incorporating within their analysis of African socialism the Soviet external dimension. The two books also vary in their value; the Heldman work is disappointingly thin gruel, while the Ottaways offer rich fare both to Africanists and students of Soviet policy.

Heldman fails to take us beyond what we already knew about the Khrushchev first-phase activism from earlier work by Robert Legvold, Christopher Stevens, Roger Kanet, Alvin Rubinstein,[12] and others. He misses the one clear opening left to him by previous contributions: Soviet relations with the Maghreb. His sense of the African context is inadequate; the bibliography shows no trace of the major works dealing with

[9] Jowitt, "Scientific Socialist Regimes in Africa," pp. 144-146.

[10] Kosukhin, "Revolutionary Democracy," pp. 53-54.

[11] Freidel Trappen and Ulbricht Weishauft, "Aktuelle Fragen des Kamfes um Nationale und Social Befrieng in Subsaharischen Afrika," *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, February 1974, p. 30. I am indebted to Melvin Croan for drawing my attention to this quotation.

[12] See Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Red Star on the Nile* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

African states important to his analysis (for example, the "national democracies" of the first phase).

The four key determinants of Soviet policy are said by Heldman to be ideology, institutions, events, and personality; while one could hardly dispute the importance of each of these, they are so vague and general that they do not offer much conceptual purchase upon the subject. The "empirical" segment of the volume consists of sundry correlational analyses of measures of UN voting, diversity of Soviet-African relationships, and activity level of "communist-oriented domestic groups." While one may admire the ingenuity of the statistical manipulations, the residue of analytical gold extracted by this mathematical metallurgy is very small.

The Ottaways' study is wholly different. They offer a wide-ranging, finely crafted, richly insightful comparative study of what the authors choose to call "Afrocommunism." This scholar-journalist team has nearly two decades of African experience, including prolonged residence in Algeria, Ethiopia, and Zambia. Marina Ottaway, a sociologist, has taught at the universities of Ethiopia and Zambia. David Ottaway, a correspondent for the *Washington Post,* is considered by many to be the ablest American reporter in Africa.

The problematic for the Ottaway study is not Soviet policy per se, but the Marxist-Leninist state in Africa. To understand the genesis of this second wave of socialist states, they step back to examine the experience of four of the most visible first-wave socialist experiments: Zambia, Tanzania, Guinea, and Algeria. While they perhaps strain too hard to encapsulate these polities into a single striking metaphor (Zambian socialism as an "upper class welfare state," Tanzanian as "development without growth," Guinean as "politics in command," and Algerian as "economics in command"), the four vignettes do capture inner essences of the various experiences. The main body of the work is devoted to an examination of what the Ottaways believe to be the three most exemplary cases of "Afrocommunism": Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. Here the internal dynamic and the external influences are woven together with a fine hand. The portraits that emerge are judicious and balanced, and illuminate not only the lessons of this new pathway, but also changing patterns of Soviet policy in Africa.

In their concluding section, the authors turn explicitly to the international dimension and thoroughly explore what the implications of an Afro-Marxist regime commitment are for external linkages. They argue persuasively that the ideological choice is far more than sheer rhetoric. At the same time, they stress that nationalism and radical anti-imperial Third World solidarity are crucial components of the Afro-Marxist perspective;

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

these states are clearly more autonomous than the Mongolias, North Koreas, Vietnams, or even the Cubas.

The Ottaways deliberately choose the term "Afrocommunism" (which no "Afrocommunist" would employ) to underscore their conviction that ideological self-ascription must be considered as politically meaningful. This same logic governed the authors' choice of the three states that have made the most earnest effort to incorporate an ideological project into policy choices, and their omission of other, more heterodox, specimens such as Congo, Benin, Madagascar, or Somalia. One may wonder nonetheless whether the term is felicitous; even with the "Afro" prefix, "communism" may carry too many connotations that are not reflected in actual practice and thus understate the originality of these experiences.

While several years have now transpired since the last declaration for Marxism-Leninism in Africa, the Ottaways are convinced that others will follow in this path. They are probably right; disappointing economic performance in many countries, serious decay of the state in a few (Zaire, Uganda, Ghana, Chad), and the perceived indifference or even hostility of the Reagan administration to African aspirations may create the preconditions for a third wave of Soviet activism and ideological conversion. Those who wish to be prepared for a third era of Soviet opportunity, if it does come, could do no better than to study carefully the Ottaways' volume for its meticulous synthesis of the lessons of the second.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOCIAL ORDER AND THE GENERAL THEORY OF STRATEGY

Alexander Atkinson
London School of Economics

Is there a place left in international politics for the real use of violence as an instrument of policy in the nuclear age? Dr. Atkinson attempts to answer this question with new considerations in the presentation of a general theory of strategy. He argues that the classical theory of strategy, so influential for the last century and the better half of this century, was built on a mainly hidden structure of reasoning that still infests theory today. The socially rooted lessons that insurgent warfare can inform, as best exemplified by the Chinese Civil War, reveal this hidden structure of which Clausewitz is the most eloquent example. The author outlines for observers and students of international politics the direction new forms of politically motivated violence are headed in the nuclear age.

January, $17.50 original paperback.

ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL
9 Park Street, Boston, MA 02108

New Foreign Policy Study from Hoover Institution Press

The United States and the Republic of Korea
Background for Policy
by **Claude A. Buss**

If hostilities between North Korea and South Korea again erupt, the chances are that under present circumstances, the Russians on one side and the Americans on the other would be involved immediately in another war on the mainland of Asia. This study answers the imperative to search out the roots of potential conflict by considering what the United States can and cannot do in seeking to protect its interests, and explores the international ramifications of the U.S.–ROK relationship.

$10.95 200 pages ISBN: 0-8179-7542-X January 1982

Hoover Institution Press • Dept. 8104
Stanford University • Stanford, CA 94305

MasterCard and VISA orders accepted by telephone. inside California:
New toll-free number for orders: 1-800-227-1991 (415) 497-3373

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Today's good turn.



A badge used to be your reward for a Good Turn. Now, satisfaction is—knowing that you're helping Scouting shape young lives.

The National Boy Scouts Alumni family is helping do just that. You can enroll today.

By joining, you will encourage young people to follow high ideals—the ideals Scouting has always taught.

Now that's a Good Turn.

Your one-year, $10 membership entitles you to the *Alumni Bulletin*, the Annual Report, a membership card, an attractive certificate suitable for framing, and a bronze-look Scouting lapel pin.

Your membership fee is tax deductible.

Call today.
1-800-331-1750, Operator 700
Free pin with enrollment.
In Oklahoma call 1-800-722-3600

National Boy Scouts Alumni • 1325 Walnut Hill Lane • Irving, Texas 75062-1296

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AUTHORS!

The Foreign Policy Research Institute is pleased to announce two new series in its publications program—the **Philadelphia Policy Papers** and, published by Praeger in cooperation with FPRI, **Foreign Policy Issues**. The Editors are committed to publishing work of the highest quality in the broad area of international affairs, though special emphasis will be given to policy-relevant scholarship. The Editors, moreover, will place a premium on prose that is clear, concise, and unmarred by jargon or obtrusive style.

Works in the Philadelphia Policy Papers series will generally be shorter than those in the Foreign Policy Issues book series, ranging from 75 to 150 pages of double-spaced manuscript, and will deal with more timely international developments and foreign policy issues. Manuscripts considered for the book series will run approximately 275 pages, or 74,000 words.

Submissions are welcome, but please do not send us the entire manuscript. Rather, send a précis, table of contents, and sample chapter to either Nils H. Wessell, Managing Editor, Orbis (Philadelphia Policy Papers) or Charles B. Purrenhage, Managing Editor, Book Series (Foreign Policy Issues) at the following address: **Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104.**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION

(Required by 39 U.S.C. 3685)

1. TITLE OF PUBLICATION	A. PUBLICATION NO.	2. DATE OF FILING
ORBIS	0 0 4 1 0 4 0	Oct. 1981
3. FREQUENCY OF ISSUE	**A. NO. OF ISSUES PUBLISHED ANNUALLY**	**B. ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION PRICE**
4 times per year (quarterly)	4	$15.00 & $25.00

4. COMPLETE MAILING ADDRESS OF KNOWN OFFICE OF PUBLICATION *(Street, City, County, State and ZIP Code) (Not printers)*

3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104

5. COMPLETE MAILING ADDRESS OF THE HEADQUARTERS OR GENERAL BUSINESS OFFICES OF THE PUBLISHERS *(Not printers)*

3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104

6. FULL NAMES AND COMPLETE MAILING ADDRESS OF PUBLISHER, EDITOR, AND MANAGING EDITOR *(This item MUST NOT be blank)*

PUBLISHER *(Name and Complete Mailing Address)*

Foreign Policy Research Institute
3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104

EDITOR *(Name and Complete Mailing Address)*

William R. Kintner, 3508 Market, St., Suite 350, Phila., PA 19104

MANAGING EDITOR *(Name and Complete Mailing Address)*

Nils H. Wessell, 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Phila., PA 19104

7. OWNER *(If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual must be given. If the publication is published by a nonprofit organization, its name and address must be stated.) (Item must be completed)*

FULL NAME	COMPLETE MAILING ADDRESS
ORBIS is owned and copyrighted	by the Foreign Policy Research
Institute, 3508 Market Street,	Suite 350, Phila., PA 19104

8. KNOWN BONDHOLDERS, MORTGAGEES, AND OTHER SECURITY HOLDERS OWNING OR HOLDING 1 PERCENT OR MORE OF TOTAL AMOUNT OF BONDS, MORTGAGES OR OTHER SECURITIES *(If there are none, so state)*

FULL NAME	COMPLETE MAILING ADDRESS
NONE	

9. FOR COMPLETION BY NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AUTHORIZED TO MAIL AT SPECIAL RATES *(Section 411.3, DMM only)*
The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for Federal income tax purposes *(Check one)*

☒ *(1) HAS NOT CHANGED DURING PRECEDING 12 MONTHS*

☐ *(2) HAS CHANGED DURING PRECEDING 12 MONTHS*

(If changed, publisher must submit explanation of change with this statement.)

10. EXTENT AND NATURE OF CIRCULATION	AVERAGE NO. COPIES EACH ISSUE DURING PRECEDING 12 MONTHS	ACTUAL NO. COPIES OF SINGLE ISSUE PUBLISHED NEAREST TO FILING DATE
A. TOTAL NO. COPIES *(Net Press Run)*	4133	4151
B. PAID CIRCULATION 1. SALES THROUGH DEALERS AND CARRIERS, STREET VENDORS AND COUNTER SALES	15	0
2. MAIL SUBSCRIPTION	2968	3078
C. TOTAL PAID CIRCULATION *(Sum of 10B1 and 10B2)*	2983	3078
D. FREE DISTRIBUTION BY MAIL, CARRIER OR OTHER MEANS SAMPLES, COMPLIMENTARY, AND OTHER FREE COPIES	150	146
E. TOTAL DISTRIBUTION *(Sum of C and D)*	3133	3224
F. COPIES NOT DISTRIBUTED 1. OFFICE USE, LEFT OVER, UNACCOUNTED, SPOILED AFTER PRINTING	995	927
2. RETURN FROM NEWS AGENTS	5	0
G. TOTAL *(Sum of E, F1 and 2 - should equal net press run shown in A)*	4133	4151

11. I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete

SIGNATURE AND TITLE OF EDITOR, PUBLISHER, BUSINESS MANAGER, OR OWNER

N. H. Wessell, Managing Editor

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS

A JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS

Index to Volume 25

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS
A Journal of World Affairs

VOLUME 25
NUMBER 1
SPRING 1981

Reflections on "Salvadorians, Sandinistas, and Superpowers" Adam M. Garfinkle 3

The Most Dangerous Decade: Historic Mission, Legitimacy, and Dynamics of the Soviet Empire in the 1980s Colin S. Gray 13

Choice and Consequence in Sino-American Relations Thomas W. Robinson 29

The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia: Interests, Goals, and Constraints Sheldon W. Simon 53

Japan's Security, Defense Responsibilities, and Capabilities Taketsugu Tsurutani 89

What the Saudis Really Want: A Primer for the Reagan Administration Bruce R. Kuniholm 107

The European Community in 1981: Pondering at the Crossroads Paula Scalingi 123

The United States and South Africa: Barriers to Communication John Chettle 145

Lessons from Aerospace: The Prospects for Rationalization in NATO Bernard Udis 165

The United Nations Secretariat Revisited Seymour Maxwell Finger and Nina Hanan 197

Issues in Soviet-American Relations: Conference Report Nils H. Wessell 209

Reader Feedback: Letters to the Editor 225

Review: Poland, the Permanent Crisis F. Stephen Larrabee 233

Selected Publications Received 247

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS
A Journal of World Affairs

VOLUME 25
NUMBER 2
SUMMER 1981

Reflections on the Quarter:

Toward a New Strategy of Independence — William R. Kintner — 279
Mitterrand's France — Lord Saint Brides — 281
Yugoslavia's Mounting Difficulties — Alvin Z. Rubinstein — 286

America in NATO: The Conventional Delusion — Alan Ned Sabrosky — 293

U.S. and Soviet Approaches to Military Strategy: Theory vs. Experience — Roman Kolkowicz — 307

Soviet Theater-Nuclear Forces: Implications for NATO Defense — Robert Kennedy — 331

American Seapower at Risk: Nuclear Weapons in Soviet Naval Planning — Gordon H. McCormick and Mark E. Miller — 351

Problems of Albanian Nationalism in Yugoslavia — Pedro Ramet — 369

The Fragmentation of Arab Politics: Inter-Arab Affairs Since the Afghanistan Invasion — Bruce Maddy-Weitzman — 389

Nigeria: Future Nuclear Power? — Robert D'A Henderson — 409

Reader Feedback: Letters to the Editor — 425

Overseas Research in Review:
International Relations Research in Spain — William T. Salisbury — 429

Review:
From Changing the Guard to Guarding the Change — Richard K. Betts — 433

Selected Publications Received — 447

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS

A Journal of World Affairs

VOLUME 25

NUMBER 3

FALL 1981

Changes in ORBIS and at the Foreign Policy Research Institute — William R. Kintner, Alan Ned Sabrosky — 485

Forum: Reagan's Foreign and Defense Policies

Off to a Fairly Good Start — Charles Burton Marshall — 487
Toward a Reagan Middle East Policy? — Robert G. Neumann — 491
Cold War II? A Cautionary Note — Alan Ned Sabrosky — 496
Theater-Nuclear Forces and NATO Security — Paul C. Warnke — 501
The Reagan Strategic Program and Foreign Policy — Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. — 505

Crisis, Pretentious Ideologies, and Superpower Behavior — E. Raymond Platig — 511

Oil, War, and Grand Strategy — David A. Deese — 525

U.S. Foreign Policy and the Soviet Energy Predicament — Arthur Jay Klinghoffer — 557

Nuclear Shadowboxing: Soviet Intervention in the Middle East — Francis Fukuyama — 579

Constraints on the USSR in Southwest Asia: A Military Analysis — Keith A. Dunn — 607

America and Europe in the Middle East: A New Coordination? — Adam M. Garfinkle — 631

The Soviet Global Threat and the West — Pierre M. Gallois — 649

POLISH REFORMER: **A Long Way to Go** — Pawel Spiewak — 663

Contrasting Perspectives:

CENTRAL AMERICA, CUBA, AND U.S.-SOVIET COMPETITION

The Strategy of Conflict and the Politics of Counterproductivity — Donald E. Schulz — 679

The USSR, Cuba, and the Crisis in Central America — Jiri Valenta — 715

Deterrence, Arms Control, and U.S. Strategic Doctrine — Keith B. Payne — 747

Will Technology Make Shelters Obsolete? — Carsten M. Haaland and Conrad V. Chester — 771

Reader Feedback: Letters to the Editor — 797

Overseas Research in Review: Strategic and International Affairs Research in France — David S. Yost — 801

A Note on ORBIS Reviews — Charles B. Purrenhage — 816

Review Essay: The Politics of Armed Demonstration — Gordon H. McCormick — 817

Selected Publications Received — 829

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS

A Journal of World Affairs

VOLUME 25

NUMBER 4

WINTER 1982

Editors' Note 852

Forum: U.S. Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa

The Pursuit of Coherence	Richard E. Bissell	853
On Safari – Again	Helen Kitchen	855
Nigeria and the United States	Ali Mazrui	858
The Dimensions of U.S. Policy Toward South Africa	Alan Pifer	864
Has Constructive Engagement Died?	John Seiler	867
A Rapprochement with Racism?	Stephen J. Solarz	873

Bridging the Black-White Gulf in Africa	Newell M. Stultz	881
African Flashpoints: Prospects for Armed International Conflict	Raymond W. Copson	903
Things Fall Apart?	Dennis Austin	925
Military Rule and Military Order in Africa	Henry S. Bienen	949
Ideology, Parties, and Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa	Michael Radu	967
Africa and Foreign Aid: Using Scarce Resources Wisely	Frederick W. Stokeld	993
U.S. Policy Toward Africa: At America's Service?	W. Scott Thompson	1011
Issues of African Diplomacy in the 1980s	I. William Zartman	1025

Review Essays

Winning the War for Zimbabwe	Robert I. Rotberg	1045
Soviet Diplomacy in Africa	Crawford Young	1053

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

ORBIS welcomes articles that examine problems in international relations. All correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, ORBIS, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104.

Manuscripts

☐ Authors should submit an original and two clear copies, accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope if return of the manuscript is desired.

☐ The entire manuscript (*including footnotes and tables*) should be typed double-spaced. Footnotes should be placed at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the page. Tables should be typed on separate sheets, and all internal rules should be omitted. Articles that do not follow this format will be returned for retyping.

☐ Care should be taken that footnotes contain complete bibliographic information. For the proper footnote form — and all matters of style — please consult the latest edition of *A Manual of Style* (University of Chicago Press).

☐ The title page should include only the article title, author's name, and a fifty-word biographical statement (positions held, area of specialization, publications, and research-in-progress).

Figures

☐ Illustrations should be submitted as glossy photographs. The ideal sizes are 4-⅜″×7″ (full-page) or 4-⅜″×3-⅜″ (half-page), but in no case should photos be larger than 8″×10″. Prints should not be stapled or clipped, and author's name, figure number, and top of figure should be marked *lightly* on the back.

☐ Legends should be typed double-spaced on a separate sheet.

☐ If an illustration has been published previously, the author must get permission to reproduce it.

☐ ORBIS will prepare maps and graphs for authors if they cannot provide camera-ready artwork, but some production costs will be passed on to the author.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Indexes. ORBIS is indexed by *Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences Index, Current Contents, Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences, ABC Pol Sci,* and *Combined Retrospective Index to Book Reviews in Scholarly Journals.* Abstracts of ORBIS articles appear regularly in *Historical Abstracts* and *America: History and Life,* both of which are publications of the American Bibliographical Center, as well as in *International Political Science Abstracts,* published in Paris by the International Political Science Association. ORBIS is abstracted and indexed in *United States Political Science Documents,* University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh.

Microfilm and Microfiche. ORBIS is available to subscribers on spacesaving microfilm and microfiche. As begun with Volume 7 (the Spring 1963–Winter 1964 issues) for microfilm, and Volume 1 (1957–1958) for microfiche, each volume of ORBIS is recorded separately and is obtainable at the end of the volume year. A complete backfile of microfilm, Volumes 1-6, is on one reel, priced at $24.00. Please address inquiries direct to distributors. *For microfilm:* University Microfilms International, P.O. Box 1346, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. *For microfiche:* KTO Microform, Route 100, Millwood, New York 10546.

Reprints and Back Issues. Back issues of ORBIS, Vols. 1-20, are available from Kraus Reprint Company, Route 100, Millwood, N.Y. 10546. Beginning with Vol. 21, back issues are available from the ORBIS Circulation Manager at $6.50 per copy. (Outside U.S.A., add $1.00 per copy.) Reprints of articles published in ORBIS, as long as they are available, are $1.00 each. (Bulk-order prices provided on request.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COMING UP IN ORBIS . . .

FORUM on Reagan's Middle East Policy:
LANDRUM BOLLING, ADAM GARFINKLE,
MICHAEL HUDSON, AMOS PERLMUTTER, DANIEL PIPES

WILLIAM GRIFFITH on the West German peace movement

MORTON HALPERIN on theater-nuclear forces and U.S. relations with West Germany

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN on the Sovietization of Afghanistan

LORD ST. BRIDES on French foreign policy under Mitterrand

IVAN VOLGYES on internal conflicts within the Warsaw Pact

(among others . . .)

PLUS a review of foreign affairs research in India

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED